A Subjective Group Dynamics Approach to Group Socialization Processes

Isabel Maria Rocha Pinto

PhD dissertation supervised by

Prof. Dr. José M. Marques

Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences

University of Porto

2006

To my son Samuel and to my father

"Your life is the most precious contributor

for the accomplishment of this work."

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Prof. Dr. José Marques for the supervision of my work. “Your scientific ethics values on experimental research and your conviction in the investigation of social phenomena were great contributors for my decision of being a social psychologist researcher.”

To Prof. Dr. Gabrielle Poeschl for giving me great opportunities for my professional career. “You helped me to develop determinant skills to conclude my work”.

To Prof. Dr. Marianne Lacomblez for providing me some important conditions to accomplish my work. “I cannot thank you enough”.

To Miguel Cameira and Rui Serôdio for sharing with me a long and frequently painful PhD course. “You are great colleagues.”

To Maria José Neves, Marta Santos, Raquel Barbosa, and Eugénio Levandeira for being great friends. “Thank you for the (inhuman) patience and support you provided me”.

To Helena for keeping me socially alive (although probably she does not think so), for sharing with me many important moments and for being the best friend I could ever have. “I will never forget what we lived together and what you did for me.”

To my parents and Quinha for all the love and care they gave Samuel and me. “I could not make this without you. I hope I have made you proud of me.”

To Samuel for “pulling me back to earth” every day, for being the best partner in life, for taking care of me when I really needed, and for helping me to be the mother he needs. “You are my life and I love you so much…”

Abstract

We ran four experiments inspired on an integrative approach between the subjective group dynamics model developed by Marques and colleagues (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) and the group socialization model proposed by Levine and colleagues (e.g. Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). In the first experiment, participants had to judge two target members (either from the participants' in-group or out-group), one that adopted a likeable and another that supported an unlikeable opinion. Furthermore, half of the participants believed that the likeable opinion consisted in a prescriptive group norm (these participants assumed a full member status), whereas the other half had no such information (these participants assumed a new member status). Full member participants engaged in a black sheep effect (e.g. Marques, 1990); namely, they upgraded the normative in-group member and derogated the deviant in-group member comparatively to similar out-group targets. Furthermore, they expressed commitment toward the violated norm. In turn, new member participants upgraded in-group targets as compared to out-group targets and showed more tolerance towards the unlikeable opinion.

In the other three experiments, participants had to judge two in-group or out-group members that descriptively had different status within the group (new member, full-member, marginal member or ex-member) and were prescriptively normative and deviant targets. Results showed that participants engaged in a black sheep effect strategy only when these members were described as full members. We also found that when judging deviant full-members of the in-group, the more participants perceived these targets as threatening to the in-group the more they derogated these targets. Moreover, whereas participants prefered hostile reactions to deal with deviant full-members of the in-group, they reacted consistently with socialization strategies to deal with deviant new members (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).

Résumé

On a réalisé quatre expérimentes inspirés à une approche intégratif du modèle de la Dynamique des Groupes Subjective (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) et le modèle de la socialisation groupale proposée par Levine et collègues (e.g. Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). Dans la première étude, les participants devraient juger deux membres-cible (de l'endogroupe ou de l'exogroupe par rapport au participant), un membre adoptant une opinion agréable et l'autre soutenant une opinion désagréable. En outre, la moitié des participants pensaient que l'opinion agréable faisait partie d'une norme prescriptive du groupe (ces participants a adopté un statut de membre nouveau), tandis que l'autre moitié n'avait pas cette information (ces participants a adopté un statut de membre de plein droit). Les membres de plein droit ont présenté l'effet brebis galeuse (e.g. Marques, 1990); nommément, ils ont surévalué le membre normatif de l'endogroupe et dérogé le membre déviant de l'endogroupe comparativement aux membres similaires de l'exogroupe. En plus, ils ont exprimé engagement á la norme violée. A son tour, les membres nouveaux ont surévalué cibles endogroupaux relativement aux cibles exogroupaux et ont présenté tolérance sur la opinion désagréable.

En trois autres expérimentes, les participants devraient juger deux membres endogroupaux et exogroupaux qui descriptivement avaient statuts différents dans le groupe (membre nouveau, membre de plein droit, membre marginal ou ex-membre) et étaient des cibles prescriptivement normatives et déviantes, respectivement. Les résultats ont montré que les participants ont usé la stratégie de l'effet brebis galeuse seulement quand ces membres étaient décrits comme membres de plein droit. On a aussi découvrait que, quand les participants jugeaient membres de plein droit déviants, le plus ils trouvaient ces cibles menaçantes pour l'endogroupe, le plus ils les dérogeaient. En outre, tandis que les participants réagissaient hostilement face aux déviants membres de plein droit de l'endogroupe, ils réagissaient avec des stratégies de socialisation face aux déviants nouveaux membres (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).

Resumo

Realizámos quatro estudos inspirados numa abordagem integrativa do modelo da dinâmica de grupos subjectiva desenvolvido por Marques e colegas (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez e Hogg, 2001) com o modelo de socialização grupal proposto por Levine e colegas (e.g. Moreland, Levine e Cini, 1993). No primeiro estudo, os participantes julgaram dois membros (do endogrupo ou do exogrupo), um que adoptava uma opinião desejável e outro que adoptava uma opinião indesejável. Metade dos participantes foi informada de que a opinião desejável correspondia a uma norma do grupo (estes participantes assumiram o estatuto de membros de pleno direito), enquanto que a outra metade não tinha acesso a essa informação (estes participantes assumiram o estatuto de membros noviços). As avaliações dos membros de pleno direito reflectiram um efeito da ovelha negra (e.g. Marques, 1990); nomeadamente, enalteceram o membro normativo do endogrupo e derrogaram o membro desviante do endogrupo, comparativamente com membros semelhantes do exogrupo. Para além disso, manifestaram o seu envolvimento em restabelecer o valor da norma violada. Por seu lado, os membros noviços avaliaram mais positivamente os membros do endogrupo do que do exogrupo e evidenciaram mais tolerância relativamente à opinião indesejável.

Nos outros três estudos, os participantes julgaram dois membros (do endogrupo ou do exogrupo) que descritivamente assumiam diferentes estatutos (membros noviços, de pleno direito, marginais ou ex-membros). Em termos prescritivos, um alvo era normativo e o outro desviante. Os participantes evidenciaram um efeito da ovelha negra apenas quando julgaram membros de pleno direito. Os resultados mostram ainda, que ao julgar membros desviantes de pleno direito do endogrupo, quanto mais os participantes os consideram como uma ameaça ao endogrupo, mais derrogam estes alvos. Para além disso, enquanto que os participantes preferiram utilizar reacções hostis relativamente aos membros desviantes de pleno direito do endogrupo, preferiram reacções consistentes com estratégias de socialização (para lidar com desviantes noviços Levine, Moreland e Hausmann, 2005).

INDEX

CHAPTER II

SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE GROUP SOCIALIZATION MODEL: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO REACTIONS TO DEVIANCE 61

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER VI

INDEX OF TABLES

INDEX OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

We begin this work by claiming that social deviance is a normal phenomenon. This claim may seem paradoxical from a common-sense perspective. However, this assumption is a well-established issue of agreement, among social scientists, ever since classical sociologist Émile Durkheim showed that deviance is not only the infraction of these groups' and societies' norms, but, more importantly, it is the very mechanism through which norms are created and reinforced (Durkheim, 1897, 1915; 1930/1998; cf. also Mead, 1918 and Marques, in preparation). A similar idea has been later recovered by traditional work in social psychology, with the small group dynamics approach (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968, for instance). However, this approach traditionally views deviance, more directly focused on deviance's disruptive potential, than as a source of group cohesiveness. In the present thesis, we attempt to articulate two models that have important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of reaction of normative individuals to deviance, in small face-to-face groups, and in large social categories: Levine and colleagues' *group socialization model* (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994) and Marques and colleagues' *subjective group dynamics model* (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

As Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg (2001) pointed out, social groups, and the large society, devote great amounts of energy to the control, in formal as well as in informal ways, of social deviance. The mentally-hill are taken care of so as to be "cured", delinquents are "re-socialized", sexual deviants are often object of scorn or even physical punishment, army defectors may be brought to trial and sentenced for treason, individuals who disagree with the consensual position of their group are

downgraded or even expelled from the group, and group members who adopt unlikeable opinions are the focus of hostile reactions on the part of other members (cf., for example, Archer, 1985; DeLamater, 1968; Duyckaerts, 1966; Erikson, 1964, 1966; Foucault, 1975; Levine, 1980; Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998).

However, regardless of how it is defined, as crime, or as pathology, or as dissidence, for example, deviance is present in all societies and groups. In addition, as Durkheim (1930/1998; Durkheim, 1897) has noticed, all societies report stable, or even increasing, rates of deviance across time. In fact, rather than being a menace to social cohesiveness, deviance may play a functional role in societies. For instance, it may help to clarify societies' and groups' boundaries and to reinforce their normative system (Erikson, 1966, 1964; Mead, 1918). Deviance also serves as an example to new members (Durkheim, 1915). It enables them to learn the important norms to respect.

Intra-Group and Inter-Group Aspects of Deviance

In this work, we argue that different conditions confer different meanings to deviant behaviour. For this particular purpose, we define deviant behaviour as the adoption of socially undesirable positions that run counter the norms that are generally adopted by a group or by the society, and that are viewed as prescriptions, or principles to which individuals "ought" to adhere (cf. Forsyth, 1990). We argue that such behaviour may have different implications in the eyes of normative individuals, depending on those who enact it and, more specifically, on their inter-group and intra-group statuses. That is, normative members of large social categories, as well as members of face-to-face groups may adopt a more or less prescriptive focus towards

deviants, depending on whether these deviants are construed as members of their group or as out-group members. Concomitantly, such prescriptive focus may depend on whether the deviants' status place them more to the centre or more to the periphery of their group. Thus, normative and deviant behaviour can be studied only in light of the group context in which it occurs, and the reactions evoked by normative and deviant group members will become meaningful only in light of their positions within the group.

Small Groups and Large Social Categories

The distinction between small, dynamic, interactive groups and large social categories has implications to the processes that are supposed to underlie the social and psychological structural properties of these groups. Face-to-face groups have been viewed as collections of individuals that are structured in terms of their direct interactions and interdependence, that ultimately lead to role differentiations (e.g. Shaw, 1976). However, even within such role differentiated structure, group members will attempt to establish uniformity of beliefs, as an important source of social validation of their view of relevant aspects of reality (Festinger, 1950; Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro & Mannetti, 2002; Levine, 1980). Group members thus view dissent as a potential jeopardy to the subjective validity of their beliefs. Group reactions to these kinds of situation include the use of inclusive or exclusive strategies (see Levine, 1980, for a review). Inclusive strategies consist in attempts to influence and pressure deviant members to conform to normative expectations (Festinger, 1950; Orcutt, 1973; Schachter, 1968). Such reactions are essentially related to socialization (e.g. Festinger,

1950; Levine, 1980; Levine & Moreland, 1994). Exclusive reactions (Orcutt, 1973) may lead to the expulsion of deviant members from the group, and are applied only when inclusive reactions are not effective (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison & Viki, 2005; Festinger, 1950; Israel, 1956).

In turn, large social categories have been viewed as cognitive representations that affect behaviour to the extent that there is a common identification to the same category by a number of individuals, that ultimately lead to the strong assimilation of individuals to their group's prototype, thus, perceived similarity and interchangeability among members (e.g. Miller, Prentice & Lightdale, 1994; cf. also Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998; Wilder & Simon 1998). In this vein, intra-group deviance would be counterproductive in light of individuals' motivation to hold a positive, and distinctive social identity.

The parallel between processes occurring in face-to-face groups and process that ensue from individuals' social identification is interesting to our work, because we propose that reactions to deviance in large social categories are, to a large extent, the psychological equivalent of individuals' reactions to dissent in face-to-face groups (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994).

Structure of the Thesis

We have divided this thesis into six chapters, besides this Introduction. Chapters I and II deal with the theoretical framework underlying this thesis. Chapters III-V deal with four experiments in support of predictions issued from that framework. Chapter VI presents our conclusions.

Face-to-Face Groups and Social Categories: What are their Differences?

In Chapter I, we compare the small group approach and the social identity approach to group processes. In light of these approaches, we discuss the processes according to which groups form and maintain themselves. According to the small group perspective, a group results from a regular interaction between two or more individuals that develop affective ties in such a way that they become interdependent (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998; Shaw, 1976). In such an interdependent interaction, intra-group uniformity is determinant of groups life. As a result, groups create mechanisms that tend to ensure cohesiveness between their members and conformity to beliefs and behaviour that help achieving group goals and uniformity with group members' consensual beliefs and expectations (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950).

As opposed to the above perspective, the social identity approach assumes that intra-group cohesion is mediated by the identification of each individual to the cognitive representation of the group (Hogg, 1992). Groups have a psychological existence that, to a large extent, determines the actions of their members in relevant social context (Tajfel, 1978). As a result, individuals should be highly motivated to generate and to maintain inter-group distinctiveness as a way to get a clear-cut representation of their social identity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Haslam & Wetherell, 1987). Concomitantly, and equally important, individuals would attempt to achieve and to maintain a positive difference between their group and relevant out-groups in relevant social comparison situations (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

An Integrative Approach to Reactions to Deviants

The theoretical framework for our research is directly located at the confluence between the two above mentioned approaches. In Chapter II, we present the group socialization model and the subjective group dynamics model. We attempt to compare important assumptions of the two models and to draw implications of those assumptions in light of our empirical work. Our research deals with individuals' judgments of in-group or out-group members who adopt normative and deviant opinions, and is at the confluence of the classical Small Group approach, and the Social Identity approach. Concretely, we attempt to articulate between the Socialization Model proposed by Levine, Moreland, and colleagues (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982) and the Subjective Group Dynamics Model proposed by Marques and colleagues (e.g. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

According to Levine and colleagues' socialization model, intra-group status depends on reciprocal commitment between the group and individuals. According to the model, socialization processes should always be approached taking the point of view of both parties implied in the relationship: the member and the group as a whole and the kind of behaviour group members adopt towards each other will depend on their respective statuses in the group. According to Marques and colleagues' (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques & Páez, 1994) subjective group dynamics model, group members depends on salient contextual cues and cognitively accessible categories that lead individuals to identify with a given social category. Following this process, individuals will perceive likeable in-group members as instances that reinforce their beliefs on a positive social identity, and unlikeable in-group members as instances that jeopardize the validity, or perceived legitimacy, of such beliefs. As a

result, individuals will derogate the deviants, as part of a psychological process aimed to legitimize, although subjectively, the positivity of social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Our central empirical argument ensues from these two perspectives. We argue that reactions to deviants depend on three factors.

The first factor is whether these deviants are in-group or out-group members. Because deviant in-group members should have a major impact on the in-group's identity, individuals should derogate these deviants as compared to similar others who belong to an out-group, and thus, whose impact on social identity is irrelevant. The second factor is individuals' status in their group. Individuals who occupy a more central status in their group should, on the one hand, be more committed to the group and, on the other hand, have better knowledge of the standards required by the group to uphold a positive social identity, than individuals who occupy other statuses. Therefore, the former should be more sensitive, i.e. more prescriptive, regarding emerging in-group deviance and, hence, should more strongly derogate in-group deviants. The third factor is the status of the deviants. Individuals who occupy less central status in the group may be more expected to deviate, either because they are not yet fully socialized within the group, or because they are already dissenting. In turn, members who occupy a more central status should be expected to behave in accordance with the group's demands. Therefore, their deviance should have a stronger negative impact on other members' subjective validity of the in-group's positively differentiated position from the out-group and, hence, they should be more strongly derogated than the former members.

Because we are mainly interested in the theoretical implications of reactions to deviance in groups, and based on the part of Chapter I dedicated to the role that norms play in groups, in Chapter II, we devoted significant attention to the prescriptive, as

opposed to descriptive functions of group norms. This is an important assumption of the subjective group dynamics model according to which, in reacting to deviance, group members simultaneously adopt a descriptive focus and a prescriptive focus. The former would allow them to differentiate between in-group and out-group, thus making social identity salient. The latter would lead them to judge salient in-group members in terms of their contribution to positive in-group differentiation. Further, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms may be helpful in understanding commitment, that we interpret as being, to a large extent, associated with a norm of loyalty towards the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 1996).

Effects of Individuals' Socialization Status on Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable In-Group or Out-Group Members

In Chapter III, we report an experiment (Experiment 1) on the effects of participants' intra-group status on their evaluations of normative (likeable) and deviant (unlikeable) in-group and out-group members. In this experiment, we used a procedure inspired from the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971), in which we manipulated participants' intra-group status (new member, full member), targets' membership (in-group, out-group), and targets' normative position (likeable, unlikeable). The main dependent measure was the evaluation of the target members. The major result of this experiment is that participants who had been assigned a full member status upgraded normative in-group targets and derogated deviant in-group targets more than similar out-group targets. In turn, participants who were assigned with the status of new member favoured both in-group members (likable and unlikable members) relative to out-group members. Furthermore, participants with

full member status tended to reinforce the in-group norm, whereas participants with new member status showed more tolerance towards the unlikeable opinion.

Effects of Targets' Socialization Status, Group Membership, and Likeability on their Evaluation

In Chapter IV, we report two experiments (Experiments 2 and 3), in which we investigated how group members react towards normative and deviant members that hold a differentiated intra-group status (new member, full member, and marginal member, or ex-member). In experiments 2 and 3, we tested the effects of group membership and socialization status on the reaction to the deviant opinion. Participants judged a normative and a deviant member, either from the in-group or from the out-group, with one of the statuses referred above. The main results were consistent across the two experiments. Among other things, participants judged more extremely both normative and deviant in-group full members than they judged all other members (either members with other statuses, or members of the out-group). The in-group normative full member was the most positively evaluated, whereas the deviant in-group full member was the most negatively evaluated member of all.

Effects of Targets' Socialization Status on Perceptions of Threat and Strategies to Deal with In-Group Deviants

In Chapter V, we report one experiment (Experiment 4) aimed to check for two ideas, besides the general hypothesis according to which participants would upgrade normative in-group full members and derogate deviant in-group full members as compared to all other members. One such idea, is that derogation of deviant in-group

full members is mediated by the perceived threat of these members to the group as a whole. Our results partially supported this idea. The other idea is that participants will adopt different reactions towards in-group deviants, depending on these deviants' intra-group status. We found that participants' generally advocated teaching strategies, aimed at informing deviants or persuading them to join the likeable opinion, when these deviants held new member status. However, when the deviants had a full member status, participants advocated punishment strategies, such as downgrading the deviants in terms of their responsibilities in the group, and threatening these members with personal negative consequences for their deviance.

Implications of Deviance in Groups and in Society

Chapter VI concludes this work. In that chapter, we attempt an integration of the results we obtained in our studies in light of the group socialization and the subjective group dynamics models. We attempt to draw some implications for processes occurring in small groups, in large social categories, and in the society at large.

CHAPTER I

FACE-TO-FACE GROUPS AND LARGE SOCIAL CATEGORIES: WHAT ARE THEIR DIFFERENCES?

The study of groups in social psychology has traditionally evolved along two general theoretical and empirical orientations, which, only more recently, have been subject to integrative attempts (e.g. Hogg, 1992; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Marques & Páez, 1994). One such orientation is the small group approach (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Shaw, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley 1959/1986; cf. also Forsyth, 1990). The other orientation was initiated with Tajfel's (1978) seminal work on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), The typical object of study of the small group approach is the so-called dynamic, interactive group, that is a group structured in terms of inter-individual interaction and interdependence among its members (e.g. Shaw, 1976). In turn, the typical object of study of the social identity approach is the large social category that is a group whose existence is primarily located at the level of individuals' cognitive representations of society and of their location within such representation as members of social groups (Turner, 1975). The present chapter is intended to outline these two perspectives about social groups.

Group Formation

According to the small group approach, the basic condition for the existence of a group is the interaction and interdependence between individuals (Shaw, 1976). In this vein, groups are sustained by the positive interpersonal orientations among their members, that are reflected by their interactions, and these orientations are functional for the maintenance of the group as a social unit, and for the accomplishment of goals that could not be achieved by the individuals alone (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1968).

Group affiliation would ensue from individuals' intentions to initiate and to preserve positive interpersonal interactions (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). Such interpersonal interactions can involve attraction, control, and/or interdependence (cf. Forsyth, 1990). Some individuals tend to affiliate because they feel similar and attracted to each other (Newcomb, 1963, 1956), or because they need to feel power over other people, or to be controlled by other people (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). In any case, when there is harmony between individuals' motivations, social interaction in the group will be rewarding, and individuals will increase their commitment to the group's life.

However, individuals' common group membership co-exists with interpersonal differences (Asch, 1987). Indeed, even among individuals who have positive interpersonal orientations and common goals, there is enough interpersonal variability of beliefs, motivations, and behaviour to allow for emerging conflict. In the absence of any form of social regulation, interpersonal differences would rapidly generate group

dissent and, ultimately, group dissolution (Asch, 1987; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). As a result, groups must mobilise part of their energy to the implementation of social regulation mechanisms aimed to prevent, or to resolve, internal conflict (Levine, 1980).

Social regulation mechanisms require an internal structuring of the group. Group structuring, in spite of conditioning and restraining individuals' behaviour, allows group members to know both what to expect from other members, and what these members expect from them (Asch, 1987; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Sherif, 1936). Group structuring thus involves the formation of social norms and group roles that help, not only to establish group uniformity and cohesiveness, but also to accomplish group goals (Forsyth, 1990; Levine & Moreland, 1994).

Social Reality and Group Locomotion

One important consequence of the above process is that individuals often exert mutual influence in the construction and sustenance of shared beliefs. In other words, group uniformity allows for the construction of consensus on relevant issues, i.e. the construction of the group's *social reality* (Festinger, 1950). Concomitantly, it allows individuals to attain goals that they could not successfully achieve in isolation, i.e. *group locomotion* (Festinger, 1950). When the group members have to reach a certain goal, group uniformity can be desired or even demanded. This uniformity will be more determinant, the more it is perceived to facilitate the achievement of the group goal.

Consensus and behaviour similarity concerning the group goal is determinant to validate the chosen means to attain the goal and to reach effective coordination

within the group in view of required actions for success (cf. also Cartwright & Zander, 1968). In other words, group members need to validate group values that emerge in the form of personal beliefs. Uniformity entails perception of consensus, and this perception contributes to the reduction of uncertainty regarding relevant aspects of group members' lives.

The Importance of Group Norms

Obviously, group norms fulfil an important role in the establishment of intra-group uniformity. Because norms regulate social interaction and define the proper behaviour to adopt, norms promote interdependence, similarity, and cohesion between group members (e.g. Forsyth, 1990). Some norms that may not even be effective guides for behaviour are, nevertheless, maintained by groups only because they contribute to members' cohesiveness. Such norms function as rituals that contribute to improving members' loyalty towards the group (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986).

We may find different definitions of social norms in the literature, most often in the form of typologies, whose wide array clearly reflects their impact in all instances of social behaviour (cf. Gibbs, 1992; Morris, 1956).[1] A more process-oriented definition is that norms are socially constructed propositions that bring regularity and control to interpersonal relationships within similar situations (e.g. Gibbs, 1965, 1977; Morris, 1956; Sherif, 1936; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). The most general functions of norms include the prescription of which behaviour is desirable or tolerated,

[1] For example, Sorokin (cited by Morris, 1956) distinguishes between "law", "technical norms", "norms of etiquette", and "fashion", whereas Williams (also cited by Morris, 1956), distinguishes between "technical", "conventional", "aesthetical", "moral", and "institutional" norms. Gibbs (1965) distinguishes between nineteen types of norms, but, as he recognizes, some of these types are irrelevant or even inexistent.

reduction of potential interpersonal conflicts or misunderstandings, and decreasing the possible costs associated with exceeding communication. Once a norm is established and group members internalize it, there is no need for controversy concerning behaviours associated to this norm (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986).

Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms

Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998) distinguish between two types of norms depending on their moral character value. According to these authors, norms can be inducted from the frequency of commonly displayed behaviour by the majority of the members of a social group. Such modal norms are purely informative. They allow individuals to reach quick decisions concerning how to behave in specific situations based on the observation of what most of the other individuals do. Consequently, individuals assume that frequent behaviours and opinions are usually the most appropriate and adapted to the situation (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996). Cialdini and colleagues designated these as *descriptive norms* (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Descriptive norms should operate as context-dependent criteria, or *local standards*, which help individuals adjusting their behaviour and predicting events in, specific situations, (Miller & Prentice, 1996).[2]

[2] Miller and Prentice's (1996) idea is based on previous work by Kahneman and Miller (1986). These latter authors argued that comparison standards are not given *a priori* but rather, are computed *on-line* from present contextual cues that are compared to past relevant contexts. This process of "*backward thinking*" (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) activates a frame of reference that corresponds to the individuals' relevant expectations, ideals, goals and beliefs in the situation. Each new stimulus is compared to alternative cognitively salient stimuli. There are two types of alternative stimuli: "*could be*" and "*should be*" stimuli. *Could be* stimuli consist of cognitively salient expectations for the current context, whereas *should be* stimuli refer to cognitive representations of what is considered as being the right things to occur in the situation

However, social norms can also refer to behaviours that are socially approved regardless of their frequency or distribution across individuals. Such norms inform of what individuals *ought to do*, rather than what individuals *actually do*, and therefore, are associated to the notion of social morality (cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). These would correspond to *global norms* (Miller & Prentice, 1996), or *generic norms* (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). This kind of norms should correspond to pre-established, context-independent, stipulations that, once activated should lead individuals to anticipate rewards for their observance and sanctions for non-compliance (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991; Cialdini, 1996; cf. also Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001).

Thus, whereas descriptive norms call upon individuals' motivation to behave in a way similar to relevant others, generic norms would have an injunctive character, and they should appeal to individuals' sense of *oughtness* and motivation for social approval (Cialdini, 1996; Forsyth, 1990; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

Although the distinction between descriptive, or local, norms, on the one hand, and prescriptive, global, or generic norms, on the other hand, is debatable, [3] Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991) found support to this assumption. For example, these authors found that participants littered less when facing a clean environment, than when the environment was dirty. In addition, participants' littering behaviour was more frequent when they could witness littering by other individuals. In

[3] Notice that this idea is debatable. As Miller and Prentice (1996) put it, "a social norm is an attribute of a group that is considered to be both descriptive of and prescriptive for its members" (Miller & Prentice, 1996, p.800). Miller and Prentice (1996) consider that every norm is context-dependent and contains both descriptive and prescriptive attributes, because it simultaneously specifies the most frequent and the most correct behaviour. In a similar vein, Thibaut and Kelley (1959/1986) argue that the regularity of behaviour indicates that it is consistent with some norm. Thus, the occurrence of similar behaviour patterns among individuals should indicate that these individuals are attuning to a group norm that stipulates group members' expectations about behaviour and, as such, not only describes, but also prescribes behaviour.

other experiment, Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno (1991) showed that the observation of other people's violation of a prescriptive norm made this norm salient to participants and reinforced their commitment to the norm. In addition, when the prescriptive norm was made salient by a message stating that no garbage should be thrown on the ground, participants who watched other individuals' littering avoided littering more than when littering behaviour was not salient. An implication of this finding is that the salience of injunctive norms may have a stronger impact on individuals' behaviour than the salience of descriptive norms.

In brief, some norms seem to have a stronger prescriptive character than others, and this character seems to be, to a large extent, independent of the frequency with which the norms emerge in individuals' behaviour. This assumption is in line with the common observation that there is not necessarily a strong correlation between what individuals do (or perceive others to do), and what individuals think they ought to do (or think that others ought to do) (cf. Marques, in preparation). For example, risking one's life to save the life of a stranger in a fire is certainly less frequent than withdrawing. Nevertheless, the former act may be socially praised as an act of courage, or heroism, whereas the latter may be socially perceived as an act of cowardice. Therefore, although we may assume that, in general, there may be a consistence between prescriptive norms and the frequency of behaviour, it seems reasonable to suppose that such consistence is not total. The operation of prescriptive norms involves a deduction process, from what ought to be to what is observed. Conversely, there should be a much stronger consistency between observed behaviour and descriptive norms, because, by definition, these norms are inductively constructed from the observation of actual behaviour. Prescriptive norms should be anchored on a sense of morality which by no means indicates behaviour consistency with the norm, but which

certainly means agreement with the moral principle that it represents (cf. Durkheim, 1930/1998; cf. also Marques, in preparation).

If the above ideas are accepted, then, we may propose that prescriptive norms correspond to the operational stipulation of social values. Indeed, as Sherif (1936) pointed out, values refer to general expectations that material or, more often, symbolic objects, satisfy social and personal needs, hence allowing individuals to derive attachments and loyalties towards these objects. However, values operate as general principles that apply to very general situations (Becker, 1963), and therefore are poor guides for action. Prescriptive norms should thus operate at the intermediate level between social values and individuals' behaviour (Becker, 1963; Erikson, 1964; Forsyth, 1990; Sherif, 1936).

Interestingly, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms coincides with the two kinds of influence that have been traditionally recognized as occurring in face-to-face groups. We are referring to what Deutsch and Gerard (1955) designated, respectively, as *informational influence* and *normative influence*

.

Informal and Normative Influences

As we noted above, one important function of group life is that it allows individuals to validate their beliefs and to achieve their common goals. As a result, groups will seek to establish consensus regarding the common beliefs, attitudes, and goals of their members (Festinger, 1950, 1954). Therefore, they establish influence mechanisms aimed to ensure such consensus. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished between informational influence and normative influence to refer such mechanisms.

Informational influence depends on individuals' motivation to hold subjectively valid beliefs about relevant aspects of life, when they cannot validate their beliefs based on objective tests of reality (Festinger, 1950). In this case, social consensus, and, specifically, consensus with relevant others, would become the criterion of validity. As Festinger (1950/1989, p. 119) pointed out, "an opinion, a belief, an attitude is 'correct', 'valid', and 'proper' to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions, and attitudes". The more the relevant individuals who share an opinion are, the more this opinion will be viewed as valid and accurate. We may think that subjective certainty about an opinion or behaviour would be a direct function of the degree of observed consensus among other people, namely relevant people, about that opinion or behaviour.

Whereas informational influence involves the private acceptance of influence by the target of influence, normative influence involves overt compliance with other people's expectations. According to Deutsch and Gerard (1955), normative influence depends on individuals' motivation to get social approval by behaving in accordance with the expectations of relevant others. (e.g. Asch, 1955, 1951). Thus, normative influence seems to be associated with the injunctive character of social norms. Whereas informational influence will be the most effective in situation that generate informational uncertainty, normative influence will be effective in situations in which there is certainty that others have the ability to prescribe the individual's behaviour, to detect lack of compliance, and to act in consequence (cf. also Jones & Gerard, 1967).

Group Roles

In group contexts, social norms, descriptive or prescriptive, thus define the adequate beliefs and behaviour that group members should adopt either privately, or overtly. A related function of group norms is that they prescribe group roles (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986). Groups define goals, values, beliefs, skills and behaviour standards that are expected to be met by every group member (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959/1986).Often, these normative expectations may lead group members to sacrifice their personal goals in order to contribute to the successful achievement of the collective goals (Zander, 1985, in Forsyth, 1990). In such circumstances, individuals will choose to behave consistently with the role they assume within the group. For example, in struggling for a collective goal, workers may go on a strike, thus sacrificing part of their salary (which is important for the satisfaction of some personal needs).[4]

If internal differentiation occurs in terms of defined group roles, groups may not only accept such differentiation, but also encourage it. According to Sherif (1936) and, more recently, Bormann and Bormann (1988, in Levine & Moreland, 1994), the definition of roles within small groups thus reflects group's preference for behaviour that allows to accomplish its goals. Group members who adopt such behaviour are viewed as reliable, and are rewarded by the group (cf. Levine, 1980; Levine & Moreland, 1998, 1994; see Chapter II). Thus, individuals seem to adopt group roles on the basis of their contribution to the group's needs, rather than on the basis of their personal characteristics (Levine & Moreland, 1984; Sherif, 1936). An outcome of this

[4] Interestingly, this idea is akin with Social Identity Theory's distinction between social mobility strategies and social change strategies (see below). In adopting social mobility strategies, individuals favour their own personal goals over collective goals, whereas, in adopting social change strategies individuals will not differentiate between personal and collective goals.

process is that, in the same way individuals commit themselves to personally rewarding groups, groups also recruit members and commit themselves to members who contribute to the social validation of collective beliefs and the achievement of collective goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993).

In brief, uniformity is achieved through mutual influence, involving both a motivation to influence, and a predisposition to accept influence from other members (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Even the process of recruiting new members is largely guided by appraisals of such individuals' potential to help maintaining group uniformity, and hence, to contribute to the groups continued existence. These processes are based on the group's ability to establish normative expectations, susceptible of generating respect for group beliefs, and similarity among group members (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Because group members need to validate group values and norms, and to evaluate group skills and opinions, intra-group uniformity is a reflection of intra-group consensus about these issues. One importance implication of this fact is that groups are systematically forced to deal with the potential dangers of emerging deviance.

Group Cohesion and Social Integration

However, individuals' motivation to share a group's social reality and to contribute to group locomotion varies with the importance they assign to group membership. Some groups may become a reference whereas others do not. Referent groups affect individuals' perceptions of reality and behaviour (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). The more individuals are motivated to become members of a group and the

more strongly and frequently they adopt behaviour that is consistent with that motivation, the stronger will be the referent significance of the group. In brief, individuals will attempt to become more similar to the other members in those attributes that define the group (Cartwright & Zander, 1968).

An inherent quality of group life is thus *group cohesiveness*. Group cohesiveness has been defined as the set of forces acting upon individual group members in order to keep their allegiance to the group (Cartwright, 1968; Forsyth, 1990). More cohesive groups can also more easily ensure their continued existence, through the reciprocal positive affective ties of their members and, consequently, through their increased involvement with the group (Levine & Moreland, 1998). Cohesiveness seems to ensue from two operating forces upon group members. *Internal forces* enhance intra-group attraction, whereas *external forces* act to decrease the attraction felt towards alternative groups (Cartwright, 1968). Group cohesiveness emerges as individuals' willingness to remain members in the group (Cartwright, 1968).

Another inherent quality of groups is *social integration* (Levine & Moreland, 1998). Social integration may be defined as the extent to which members think and behave according to the group's normative expectations. The higher is the degree of social integration, the more the personal needs of group members will match the group's needs. Thus, the longer individuals are members of a group, and the more they participate as members in the group's life, the more they are expected to feel high levels of social integration (Levine & Moreland, 1998).

The small group approach conceived deviance as a statement of differentiation from intra-group uniformity (Levine, 1980, for a review). It traditionally refers to "an opinion expressed by one (or a minority of) group member(s) that differs from the modal opinion of a physically present (or realistically simulated) majority of group members" (Levine, 1980, pp375-376). According to Festinger (1950), discrepancies within groups can be solved in three ways. Deviant members may change their opinions towards the majority opinion (conformity), the majority can change its opinions towards deviant opinion (innovation), or the group may expel deviant members and redefine its boundaries.

Reactions of majority members to group deviants may emerge in the form of *inclusive* or *exclusive* reactions (cf. Levine, 1980). An inclusive reaction stands for normative members' attempts to make the deviants join the group's modal opinion. An exclusive reaction stands for the group's definition of its boundaries, namely, by expelling the deviant. According to Orcutt (1973), the adoption of an inclusive or an exclusive reaction depends on the type of attributions group members make about deviant members. Deviance is generally associated with an attribution of dispositional characteristics to deviants. Such an attribution is fundamental to anticipate the future contribution of the deviant members to the group's goal attainment (Levine, 1980; cf. also Zander, 1976, in Forsyth, 1990). Dispositional attributions would trigger exclusive reactions, whereas external attributions would trigger inclusive reactions.

Three forms of inclusive reaction to deviance are *acceptance*, *communication*, and *hostility.* Acceptance emerges in groups in which lenience towards deviance is

socially valued (Coser, 1962). Moreover, some groups may tolerate deviance from members who hold some roles, but not from members who hold other roles. For example, leaders may be ascribed idiosyncrasy credit (Hollander, 1964) that allows them to dissent from some group norms while being accepted by the group. Communication is the typical occurrence of informational influence, which occurs when group members direct a high amount of communication towards deviant members (Festinger, 1950). Finally, hostility emerges when group members refers to more punitive reactions, or the expression of negative judgments towards the deviants (Israel, 1956), and might correspond to the exertion of normative influence in that the goal is less to persuade the deviants than to force them to adopt the group's majority opinion.

On their side, exclusive reactions to deviance may emerge in three different ways: *stigmatization*, *avoidance*, or *expulsion*. Stigmatization consists in a response, based on social consensus about the targets of stigmatization and is usually accompanied by a moral justification or ideology that supports their exclusion from the group. Frequently, stigmatization serves some functions such as relief of discomfort, system justification and preservation of other members' statuses within the group (Major & Eccleston, 2005). Avoidance consists of isolating the deviant member from the group's activities (Israel 1956). To some extent, it is similar to ostracism (Williams, 2001). In this context, deviants receive lower amounts of communication, information about the group, and their participation on group's activities is hindered. Finally, expulsion stands for casting the deviant out of the group, and is the most intense exclusive strategy (Israel, 1956). Expulsion emerges with the perception that the deviant is an unrecoverable member (Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993).

In brief, deviance corresponds to a breach in the group's consensus about social reality, or to a withdrawal of group members from a common effort to achieve group goals. As a result, normative members typically engage in informational influence and, if this fails, in normative influence mechanisms in order to re-establish group consensus. If these mechanisms fail, the group may expel the deviant (Festinger, 1950; Levine, 1980).

One can find illustrations of the above mentioned strategies in the literature. For example, Festinger and Thibaut (1951, cited by Levine, 1980) ran an experiment in which they measured the amount of communication (informational influence) that group members directed toward a deviant member. Participants were members of groups that supposedly had to discuss an issue, and were subject to one of three experimental conditions as a function of the high, medium or low external pressures towards intra-group uniformity. Moreover, participants believed that they were similar to, or different from, the other group members. The results showed that, in general, participants directed more communication at the deviant than at other group members. However, this effect was stronger when participants felt high pressure for intra-group uniformity. Communication decreased over time only when groups were heterogeneous and pressure for uniformity was low. In this condition, participants decreased communication and redefined group boundaries through the formation of sub-groups.

In another experiment, Sampson and Brandon (1964, cited by Levine, 1980), also tested this idea. These authors formed group discussions about a black juvenile delinquent. In each group, a confederate adopted either a deviant position by showing racist beliefs, or a normative, non-racist, position. Furthermore, the confederate either behaved consistently with the group's opinion about the juvenile case, or disagreed

with the majority. Results indicated that the non-racist confederate who disagreed with the majority opinion received more communication (inclusive reaction), whereas the racist confederate who disagreed with the majority opinion was practically ostracized by the other members (exclusive reaction).[5] The authors propose that when group members perceive a possibility of persuading dissident members to adopt the group's opinion, they will attempt to influence these members. On the contrary, when they perceive that the dissidence is based on personal dispositions (racist beliefs), they abandon their persuasion efforts.

Reactions of majority members to in-group deviants also depend on the relevance of the issue in terms of which dissidence emerged for group locomotion (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1968). The impact of deviants would be a direct function of the existing interdependence in the group for the accomplishment of collective goals. In support of this idea, Schachter (1968) had participants clubs to discuss a case. Four confederates and three uninformed participants composed each club. Three of the confederates behaved in consistent normative manner, whereas the fourth adopted a deviant opinion. According to conditions, the deviant confederate either maintained the deviant opinion throughout the discussion (extreme deviant condition), or conformed to the majority's opinion (slider deviant condition), or conformed to the majority opinion (control condition). In addition, the issue under discussion was either relevant or irrelevant to the club's goals (Schachter, 1968). At the end of the discussion, participants had to assign group members to several types of committees within the club. Among other results, Schachter (1968) found that participants downgraded the deviant confederate,

[5] In discussing this experiment, Marques and Páez (1994) suggest that the racist-non-racist manipulation actually corresponds to an inter-group situation, in which the non-racist confederate would be viewed as an in-group member whereas the racist confederate would be viewed as an out-group member. Therefore, these authors speculated, Sampson and Brandon's (1964) results would indicate a major concern from participants' with in-group than out-group deviance.

especially when this deviance was extreme and the issue was relevant to the club (Schachter, 1968).

To summarize, the small group approach views interpersonal attraction, similar beliefs and goals, and social interaction as the basic elements of group formation. In affiliating with a group, individuals would attain a sense of validity of their opinions and increase the likelihood to achieve goals they could not attain in isolation. As a result, internal uniformity is decisive for group's life. As a result, groups develop social influence mechanisms to ensure members' conformity to standards that are important to the accomplishment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; Turner et al., 1987; Hogg, 1993), as well as strategies to deal with emergence of deviance. Two such mechanisms are informational influence and normative influence. Informational and normative influence can be viewed as the operation of descriptive criteria that lead individuals to feel certain about their opinions, as well as of prescriptive criteria that stipulate the way group members ought to behave. Both should contribute to generate intra-group uniformity of beliefs and goals, as well as to stipulate group members' behaviour depending on the position they occupy in the group. When, influence is not strong enough to ensure intra-group uniformity, normative (or the majority of) group members may adopt strategies towards deviants that range from persuasive attempts to their ultimate expulsion from the group.

As we wrote in the Introduction, the small group approach is founded on quite different assumptions as those of the social identity approach. Indeed, the social identity approach presents quite different implications for the understanding of group processes, either in terms of group formation, or in terms of group uniformity, or in terms of group members' reactions to deviance. We devote the next section to an overview of this approach.

Social Categories

Social Identification

According to the social identity approach (e.g. Tajfel, 1978), a group has essentially a psychological existence. In identifying with a social category, individuals' self-concept as group members becomes cognitively salient, and thus the group assumes a cognitive existence through their members (Tajfel, 1978). In this vein, as Tajfel (1978) pointed out,

> "A psychological group is being defined as a collection of people that share the same social identification or define themselves in terms of the same social category membership" (Turner, 1984, p.530).

A basic condition for the existence of a social category is that it is defined by internal and by external criteria (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978), that is, individuals categorize themselves and are categorized by others as members of a social group. The external criterion of social categorization thus corresponds to an existing consensus on the part of non-group members, about designating a collection of individuals as a group. The internal criterion refers to social identification, that is, to the fact that individuals believe that they are, indeed, members of that group. This is often motivated by their external categorization (Tajfel, 1978).[6]

[6] Interestingly, this idea is not exclusive to the social identification approach. Cartwright and Zander (1968), for instance, argue that two necessary conditions for members of face-to-face groups to define themselves as a group are, first, that they see themselves as a unity, and that there exists consensus on the part of non-members about the existence of that unit. However, as far as we know, the small group dynamics approach has not traditionally explored this assumption.

Social identification leads individuals to feel psychologically attached to their membership, to share emotions, beliefs, attitudes with other group members, and to behave in a uniform manner as result of their shared identity (Turner, 1984). As a result, interpersonal similarity is not sufficient (and, in fact, it is unnecessary), to explain group behaviour. Perhaps the two empirical cornerstones of the social identity approach are the well-know *perceptual accentuation* (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) and the *in-group bias* phenomena, as observed in the classical *minimal group paradigm* studies (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971).

The Perceptual Accentuation Process.

The term perceptual accentuation is used to account for the cognitive construction of continuous stimulus dimensions in terms of dichotomies of opposed categories (Tajfel, 1969). The implication of this process to social perception is that, in perceiving individuals as members of opposite categories, perceivers will tend to disregard differences between members of the same category, while emphasizing differences between members of opposite categories (Tajfel, 1969).

In their well-known studies about the perceptual accentuation process, Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) had participants to make judgements of the lengths of eight different lines that were randomly presented to them several times. These lines differed from each other by a constant ratio of 5% length, between a shortest 16,2 cm and a longest 22,9 cm. To one third of participants, the four smaller lines were systematically presented in association with the label "A", and the four longer lines were systematically presented in association with the label "B". To another third of participants, the association of lines and labels was made completely at random. The final third of participants could not see labels associated to the lines. The participants' task was to estimate the lines' lengths. The results showed that when the association of

lines and labels was correlated with the line lengths, participants' estimates reflected an over-estimation of differences between the lengths of lines associated with different labels and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the underestimation of differences between lines associated with the same label. This did not occur in other conditions.

Doise, Deschamps and Meyer (1978) found a similar process with judgments of individuals. They showed that participants who had to judge, either several boys or several girls on a series of personality traits differentiated significantly more between the target boys, or among the target girls than did participants who judged both boys and girls. In addition, the latter participants differentiated significantly more between the traits assigned to boys and those assigned to girls than did the former. This process of perceptual accentuation became central to self-categorization theory, in which it has been formalized in terms of the meta-contrast principle (cf. below).

In-Group Bias and the Minimal Group Paradigm.

The second basic notion for the social identity approach is in-group bias. In-group bias is an expression of in-group favouritism, defined as "any tendency to favour in-group over out-group members on perceptual, attitudinal or behavioural dimensions" (Turner, 1984, p. 66) in individuals' evaluations of in-group and out-group as whole, or their members, or when they assign goods (e.g. money, points, etc.) to in-group and out-group members.

In one of their seminal "minimal group" experiments, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971) present 12 slides of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky to the participants, and asked them to express their preference for each of these paintings. In a second phase of the experiment, the authors randomly divided the participants into

two categories ("Klee" vs. "Kandinsky"), purportedly based on their preferences for paintings, and asked them to fill in some matrices. Each matrix included several options that corresponded to the comparative assignment of two amounts of money, one to each of two other individuals. These individuals, either were members of the same category, or were members of different categories. The most relevant situation involved inter-group comparison whereby, one target individual was an in-group member, and the other was an out-group member.

Each matrix allowed participants to choose among several possibilities. For example, participants could assign the highest possible amounts of money to both target individuals, regardless of the groups to which they belonged (maximum joint profit). Alternatively, they could assign the highest possible amount of money to the in-group target, regardless of the money assigned to the out-group member (maximum in-group profit). Another possibility was to generate the maximum positive difference between the amount of money assigned to the in-group target and the amount of money assigned to the out-group target. However, by doing this, participants should necessarily assign an absolute lower amount of money to the in-group target than they would if they chose any other alternative (maximum in-group difference)

Among other results, Tajfel and colleagues (1971) found that the most consistently chosen option corresponded to the maximum in-group difference alternative. Participants preferred to establish the highest possible positive difference between the money assigned to the in-group members and that assigned to the out-group members, even though by assigning less money to the former than if they chose any other alternative. This process was later shown to be independent from individuals' interpersonal similarity. Billig and Tajfel (1973) divided participants in four experimental conditions, according to which they were interpersonally similar or

different from in-group or out-group members. These authors found that participants showed a more favourable attitude towards interpersonally similar than interpersonally different individuals. Nevertheless, their attitude was still more favourable towards in-group members than towards out-group members, regardless of whether these members were interpersonally similar to, or different from, the participants.

The commonly accepted explanation for in-group bias (e.g. Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1979) is that, in generating a positive differentiation between the in-group and the out-group, individuals will be enhancing their *social identity*, i.e., "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of the social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63)"

Social Identity and Social Comparison

Social identity seems to be a powerful determinant of inter-group behaviour. According to Tajfel (1978), it involves the joint operation of cognitive, evaluative, and emotional components. The cognitive component corresponds to the individuals' knowledge that they belong to a category. The evaluative component relates to the positive or negative value that is socially attributed to that category. The emotional component corresponds to the affective outcome of the previous two components. Individuals will feel satisfied or unsatisfied with their social identity, depending on whether the group in which they categorize themselves endowed with positive or negative social value, respectively. For example, when a group is perceived as holding an inferior social status in comparison with other groups, this fact brings negative

consequences for members' self-esteem (Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In turn, when the group is perceived as having a superior social status, individuals assume a positive value for their self-concept (Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)[7].

However, the cognitive, as well as the evaluative, definition of the group is always necessarily comparative in nature. According to Tajfel (1978), social identification always occurs in a context in which other groups are salient, so that individuals are able to distinguish between in-group and out-group. Thus, psychological groups are not simple representations of aggregates of individuals. Their definition is intertwined with value, and this value is defined only by reference to the inter-group comparison context (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986).

According to Tajfel (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), social situations can be positioned along an *interpersonal - inter-group* continuum. Although a "pure" interpersonal situation would be very unlikely, because individuals' membership to social categories are always involved to a certain extent in social interactions (Tajfel, 1978), interpersonal situations would correspond to interactions between two or more people that are largely based on their respective personal characteristics. In turn, inter-group situations, which may occur in the pure form, are those in which the interaction between two or more people is exclusively based on their category membership(s). Inter-group situations thus involve the individuals'

[7] When the in-group has a comparatively low status and its members consider this status as unjust, the group starts to question the existing social structure (Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In turn, members of high status groups will attempt to secure the social structure when they perceive a risk of status loss (Turner & Brown, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). These strategies depend on the availability of perceived cognitive alternatives to that social structure as well as on the perceived justice and correctness concerning the status that groups hold within society (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). Perceived group status, perceived illegitimate status, and perceived instable status are, therefore, decisive to whether cognitive alternatives of the social structure are made salient and to whether individuals will or will not collectively engage in social change (Tajfel, 1978, 1982).

depersonalization, because their behaviour is based on their self-definition as group members rather than as unique individuals (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986). Thus, the more cognitively salient is individuals' group membership, the closer to the inter-group extreme will be their behaviour. As a result, individuals who, in that situation, perceive themselves as members of the same group will behave uniformly, and will differentiate their behaviour from the out-group's (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel, & Turner, 1986; cf. also Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Social Mobility and Social Change Strategies

The interpersonal – inter-group behaviour continuum is associated with another continuum proposed by Tajfel (1978) to account for the strategies used by individuals to reach or to maintain a positive value within the social structure (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Such strategies may range from *social mobility* to *social change*, and are associated with individuals' beliefs concerning the social structure. Beliefs in social mobility correspond to a view of a flexible society, in which individuals can easily move from group that endow them with an unsatisfactory identity to more satisfying groups. In this context, individuals would dis-identify with their group to, objectively or subjectively, join another one. This phenomenon has been shown to occur when individuals think they have the individual skills or characteristics required to be members of a higher status group (e.g. Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries & Wilke, 1988). In turn, beliefs in social change are based on the perception of a stratified social structure together with the notion that group boundaries are impermeable, so that individual mobility is seen as difficult or impossible (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Social competition and social creativity. In a context defined by social change beliefs, satisfactory social identity can be achieved in terms of either *social creativity* or *social competition* (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). By applying to social creativity, individuals redefine core elements of the social comparison situation (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, individuals may refer themselves to in-group favouring dimensions of social comparison to the detriment of less favourable ones. By applying to social competition, individuals will engage in effective collective action, in which groups engage in direct confrontation in order to obtain a higher relative position within the social structure, and hence a positive value for the in-group. Obviously, social creativity and social competition are not mutually exclusive (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Lemaine, Kastersztein and Personnaz (1978) describe experiments that illustrate the use of social creativity. In these experiments, two groups of children competed for a unique reward. However, one of the groups had more resources available for the successful achievement of the experimental task, and thus was better equipped to receive that reward. Despite its scarce resources, groups who lacked resources for equitable competition generally engaged in compensatory strategies in order to attain favourable comparisons with the more resourceful groups. For example, in one such experiment, Lemaine and colleagues (cf. Lemaine, Kastersztein & Personnaz, 1978) had children to build a hut. Children were divided in two groups, one of which possessed more resources (high status group) to build the hut than the other (low status group). In order to compensate for their possibly poorer hut, the low status group also built a little garden and used it as an argument to claim the prize.

Self-Categorization Theory

Based on Social Identity Theory, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987) proposed a theory directly aimed to explore cognitive antecedents and consequences of social identification: *Self-Categorization Theory*. Turner et al (1987) assume that the self-concept is a multi-faceted cognitive structure, so that the particular dimension through which it is represented in each given situation depends on the structural properties of that situation. As a result, individuals' behaviour as group members will depend on the particular groups that become salient in specific social contexts.

The Prototype Model of Categorization

Self-categorization theory is also partly inspired on Rosch's (1978) *prototype* model of categorization. Rosch (1978) proposed that categorization occurs along a *vertical* and a *horizontal* dimension (cf. also Rosch & Mervis, 1975).

The vertical dimension stands for the taxonomic organization of information in memory, ranging from more abstract (e.g. "furniture", "living beings") to more subordinate (e.g. "rocking-chair", "Pointer"), through basic (e.g. "chair", "dog") level categories. The horizontal dimension is organized in terms of the sharing of attributes by members of the same or of distinctive categories. The vertical dimension would be tributary to a principle of *cognitive economy* according to which attributes that describe represented objects are always stored at the highest possible level of abstraction. This fact implies that categories positioned at the superordinate levels would be quite abstract, because the attributes that equally apply to all of their

subordinate levels should be quite reduced in number. Conversely, categories positioned at the subordinate level would be very specific, because they would require a large number of attributes to be distinguished from other categories at the same subordinate level. Therefore, the principle of cognitive economy would lead individuals to function at the intermediate, or *basic level* of categorization, at which the ratio between the informative character of the category's attributes and the amount of cognitive effort required to process that information should be ideal (Rosch, 1978). A basic level category would

> "...be the most inclusive categories for which a concrete image of the category as a whole can be formed, to be the first categorizations made during perception of the environment, to be the earliest categories sorted and the earliest named by children, and to be the categories most codable, most coded, and most necessary in language." (Rosch, 1978, p. 382).

In the horizontal dimension, categories would be primarily defined in terms of the attributes that are shared by most of their members and that are, simultaneously, absent from most members of other categories existing at the same level of abstraction. In each category, these attributes would correspond to that category's *prototype*. Prototypical attributes are thus attributes that better allow to decide about an objects' membership to a category. For example, the attribute "to breath" is highly prototypical of the category of "living beings". Such attributes thus have high *cue-validity* (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Brahem, 1976). A categorical attribute's cue-validity will thus increase as the frequency with which it appears in association with the members of the category increases and the corresponding association with members of

contrasting categories decreases. Therefore, a prototype is defined as the set of attributes of a category that have the highest cue-validity. For the same reason, an object will be prototypical of a category as a direct function of the sum of the cue-validities of its attributes (Rosch, 1978).

According to Rosch (1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) prototypes would reflect the properties of the physical world (cf. also Garner, 1974). Self-categorization theory proposes a more plastic view of categorisation, namely by strongly emphasising its dependence on the immediate context in which social behaviour occurs.

Dimensions of Social and Self-Categorization.

Based on Rosch's (1978) idea that cognitive categories are organized along a vertical dimension, Turner et al. (1987) propose that self-categorization may occur at different levels of inclusion, which become relevant for the definition of the self-concept. From these levels, the "group level" should be the most informative in social situations, thus corresponding to Rosch's (1978) notion of basic level. At this level of social categorization, individuals would focus on perceived intra-group similarities and inter-group differences, rather than differentiating between individuals. It should be at the intermediate level, between the most abstract level of "Humans" and the most specific level of the individual self, that the concept of psychological group takes place.

Comparative Fit and Normative Fit.

The self-categorization theory's equivalent of Rosch's (1978) horizontal dimension bears to the *meta-contrast* principle. According to Turner et al (1987), the

salience of a social category depends on an interaction between the accessibility of that category in the cognitive structure, and the stimuli that are present in a perceptual setting (Bruner, 1957, cf. Turner et al, 1987). Category accessibility corresponds to the readiness with which that category will be evoked. The more accessible is a category, the less stimulus information will be required for the activation of that category. However, even a very accessible category will not be activated unless its specifications fit the particular stimuli that are present in a situation.

Fit thus corresponds to the perceived match between the stimuli present in the situation and a cognitively represented social category (Turner et al, 1987). Turner and colleagues (Turner et al, 1987) distinguish between *comparative fit* and *normative fit*.

Comparative fit refers to the adjustment between differences and similarities among group members, and a cognitive classification of social categories. Categories become salient to the extent that they classify individuals based on a perception of maximized inter-group differentiation and intra-group similarity. Normative fit, refers to the contents of the categories once they have been activated. A collection of individuals is classified in the same category to the extent that their behaviour and characteristics match the behaviour and characteristics represented by their group's prototype (Oakes, 1987, cf. Turner et al, 1987).

The Meta-Contrast Principle and the Self-Stereotyping Process.

The idea underlying the *meta-contrast principle* is that individuals are categorized within the same group to the extent that, on average, the perceived differences between these individuals are smaller than their perceived differences with other individuals (Turner et al., 1987). According to Turner et al (1987), the meta-

contrast principle is a formalization of the process according to which individuals make sense of social situations in terms of opposite categories. The meta-contrast process defines the positions within each category, that are, simultaneously, the most similar to the positions held by the other members of the same category, and the most different from the positions held by the members of the opposite category (Turner et al., 1987). Each category may, thus, be represented by a prototype that corresponds to the attributes that best summarize and represent the group and differentiate it from a contrasting group (Turner et al., 1987; cf. also Rosch, 1978).

The meta-contrast principle would provide individuals with the criteria that define their social identity. This would be mediated by a self-stereotyping process. When individuals categorize themselves as members of a group, they depersonalise themselves and assume for themselves the attributes that represent their group. In this vein, individuals become to perceive themselves based on the in-group prototype. Depersonalisation thus consists of a process whereby individuals come to perceive themselves and other in-group members as interchangeable in-group members who are highly differentiated from the out-group. The operation of the meta-contrast principle, and the consequent depersonalisation process would thus underlie inter-group behaviour, as defined by Tajfel (1978; cf. also Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner et al, 1987).

According to Turner and colleagues (1987), there should be a functional antagonism between different abstraction levels of self-categorization. In a specific situation, individuals make salient only one level of abstraction for self-definition. For example, individuals would not be able to perceive themselves simultaneously as unique individuals and as undifferentiated members of their group. The salience of a level of abstraction leads to the perception of accentuated similarity within categories

and accentuated differentiation between categories. A higher level of abstraction would imply that differentiation between categories should disappear. In turn, in a lower level of abstraction, the perception of similarities among individuals should also disappear.

Uniformity and Cohesiveness in Psychological Groups

From what we stated above, we may deduce that, in light of self-categorization theory, intra-group structure in terms of differentiated intra-group roles (but see Hogg, 2004, 2000) is not a relevant property of psychological groups. However, this does not mean that self-categorization is unrelated to normative behaviour. On the contrary, group uniformity is an important property of behaviour defined in terms of individuals' membership to psychological groups (Hogg, 1992; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

First, by definition, behaviour framed by membership in a psychological group depends on the cognitive construction of the situation in terms of an almost absolute uniformity among members of contrasting social categories, in that individuals should simply emphasize inter-group differences to the detriment of intra-group differences. Second, individuals would expect members of the categories in presence to match the specifications of their respective categories' prototypes (e.g. Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). In other words, group uniformity would emerge from self-depersonalization in terms of opposed group prototypes (Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1996).

The above cognitive processes would be assisted by a more affectively-laden process. Indeed, following the process of depersonalization, the in-group prototype would function as a mediator between the positive feelings that individuals experience

about the self, and a positive orientation towards the other members of the group, not as unique individuals but rather as depersonalized instances of the in-group (Hogg, 2000, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Instead of corresponding to the whole set of interpersonal orientations between group members as proposed by the small group approach, group cohesiveness would correspond to the positive orientation between in-group members as mediated by their common attraction to the in-group prototype (Hogg, 1992).

In support of the above idea, Hogg and Turner (1985) ran an experiment in which they manipulated the salience of participants' category membership (salient categorization vs. non-salient categorization), attractiveness of target group members (attractive vs. non-attractive) and in-group distinctiveness (positive vs. negative). After being categorized in two groups, participants' task was to form an impression of four target in-group members and of five out-group members. The targets were described in a favourable (attractive) or unfavourable (non-attractive) way. According to experimental conditions, either a positive trait was shared by all in-group members and a negative trait was shared by all out-group members (positive in-group distinctiveness), or vice versa (negative in-group distinctiveness). Participants filled matrices similar to those used in the minimal groups' paradigm (cf. above) and indicated their attitudes (similarity, attraction, preference) towards the in-group and the out-group as a whole, and about the individual members. Results showed that attitudes about individual targets were influenced by these targets' characteristics. However, when the in-group was positively distinctive from the out-group, participants favoured the in-group as a whole, regardless of the personal attractiveness of the target members. Personal attractiveness influenced interpersonal judgments but did not affect on group level-judgments.

The above results support the idea that group membership has an effect on group cohesion that is not based on interpersonal attraction. Instead, it is based on individuals' attraction to group as a whole. This is consistent with evidence showing a strong correlation between in-group members' prototypicality and attractiveness (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; see Hogg, 1992 for a review). In brief, group cohesion is a function of the prototypicallity associated to members in dimensions considered important to describe the in-group, in order to achieve a positive value for their social identity (Turner et al, 1987; Hogg & McGarty, 1990).

Social Influence in Social Categories: Referent Informational Influence

Terry and Hogg (1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 2000) propose that, depending on which social category is salient in the context, individuals will construct group norms that result from the process of social comparison and are primarily aimed to establish inter-group distinctiveness. According to these authors, group prototypes are normative constructs in that they describe and prescribe members' beliefs, opinions and behaviours. Because social norms are a constituent part of the group's prototype (and hence, of the self-concept), individuals assume group norms as a guide of their behaviour (Terry & Hogg, 2001, 1996; Terry, Hogg & White, 2000).

Based on the above ideas, Terry and Hogg (1996) conducted two experiments aimed to demonstrate that individuals' attitudes and behaviour vary depending on the contextual factors that make specific social categorizations salient. In one such experiment (Terry & Hogg, 1996, Experiment 1), they measured the attitudes and intentions of university pupils' to perform physical exercise three times a week for a

fortnight. Furthermore, experimenters asked participants to indicate the extent to which they thought that their friends and partners had attitudes similar to theirs concerning physical exercise. Finally, they measured participants' social identification with that group of friends. At the end of the two weeks, participants reported how much exercise they had done. Results showed that the more individuals identified with the group and the more they though their attitudes were similar to the groups' attitudes, the more consistent was their exercise rate with the group's attitude. Thus, when social identity is salient, individuals seem to guide their behaviour based on their representation of the in-group's prototypical specifications, or norms.

In brief, self-definition as group members makes individuals become normative, and perceive other members as normative to the extent they hold the attributes of their groups' prototypes. For the same reason, the more prototypical is an in-group member, the more this member will be recognized as a valid source of influence. Identification with the source influences target's beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. (Terry & Hogg, 2001; Turner, 1991). This idea was tested in a series of experiments conducted by Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1990). In one of their experiments (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990, Experiment 1) the authors employed the Sherif's auto-kinetic illusion procedure. Groups of six participants had to estimate the range of movement of a point of light in a dark room. Among the six participants, the estimates given by three confederates were consistently about 5 cm above the uninformed participants' estimations. Participants were divided in three experimental conditions. In the random categorization condition, confederate participants and uninformed participants were categorized at random. In the control condition, uninformed participants and confederates were not categorized at all. Finally, in the group condition, uninformed

participants were assigned to an "H" category, and confederates were assigned to a "J" category. According to the classical Sherif's (1936) hypothesis, one should expect uninformed participants to converge to the confederates' estimates in all conditions. However, no such convergence was observed. In the group condition, uninformed participants' estimates converged toward each other while showing a tendency to polarize themselves in the direction opposite to the confederates' estimates.

In another experiment, Abrams et al. (1990, Experiment 2) employed the Asch's conformity paradigm. Participants were introduced to three confederates, that were described either as in-group members or as out-group members, and who were instructed to give erroneous judgments. Results showed that disagreement with in-group confederates generated higher uncertainty on the part of participants than did disagreement with out-group confederates, and that participants complied more with in-group than out-group confederates. In the whole, these results suggest that in-group members are a powerful source of influence - a referent source (Abrams et al., 1990; Turner, 1991), and that this depends on individuals expectations of intra-group consensus and inter-group disagreement in matters relevant for the distinctiveness of their social identity (Turner, 1991; cf. also Abrams, 1990; 1994).

Deviance as a Departure from a Group's Prototype

Based on self-categorization theory's assumptions, the only way deviance can be conceived of is as a departure from the deviant's group prototype (cf. Hogg, 1992). In this vein, deviant group members would be members whose characteristics obscure inter-group distinctiveness (Abrams & Hogg, 2004). As a result, deviants may be

positive or negative (Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Fielding & Darley, 2005). Positive deviant members are those that contribute for group polarization, that is, they assume an atypical position but in the opposite direction of the other group's prototype. In turn, negative deviants would deviate in the direction of the other group, thus blurring inter-group distinctiveness.

Considering individuals' basic motivation to establish clear-cut inter-group differentiation, individuals would thus prefer those in-group and out-group members who contribute to such distinctiveness. As a result, individuals should prefer prototypical in-group and prototypical out-group members, to atypical in-group members and atypical out-group members. However, this process is debatable under the meta-contrast principle (cf. above). As suggested by Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison & Viki (2005) a departure of group members from their respective groups' prototypes should lead to their re-categorization, if the comparative fit principle applied, or the re-interpretation of the judgmental context according to an alternative inter-group dimension, if the normative fit principle applied. This idea has major theoretical and empirical implications to the present work, and shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter II in light of the subjective group dynamics model.

Conclusions

The small group approach assumes that groups are formed on the basis of social interactions between individuals and that these interactions provide the basis for group affiliation (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Members of small groups also acquire positive emotions through their membership, but these emotions emerge from

their interpersonal positive ties (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Forsyth, 1990). Conversely, the social identity approach considers that groups exist as cognitive representations whose construction is relatively independent from previous social interaction or individuals' characteristics, but that, once they are in operation, determine individuals' behaviour and the characteristics that become socially meaningful in their eyes (Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1991). Following social categorization, group members perceive themselves and are perceived by others as interchangeable representatives of their respective groups on attributes that define the group by opposition to other groups (e.g. Hogg, 1993, Turner et al., 1987). Group membership thus becomes a powerful component of the individuals' self-concept (e.g. Turner et al., 1987). Individuals develop positive or negative emotions by defining themselves as group members, because the value the group is endowed with following social comparisons is projected onto the social-self (Hogg & Abrams, 1990).

The small group approach conceives groups as entities which are affected by context changes, but whose existence does not directly depend on that context. In turn, to the social identity approach, groups cannot be conceived in the absence of an inter-group context and cannot exist outside such a context (e.g. Tajfel, 1978). A group comes to psychological existence because a specific situation becomes to be conceived as an inter-group contrast, and the only way one can analyse a group process is by placing that process in the context of the group's relationship with another relevant group (Turner et al, 1987).

In spite of their possibly different nature, both types of groups serve similar functions. Psychological groups are viewed as the outcome of individuals' attempt to provide meaning to the social context. Face-to-face groups should allow individuals to achieve a sense of validity of their opinions. In both cases, being a group member help

provides criteria for establishing a consistency between beliefs, values, goals, and behaviour. In addition, in both types of groups individuals benefit from intra-group uniformity.

The processes postulated by the two approaches about the construction of group uniformity are substantively different. To the small group approach, uniformity ensues from interplay between personal and group motivations. To the social identity approach, intra-group uniformity is the outcome of social categorization and self-stereotyping. However, to both approaches, the motivation for the generation of intra-group uniformity is a central factor of the group's dynamics. In the context of interdependence between members within small groups, internal uniformity is decisive for group's life. Groups develop mechanisms to ensure members' conformity to standards that are important to the accomplishment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; Hogg, 1993; Turner et al., 1987). Within psychological groups, perceived intra-group similarity is important for the individuals' well-being, because it produces a sense of consistency between expectations concerning the existence of clear differences between social groups and a distinctive social identity (Hogg, 1993).

Face-to-Face Groups and Psychological Groups: Are They Different?

At the end of this chapter, we are in position to clarify our standpoint about the distinction between face-to-face groups and psychological groups. The notions of *face-to-face group* and *psychological group* seem to appeal to different social psychological realities. As Wilder and Simon (1998) pointed out, in face-to-face groups the criterion for membership is defined in terms of interpersonal interaction. In turn, membership to a psychological group is defined in terms of characteristics shared

among members. This idea has clear implications for the way each perspective accounts for intra-group uniformity and differentiation. Still according to Wilder and Simon (1998 cf. also Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998; Miller, Prentice & Lightdale, 1994), whereas psychological groups would be constructs in which, by definition, all members are similar and interchangeable, in small groups

> "the goodness-of-fit of a specific member is determined by how well that person fits into the structure of the group, much as the fit of a puzzle piece is determined by how well it locks into place with other pieces. Thus, similarity among members is not necessary (...). The individual is not a replication of the group (...) How alike the individuals are in terms of appearance, beliefs, and behavior is not critical". (p. 36)

There would be little doubt that many contexts allow one to observe interactions among individuals whom *obviously* are members of the same group. These include player teams, groups of friends, neighbours, etc. However, there are many other situations in which behaviour of large groups of people who are not in immediate interaction with each other could be hardly explained without reference to their common group membership. These include sports fans, crowds, people belonging to the same race, sex, or nationality, etc.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to disagree with Wilder and Simon's (1998) observation that face-to-face "exist out there" (Wilder & Simon, 1998, p. 35), whereas psychological groups simply have a psychological existence with very few, if any, implications for individuals' behaviour. We believe that both kinds of group have

equally important impacts on individuals' behaviour, if only because no group behaviour would exist if individuals did not construe themselves as members of that group (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). As Turner and Bourhis (1996, p. 39) pointed out, group behaviour requires that individuals share a group-level fate in reality and a common belief on their group belongingness, prior to any development of collective goals and intra-group interdependence.

Notwithstanding, it seems clear that, traditionally, small group research and social identity research directed themselves, and uncovered, different aspects of group life. Small group research has deeply explored the processes according to which groups achieve uniformity, and deal with internal deviance and the functions of such processes. In turn, social identity research has deeply explored the processes according to which individuals achieve a positive and clear-cut representation of their group and of themselves as group members, and how this affects their behaviour towards in-group and out-group members.

These two perspectives have separately grown to large bodies of research, respectively, on inter-group and intra-group processes. Only relatively more recently have researchers attempted to integrate the two bodies of research (e.g. Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, 1992). In the next chapter, we deal with the group socialization model of Levine and colleague, and the subjective group dynamics model of Marques and colleagues, that we consider to be valuable contributions to such an integration. These models underlie the rationale of our studies. Therefore, we will attempt to detail them as much as possible.

CHAPTER II

SUBJECTIVE GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE GROUP SOCIALIZATION MODEL: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO REACTIONS TO DEVIANCE

In this chapter, we attempt to outline the theoretical background that contextualizes our research issue. For this matter, we attempt to integrate the socialization model, proposed by Levine, Moreland and colleagues (Levine e Moreland, 1994, 1998; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993) and the subjective group dynamics model proposed by Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). The former model is more akin to the small group dynamics tradition, although it may encompass principles of the social identity approach (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1994). The latter model draws from the social identity approach but is directed at the explanation of processes that have been typically studied in the realm of the small group approach.

As far as we know, the socialization model (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982)offers the most complete account to be found in social psychological literature of the full range of intra-group processes that define individuals' life as group members and, simultaneously, of the impact that members have on the group's life. The subjective group dynamics model (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) accounts for the interplay between intra-group processes and inter-group processes. We propose that, together, these models offer a heuristic account of social control mechanisms in social groups, mainly in what refers to normative members' reactions to deviance.

The Socialization Model

As we pointed out in Chapter I, according to the traditional perspective of small group dynamics, a group exists when its members interact regularly, develop positive affective ties and are interdependent on each other (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994, 1998). Within this context of interdependence, group members develop mechanisms to ensure intra-group uniformity and members' conformity to patterns of beliefs and behaviour susceptible of ensuring the attainment of group goals and a subjectively valid notion of reality (e.g., Festinger, 1950).

Levine, Moreland and colleagues (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & Ryan, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993) developed a model essentially within this theoretical tradition. These authors examine the reciprocal relationships between individual group members and the group. Such relationships depend on three major processes: *evaluation*, *commitment* and *role transition* (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & Ryan, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988).

Evaluation

The process of evaluation involves the reciprocal appraisal, by the group and by the individual of their mutual outcomes in social interaction. In this process, both parties define and monitor behaviour in light of their mutual expectations, that is, the ideal behaviours they should accomplish (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Group's expectations for the individual. Because the attainment of group goals is a fundamental value for groups, the contribution of each individual to this attainment (that is, the conformity to normative expectations defined by the group) is determinant to the process of evaluation. For each individual, the group develops normative expectations consistent with goal attainment, and rewards the normative behaviours accomplished by that individual (Moreland & Levine, 1988, Levine & Moreland, 1994). The more important the norm is for the group, the more positively the group will evaluate those members who meet the group's normative expectations, and the more negatively it will evaluate members who diverge from these expectations (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Individuals' expectations for the group. According to this model, the entrance of an individual to a group is the result of a voluntary decision taken by both the individual and the group. Individuals become members of a group when they consider that membership fulfils their personal needs (Shaw, 1981 cf. Moreland & Levine, 1982). Individuals consider their entrance in the group based on the evaluation of the benefits and costs compared to the non-entrance. Thus, individuals develop expectations with respect to the group's behaviour. If the group falls below the individuals' expectations, three consequences may occur: (1) individuals attempt to change the group's behaviour in the direction of their expectations, (2) individuals alter their expectations in the direction of group behaviour; or (3) individuals abandon the group (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982). The former two responses occur when individuals evaluate the group in a positive manner and perceive a potential

satisfaction of their needs by staying in the group, whereas the latter consequence ensues from a negative evaluation of the group.

Commitment

The second process that contributes for the definition of reciprocal relationship of individuals and the group is commitment. Commitment between the individual and the group results from the evaluation process and is mainly an affective process (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988). The more rewarding is the relationship between the individual and the group, the more committed both parts feel for each other.

Feelings of commitment result in a motivational link between the group and the individual and can become stronger or weaker as time passes by (Levine, Moreland & Choi, 2001; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988, Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). If the group and the individual attain their respective goals, they feel their relationship is rewarding and their reciprocal levels of commitment will rise. Commitment is also determined by the comparison of the rewards provided by the relationship and the rewards that would be potentially obtained from alternative relationships (other groups or individuals).

Commitment has direct implications for the group's life (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). A high level of commitment determines a stronger allegiance to the group goals and values by individuals, it grants positive affective ties between group members, and, therefore, strong intra-group cohesion. Concomitantly, commitment influences members' willingness to exert pressures upon the rest of the

group in order to fulfil group expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994). Thus, commitment favours individuals' engagement in pro-group behaviour.

The norm of loyalty. A concept that is intimately connected with commitment is the norm of loyalty. Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) propose the term "loyalty" to characterize intentional pro-group behaviour. The more a given behaviour requires personal sacrifice in the service of group needs, the more loyal this behaviour will be considered to be. According to these authors, there is a generic norm, which is common to all groups, that posits that members should not abandon their group. Abandoning the group is disloyal because it forces the group to undertake new tasks such as recruiting replacement members, and simultaneously, it displays a negative public image of the group. Abandoning the group is a sign that the group cannot retain its members (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001; Levine & Thompson, 1996).

Role Transition

The group's commitment to an individual may rise above, or falls below, a given threshold (group decision criterion), so that the individual tends to be perceived by the group as deserving a different role. In this case, the group will re-define the individual in accordance with the new role (Levine and Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988). The group will then apply a transition on the individual's role, reflecting the perception of their new status within the group. The corresponding process occurs for the individual's level of commitment to the group. However, in this case, the individual may decide to adopt a new role. In both cases, the group and

individual are led to elaborate new reciprocal expectations, and a new evaluation process is initiated (Levine and Moreland, 1994; Moreland, & Levine, 1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988).

According to Moreland & Levine (1982; Moreland & Levine, 1988), roles range within three regions in relation to the group. A *non-member* region refers to members that have not yet joined the group, or to members that have left the group. A *quasi-member* region refers to members that have just entered the group and have not yet attained full membership status, as well as to members that have lost full membership status. Finally, a *full member* region refers to those members that are most closely identified with the group and that have all the privileges and responsibilities associated with group membership (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Group Socialization Phases and Status

Clearly, commitment is the central factor in status changes in the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Most often, these changes follow a definite pattern. Figure 1 displays the several statuses that individuals can assume at different phases of their life as group members, depending on that factor (Levine and Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988). Although there is a chronological sequence along statuses and phases, individuals may neither assume all statuses nor pass through all phases (Levine, Moreland & Choi, 2001; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993; Moreland & Levine, 1982).



Figure 1. Group Socialization Model. In Levine & Moreland (1994, p.310)

Investigation Phase

When groups decide to recruit new members, firstly, they attempt to identify potential candidates and a mutual (individual/ group) evaluation process takes place. In this process, both parties ponder the possible consequences that new members' entrance in the group may have on the fulfilment of each part's needs (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

In this *investigation* phase, individuals assume the status of *prospective* members (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). The more positively evaluated prospective members are, the higher the probability of being admitted as group members. Simultaneously, and before entering the group, individuals engage in a *reconnaissance* process, whereby they identify different groups that might contribute to the fulfilment of their personal needs, and choose the most advantageous group (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996). As time passes by, the attraction between the individual and the group leads to an increase in reciprocal commitment. When commitment achieves the *entrance* decision criterion, the individual becomes a member of the group (Figure 1).

Entry

When entrance occurs, individuals move to a *socialization* phase, and are given the *new member* status (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Often, entrance in the group implies some sort of initiation rituals that signify the establishment of a new relationship between the individual and the group and, at the same time, discontinuance in previous relationships between the individual and alternative group memberships. The goal of these rituals is to enhance commitment between individual and group, to ease the individuals' adjustment to their new status, the assimilation of the group's spirit, and the learning of the group's normative expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

In general, new members feel highly motivated to learn group norms (Levine, Moreland & Ryan, 1998). This motivation generates feelings of loyalty toward the other members, and particularly towards full members because these are the most

representative members of the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). In expressing their loyalty towards these highly representative group members, new members would thus reify loyalty to the group as a unit (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).

Socialization

The socialization phase takes place immediately after the individual's entrance in the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In this phase, both the individual and the group engage in a mutual adaptation process. The group contributes with knowledge, skills, motivations and normative expectations to which new members are expected to conform, so they can obtain *full member* status (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

The more new members attune with the group's normative expectations, the more positively they will be evaluated and the higher will be the group's commitment to the individual. When commitment achieves the *acceptance* decision criterion, the individual assumes full member status and a new phase is initiated (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Again, a new evaluation process and new feelings of commitment occur. In contrast, the more the individual fails to meet the group's expectations, the lower will be the group's commitment to the individual. If, in this case, commitment falls to the level of the *exit* decision criterion, the individual leaves the group without ever being a full member (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Simultaneously to this socialization process, the new member will also exert some pressure upon the group so that the group meets their personal needs (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In this case, too, the more the group meets the individual's expectations, the more positively it will be evaluated and the higher will be the level of commitment of the individual toward the group. As the

group matches the individual's needs, the more *accommodation* it will show (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). When the individual's commitment to the group rises to the *acceptance* decision criterion, the individual becomes a full member. In contrast, if the group does not correspond to the individual's needs, it will trigger a negative evaluation, and the individual's commitment to the group will decrease. If commitment falls to the *exit* decision criterion, then the individual voluntarily leaves the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Acceptance

Once the individual and the group's commitment levels achieve the *acceptance* criterion, the individual's status changes from new member to full member (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Some rituals of acceptance that identify the individual's new status can mark this passage (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005; Moreland & Levine, 1982). According to Levine and colleagues (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005; Moreland & Levine, 1982), the group stops paying so much attention to the individual and starts relaxing in teaching strategies and behaviour control. Intense vigilance is no longer needed. The group shares valuable information with, and assigns more responsibilities to the individual (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

From the individual's standpoint, feelings of pride by being a group member and solidarity with other group members are, at this stage, very intense. In this stage, individuals are likely to engage in pro-group behaviour, to sacrifice themselves for the group if required, to perceive themselves as group members across a wide array of

situations, or to adopt group norms and values as a frame of reference for their behaviour (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Maintenance

Once individuals assume the full member status, a *maintenance* phase takes place. During this phase, feelings of commitment between the individual and group are at their maximum level, and so both parties are interested in maintaining the relationship (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). The group becomes a crucial component of the individual's life, while considering the individual as one of its representative members (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

In this process, the group attempts to assign each full member a specific role, so that their contributions to group goals will be maximized with the least effort from the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). It is in this phase that group members mostly differentiate their roles within group (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). However, if commitment decreases to a *divergence* decision criterion the individual will go through a new role transition, and assumes the status of *marginal member* (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

From the individuals' point of view, the less rewarding is the role the group assigns them with, the lower will be their commitment to the group. In this case, individuals invest in searching for less demanding roles so that they can still fulfil their personal needs without much personal effort (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Divergence

Marginal member status may or may not be the result of a natural course of group membership (Moreland & Levine, 1982). If it follows its natural course, this status will be expected. In this case, the group and the individual will engage in a process of dissociation and preparation for the individual's forthcoming exit. However, when the marginal member status is not expected, the relationship between the individual and the group becomes problematic, because it reflects that one of the parties did not correspond to the other part's expectations (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Considering the individuals' point of view, when they assign a marginal member status to themselves, they may feel a need to differentiate from the group. In other words, a marginal status allows the individual to feel free from the group's normative expectations. Another reason why individuals may assign a marginal member status to themselves is the fact that individuals consider that their membership does no longer satisfy their personal needs, and simultaneously are not willing to contribute to the achievement of group goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Re-socialization

Once divergence occurs, both the group and the individual evolve to a *re-socialization* phase (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Usually, the re-socialization phase aims to restore full member status to marginal members (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). During this phase, commitment can rise once again to *divergence* decision criterion. In this case, the

individual undergoes another role transition (*convergence*) and recovers full member status (Moreland & Levine, 1982; Levine & Moreland, 1994). The individual once again enters the *maintenance* phase and is expected to converge to the group's normative expectations. If divergence persists and the full member status is no longer an option, the *re-socialization* phase functions as a time interval that is used as a preparation to the eventual exit of individual (Moreland & Levine, 1982). The individual will abandon the group and assume an *ex-member* status (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Exit

Exit is a role transition that can occur in almost every phase, if group members decide to exclude a member because this member does not correspond to normative expectations and the group does not anticipate a positive contribution by the individual to group goals (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In many situations, an individuals' departure from the group may help the group display a more positive for the surrounding community, because by excluding the individual, the group may express its intolerance for internal deviance (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). However, when individuals decide to leave on their own, the group's public image may be negatively affected. Indeed, the members' departure may reflect an absence of group skills to maintain its members (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982). If a member's departure implies recruiting a new member to replace the one who left, group members will have to involve themselves in a new socialization process (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Thus, ex-members who decide to abandon the group are frequently considered as "traitors" who attempted against the norm of loyalty toward the group (Levine & Thompson, 1996). From the

individuals' point of view, exit is associated to the fact that the group has no skills to satisfy their personal needs (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Remembrance

Remembrance corresponds to the period in which reciprocal commitment between group and individual is declining until no commitment remains (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). During this phase, both the group and the individual involve themselves in retrospective evaluation about each party's role in the relationship (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). The outcome of such evaluation becomes a part of the group's history (Levine & Moreland, 1994).

Ex-members frequently serve as models to new members. If an ex-member contributed positively to group goals' achievement, then this member will be remembered as a model to follow. On the contrary, if an ex-member did not contribute to fulfil group goals, then the group can use this member as a model for unaccepted behaviour (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). From the individual's point of view, the corresponding phase to remembrance is *reminiscence* (Levine, Bogart & Zdaniuk, 1996; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). In this phase, the individual evaluates the group's contribution to the satisfaction of personal needs (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

As we can see, even as ex-members, individuals contribute in some way to the success or failure of group goals, especially in what concerns the public image that group wants to affirm and the strengthening of group standards by using ex-members as normative models. The results of the comparison between ideal and actual public

image represent the success or failure of this specific group goal (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

From the above idea, it ensues that one important function of ex-members for the group is to define the group's demands for the effective members, and even for the prospective members. Depending on whether the ex-member did or did not meet the group's normative expectations, the group can adjust more or less demanding expectations for the new members (Moreland & Levine, 1982).

Subjective Group Dynamics

Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) propose the term *subjective group dynamics* to refer the set of cognitive-emotional processes involved in the representation of intra-group uniformity and deviance occurring in the larger inter-group context. The basic assumptions of the subjective group dynamics model are inspired by social identity theory and by self-categorization theory (Chapter I).

According to the subjective group dynamics model, individuals are capable of achieving a positive social identity only to the extent they hold a subjectively validated representation of the group's normative standards that sustain positive in-group distinctiveness. Deviance of salient in-group norms will jeopardize such subjective validity, thus endangering the positive value ascribed to the in-group. As a result, deviant in-group members will be strongly derogated (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). The general model is represented in Figure 2.



Figure 2. Subjective Group Dynamics Model. In Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, (2001, p. 414).

Self-Categorization and Intra-Group Consensus

As we saw in Chapter I, in categorizing themselves as group members, individuals adopt the characteristics that define in-group prototype (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg, 1992; Turner et al., 1987). Consequently, the individual and the in-group become psychologically interchangeable (Hogg, 1992; Turner, 1981). In this sense, a

positive attitude toward the self is equivalent to a positive attitude toward the in-group prototype, and vice-versa (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In addition, self-categorization theorists assume that group prototypes encompass the normative characteristics and behaviour that group members are normatively expected to adopt as a means to maintain in-group distinctiveness (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993). As a result, individuals' opinions and behaviour are conforming to the specifications of this prototype. The major implication of this above process is that, in inter-group situations, the only possible way in which individuals may establish a positive identity is by emitting preference to the in-group.

According to the small group dynamics tradition (e.g. Festinger, 1950), intra-group consensus is crucial to validate individuals' beliefs about reality and about appropriate social behaviour. Intra-group consensus thus reinforces members' commitment towards group beliefs and normative expectations, and helps reinforcing group cohesiveness (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950; Forsyth, 1990). In line with this idea, the subjective group dynamics model proposes that clear-cut in-group distinctiveness is necessary to afford individuals with a sense of positive social identity. However, once such distinctiveness is established, individuals may need to subjective validate the standards that underlie their beliefs in a positive social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

Social Validation of Positive Social Identity

According to Marques and colleagues (cf. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques & Páez, 1994), the above process is akin to the social reality and group

locomotion functions of groups as defined by Festinger (1950). On the one hand, they suggest, self-categorization turns the social-self into the only relevant aspect of social reality. On the other hand, the only relevant psychological goal in such a context is the maintenance, or enhancement, of social identity. In most circumstances, individuals automatically assume existing in-group uniformity in the characteristics that positively differentiate the in-group from the out-group as a whole. This is due to the operation of the meta-contrast process and associated attitude of in-group favouritism (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). However, in other circumstances, salient in-group members may present characteristics that run counter such positive differentiation. Similarly to what happens in face-to-face groups, these members will negatively contribute to the group's social reality. But, in the present case, their presence disrupts the most relevant component of such reality, the social-self, and the ultimate goal of subjectively validating positive social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). As a result, individuals will strongly derogate in-group members who jeopardize these two psychological goals, while strongly valuing those who contribute to their attainment (Marques & Páez, 1994).

Descriptive and Prescriptive Norms

According to Marques and colleagues (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1994), the above process involves the operation of *descriptive* focus and *prescriptive* norms. According to Marques and colleagues, descriptive norms are associated to prototype construction through the meta-contrast process, whereas prescriptive focus has an intra-group moral value.

Descriptive norms correspond to dimensions in terms of which individuals attempt to generate inter-group distinctiveness in social comparison situations and assimilate themselves to the in-group category (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Turner et al., 1987; see Chapter I). In light of these dimensions, normative individuals should be those that bear resemblance to their respective groups' prototype. Deviant individuals would be those who bear enough resemblance to that prototype to still be considered members of the group, but also present some level of resemblance to the opposite group's prototype. Therefore, descriptive norms would have a denotative nature in that they allow to identify, or to appose labels, on individuals depending on their category inclusion (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

In turn, prescriptive norms should correspond to general moral principles that are not group-specific, and thus do not allow straightforward inferences about normative or deviant individuals' group memberships (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001). However, such norms would allow individuals to appraise others in terms of general social desirability criteria, regardless of their group membership. In this vein, prescriptive norms have a connotative nature in that they allow to one make value-laden judgments about individuals, irrespective of these individuals membership categories (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

As Marques and colleagues (2001) recognize, there should always be, to some extent, a correlation between the descriptive and the prescriptive components of social categories, because individuals should expect members of their groups to uphold prescriptive norms that sustain a positive social identity. In other terms, prescriptive norms should present an injunctive, generic character (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno,

1991, see also Chapter I), but would not be sufficient, or necessary, by themselves, to define a person's group membership.

In brief, according to the subjective group dynamics model, descriptive norms help individuals define other people and themselves in terms of category memberships. Prescriptive norms operate within these definitions and help individuals to appraise the moral quality of group members.

The Role of Prescriptive Norms in Social Identity

From the standpoint of Marques and colleagues (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) there should be a direct relationship between the perception of deviance and the salience of prescriptive norms. To some extent, this perspective is similar to that proposed by Kahneman and Miller (1986), according to which norms are made salient through *backward processing* (see Chapter I). Just as the accessibility x fit process (cf. Chapter I) makes specific social categories salient in specific contexts, so the presence of in-group prescriptive deviants will make individuals adopt a prescriptive focus in the judgmental situation. This prescriptive focus will lead individuals to appraise the consequences of such prescriptive deviance to the subjective validity of the criteria that, in their eyes, legitimate their beliefs on a positive social identity (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 2001).

Indeed, following self-categorization and the consequent depersonalization and assimilation of the self to the in-group prototype, individuals should perceive themselves and other in-group members as fully interchangeable, and thus, fully interdependent as regards the maintenance of a positive social identity. Such perceived full interdependence would project the value assigned to any in-group member onto

the social self. As a result, perception of intra-group uniform consistency with the values that sustain positive social identity would increase, and, conversely, the emergence of in-group prescriptive deviance would decrease, the subjective validity of that positive social identity.

Reaction to Deviance

In the psychological context that we outlined above, a relevant violation of prescriptive in-group normative expectations should be perceived as an offence to the social self. Indeed, the social self in psychological groups is a particularly relevant component of the group's reality (Marques & Páez, 1994). As a result, in-group deviants should trigger strongly negative reactions on the part of other members, because, in disavowing the group's standards, deviants would simultaneously decrease the individuals' group-mediated social reality, and, more importantly, the value of the social self.

In brief, when no prescriptively deviant members are salient, self-categorization elicits judgments of in-group members aimed to generate positive in-group differentiation (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998). Consequently, in-group members are judged more favourably than out-group members are, and, possibly, prototypical members of both categories will be judged more favourably than non-prototypical members (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). These judgments thus operate at the inter-group level exclusively (see Figure 2). However, the salience of prescriptive in-group deviants should elicit derogatory reactions on the part of other in-group members, as an attempt to restore the validity of beliefs on a positive social

identity. As Marques and Páez (1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998) suggested, an important theoretical implication of this idea is that there is a parallel between reactions to deviance in small groups and reactions to deviance in psychological groups. Intra-group differentiation, in the form of derogation of in-group deviants, would be crucial to validate the group's social reality. But, in psychological groups, such reality ultimately amounts to the group's identity. Therefore, in such circumstances, rather than being mutually exclusive (cf. for example Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner et al, 1987) intra-group differentiation and inter-group differentiation would operate together as a means to establish positive inter-group distinctiveness (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998)[8].

Black sheep effect. Although they were not driven by the subjective group dynamics model (actually, they inspired this model; cf. Marques & Páez, 1994), previous studies on the *black sheep effect* illustrate the above reasoning. The black sheep effect corresponds to a reaction to deviance that reflects the simultaneous operation of inter-group and intra-group differentiation processes (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

As an illustration, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988, Experiments 1-2) had Law pupils judge a good and poor speakers, issuing either from their course (in-group condition) or from the rival Philosophy course. In one experiment, participants judged either two good speakers or two poor speakers, each one issuing from a different

[8] According to Marques and colleagues (Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), derogation of the deviant in-group members is a similar process to the public norm enforcement described, for instance, by Erikson (1964, 1966), but in a psychological way. Deviance highlights a prescriptive (violated) norm, and the consequent derogation of deviant individuals may function as a process of norm reinforcement (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Thus, in society at large, deviance is determinant in informing what the group norms are (cf. also Durkheim, 1915).

school. In the other experiment, participants judged one good and one poor speaker issuing, either from the same in-group school, or from the same out-group school. Thus, whereas in the former experiment, participants were in inter-group comparison situations, in the latter, participants were in intra-group comparison situations. The results showed that, regardless of the kind of social comparison condition, and, although speech quality was experimentally controlled in both cases, participants always judged the good in-group speaker more favourably than the good out-group speaker and the poor in-group speaker more unfavourably than they judged the poor out-group speaker. Moreover, participants always considered that the in-group was superior to the out-group in terms of speech quality.

In a similar vein, Marques, Robalo and Rocha (1992, Experiment 2) had pupils of one high-schools evaluating the pupils of their school and the pupils of a rival high-school as a whole, as well as likable and unlikable pupils of each school on exactly the same judgmental dimensions. Participants again upgraded likable in-group members and derogated unlikable in-group members as compared to out-group members and, at the same time, judged the in-group as a whole more favourably than the out-group as a whole.

In brief, the black sheep effect suggests that individuals react in more extreme ways toward likable and unlikable in-group members than toward similar out-group members. Specifically, individuals evaluate likable in-group members more positively than similar members of the out-group, and simultaneously, evaluate unlikable in-group members more negatively than similarly unlikable out-group members (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; Marques, 1990; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). In addition, inter-group differentiation and intra-group differentiation may occur simultaneously, a result that supports the idea that the latter kind of

differentiation is associated with concerns about the former. According to Marques, Yzerbyt and Leyens (1988),

> "commitment to certain group values and reward outcomes have a functional status similar to the enhancement of self-esteem through membership of a group (…), because of their relevance to the subjects, unlikeable in-group members may be judged more negatively than unlikeable out-group members (…). The black sheep effect is thus in accordance with Social Identity Theory. The under-evaluation of dislikeable in-group members may be an acceptable psychological strategy for preserving the group's *overall* positivity." (pp. 4-5, emphasis in the original).

Functions of Reaction to In-Group Deviants

Inter-group and intra-group differentiations. The subjective group dynamics model (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001) posits that derogation of in-group deviant members is an inclusive reaction (cf. Levine, 1980; see Chapter I). Indeed, by definition, it is difficult to expel a deviant member from a cognitive category except by reframing the inter-group context. If such reframing occurred, that is, if a re-categorization was made that redefined a deviant individual as an out-group member, the subsequent evaluation of this individual would no longer occur at the intra-group level (cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

The above process would be consistent with the idea that there is a functional antagonism between the simultaneous emergence of intra-group and inter-group

differentiation, as stated by self-categorization theory (cf. above). However, it would be inconsistent with the basic assumption of the subjective group dynamics model according to which intra-group differentiation sustains a positive differentiation of the in-group from the out-group as a whole (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).

In brief, the subjective group dynamics model postulates that derogation of deviant in-group members is a manifestation of group members' hostility towards these deviants and, by the same token, and perhaps more importantly, of the endorsement of the violated norm on the part of normative members (Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; Serôdio, 2006). Whereas inter-group differentiation, and the principle of functional antagonism between subordinate and super-ordinate levels of categorization applies to descriptive norms, intra-group differentiation depends on the operation of prescriptive norms that prompt hostile reactions towards the in-group deviants.

As a case point, Marques, Abrams, Páez and Taboada, (1998, Experiment 3) had participants to evaluate five targets that were presented either as in-group or out-group members. These targets had supposedly ordered, several characters involved in a murder story in terms of their responsibilities for the murder. Four targets presented an ordering identical to that made by the participants, whereas one target presented an ordering that was similar with, though not identical to, the orderings made by the majority of members of the opposite group. Half of the participants were informed that their ordering corresponded to an in-group norm (prescriptive norm condition), whereas the other half were given no information and were simply to notice that a majority of group members adopted the same ordering as they had done (modal norm condition). The results indicated that, participants who judged the targets only in light

of a modal norm, consistently upgraded in-group targets more than out-group targets, irrespective of their orderings of characters. However, participants who judged the targets in light of the prescriptive norm upgraded the four in-group targets and the out-group target who adopted the in-group norm, and derogated the in-group target and the four out-group targets who adopted the out-group norm. However, and most importantly, participants also upgraded the in-group relative to the out-group as a whole, irrespectively of the norm condition in which they were.

According to the authors, the above results reflect individuals' motivation to obtain a positive social identity through the legitimization of the violated in-group norm (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998; Marques, Páez, & Abrams, 1998). Thus, the perception of an internal threat to a group's prescriptive norm evoked negative attitudes towards those members that do not legitimize group standards and positive attitudes towards those who legitimize these standards (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998).

Conclusions: An Integration of the Socialization Model and the Subjective Group Dynamics Model

The socialization model and the subjective group dynamics model have different and common aspects, regarding how they conceive of group structure, of the process through which groups establish internal uniformity and its function, and of the role of deviance in this process. In this conclusion, we attempt to outline mainly the complementary aspects of both models.

Levine and colleagues' conceptualisation of the stages individuals go through as group members, how individuals are evaluated by the group and evaluate the group, how role transitions operate, and so on, clearly applies to the life of small groups. Not surprisingly, then, the model offers a detailed account of group roles, of the processes involved in role transitions within the group, and the collective and individual functions fulfilled by these processes.

In contrast, the subjective group dynamics model is more directly focused on psychological groups or social categories, as conceived by social identity theory and self-categorization theory (e.g. Tajfel, 1978; Turner et al., 1987; Chapter I). Consequently, the model offers weak assumptions about the internal structure of groups. In this vein, group structure is grounded on members' similarity with their group's prototype and consistency with, or deviation from, standards that endow a positive comparative value to that prototype (cf. Marques & Páez, 1994).

There are, nonetheless, important aspects that encourage attempts to articulate between the two models. For instance, with the subjective group dynamics model, Marques and colleagues (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) assume that intra-group differentiation may work for the benefit of the group rather than decreasing its distinctiveness. On its side, the socialization model may accommodate to processes occurring in the realm of large social categories and inter-group context. For instance, the prototypicality level of group members might increase or decrease a groups' attraction towards these members (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1994). Because full members are expected to be the best group representatives, and are supposed to best contribute to the attainment of group goals, we may expect commitment toward these members to attain its highest level (Levine & Moreland, 1994).

In addition to their consistent view of the functions of uniformity in groups, there are important common aspects between the two models as regards the way group members ensure and reinforce intra-group uniformity. The kind of group goals assumed by each model involve distinct mechanisms of group influence In small groups, the collective goals essentially concern group locomotion and social reality. We believe that this applies to the socialization model, as well. In psychological groups, the ultimate and, perhaps, unique goal is to maintain or to acquire a positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). In both cases, group members are expected to contribute to the attainment of group goals and in both cases, social reality deals with a process of social validation of group norms, beliefs and opinions. Furthermore, such validation implies the recognition that group beliefs are "correct". This common aspect has implications for an account of reactions to deviance by both models.

According to the socialization model a deviant behaviour is any behaviour that either differentiates itself from the normative expectations defined by the group (Moreland & Levine, 1982), or that is associated to a personal decision of abandoning the group (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). According to the subjective group dynamics model, deviance ensues from lack of support of prescriptive in-group norms. The perception that other members conform to the prescriptive norms is thus essential to individuals' subjective validation of group's normative system, and this is an essential condition for the attainment of a positive social identity (Abrams et al., 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Thus, deviance is essentially a phenomenon that threatens the subjective legitimization of individuals' positive social identity (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) but, at the same time that renders subjective validation possible (Marques, 2004).

Levine and colleagues (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005) propose that divergence and exit are role transitions that indicate that individuals withdrew from full membership. Such role transitions reflect a growing exclusion of the deviant individuals from the group (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Hence, these authors propose that reaction to deviance is based on exclusive strategies. This idea can hardly apply to the subjective group dynamics model. Indeed, role transition includes moments in which individuals actually enter or exit the group. The basic assumption of subjective group dynamics is that reactions to in-group deviants ensue from the fact that these deviants cannot be re-conceptualized as out-group members (cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). It is true that, according to the group socialization model, groups do not necessarily expel their deviants, and may adopt less radical strategies, including removal of individual responsibilities, convincing individuals to accept dismissal, allowing a period before the exit, or promoting individuals' entrance in another group (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). However, this remains a group option. In turn, in the context of subjective group dynamics deviance is an inherent property of the in-group and is psychologically dealt with as such. Therefore, the subjective group dynamics model implicitly assumes that derogation of deviants is an inclusive strategy towards the in-group deviant member.

The Research Problem

In our attempt to integrate the subjective group dynamics model and the group socialization model, we propose that reactions to deviants depend on these deviants'

status within the group. Our problem for investigation concerns this general issue. We propose that the socialization status within the group is associated with different perceptions of, and different contributions for, the positive value that individuals can obtain for their social membership.

Our broad hypotheses concern the effects of group members' status on their judgments of other members who comply with or who deviate from relevant group standards, and the effects of the latter members' status on their impact on judgments made by the former. First, group members whose status within the group is well established, will be in the possession of clear-cut criteria to judge whether a given behaviour or characteristic match the group's prescriptions. In addition, because they are more strongly committed to the group, full members will more strongly inherit from the contribution of normative and deviant members to the group's value. Second, the impact of deviant, as well as normative, positions on the group's value should have a different impact on the group, depending on the status of these members within that group.

In our first experiment, we focus on how individuals who assume different status in the group react to deviant members. We may suppose that the potentially disruptive character of an emergent deviant opinion on the subjective validation of in-group norms would be stronger if this opinion was perceived as contradicting core prescriptive in-group norms. However, new members, because of their lack of normative knowledge do not completely identify with the group's normative system, and hence, should not interpret some deviant positions as a threat to this system. Full members, on the contrary, are aware of the normative system of the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Consequently, they should interpret intra-group differences directly in light of the group's norms. Thus, when faced with a

member who does not contribute to intra-group uniformity, full members should react in a more negative way than new members should.

The second set of studies (Experiments 2, 3) refers to the effects of deviant members' status on how other members react to their deviance. We may assume that the group can more easily reject a deviant if this deviant is new or marginal members, than a full member. However, as we argued above, in a social categorization context, such rejection would amount to the redefinition of the group. We propose that when such re-definition is out of question, prescriptive deviants whose status is less central to the group should be less threatening to the subjective validation of the group's normative system than more central deviant (full) members. Therefore, deviant members who assume a full member status should be the most derogated of all members.

Our fourth experiment aimed directly to test the idea that representative members that adopt a deviant opinion are perceived as a threat to the group. Moreover, we attempted to find which types of strategies group members were willing to engage towards deviant members. Depending on the deviant members' status, we should observe reaction to deviant in-group new members consistent with the socialization strategies and reaction to deviant in-group full members consistent with re-socialization strategies (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994; Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).

These three sets of studies will be presented, respectively, in chapters III, IV and V of this thesis.

CHAPTER III

EFFECT OF INDIVIDUALS' SOCIALIZATION STATUS ON EVALUATIONS OF LIKEABLE AND UNLIKEABLE IN-GROUP OR OUT-GROUP MEMBERS

According to subjective group dynamics (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), the presence of deviance within the group makes salient the prescriptive character of the violated norm (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Such violation is perceived as a menace to individuals' beliefs on a positive social identity (Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001; Chapter II). The black sheep effect represents a strategy used by group members when they face deviance within their group (Chapter II). Derogation of in-group deviant members would contribute to restore the subjective validity of the in-group's standards, and hence, to legitimize individuals' beliefs on a positive social identity (Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

However, if we take Levine and colleagues' (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1988) group socialization model into account, we should expect that the extent to which normative members are upgraded and deviant members are derogated, depends on the level of expertise of perceivers about the group's norms in light of which these members are judged. Indeed, although new members should behave in accordance with their strong commitment to the group, they still lack information about group norms. On the contrary, full members should be aware of which behaviours are consistent or inconsistent with group norms (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994).

Overview and Hypotheses

In the present experiment, participants were categorized in two groups and gave their opinions about two statements: a likeable and an unlikeable statement. Participants then evaluated two target-members (a likeable, or normative, and an unlikeable, or deviant, member) and reported their agreement with the opinions held by target-members. Participants were divided in two conditions, according to which target individuals were in-group or out-group members. Participants were divided in two further conditions according to which they either believed that the likable statement was a consensual group norm, or did not receive any kind of information about the position held by the majority members of their group. With this manipulation, we attempted to reproduce conditions representative of the different knowledge held, respectively, by full members and by new members, about the group's normative system.

The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 2 (Status: Full Member vs. New Member) x 2 (Likeability: Likeable vs. Unlikeable Target). Group and Status were between-participants factors, whereas Likeability was a within-participants factor.

We expected participants to derogate unlikable in-group members and to upgrade likeable in-group members more than unlikeable and likeable out-group members when these members were judged in light of a known consensual in-group norm. Conversely, participants who do not have information about the normative or

deviant character of target individuals' opinions should show a positive bias (in-group bias) concerning both in-group targets as compared to out-group targets.

In addition, in confronting opinions given by full members, while ignoring the normative implications of these opinions, and because they are committed to their group membership, new members should heuristically base their judgments on the sources' credibility (e.g., Böhner & Wänke, 2002). In line with this idea, we expected that participants in the New Member condition would show lower rejection of the unlikeable target's position than would participants in the Full Member condition, who were informed about the deviant character of the deviant's opinion. Concomitantly, participants in the Full Member condition should reinforce their allegiance to the normative opinion.

Pilot Study

In order to choose two statements to use in the manipulation of normative (likeable) and deviant (unlikeable) members in the main study, we asked seven male and 34 female college pupils ($N = 41$), aged from 20 to 23 years old ($M = 20.49$; $SD = 0.71$) to report their agreement or disagreement (1= *I totally disagree*; 7= *I totally agree*) with several statements.

Because we ran our experiments at a time when high-school pupils were involved in strikes regarding educational system changes, we chose this issue to construct our manipulation. The statements ranged from total support to total opposition to the high-school movement. These statements were: "I think pupils of my age have no right to fight for a better educational system"; "I think pupils of my age

should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system"; "I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them"; "I think pupils of my age cannot fight for a better educational system because everything is all right just as it is"; "I think pupils of my age should only have the opportunity to show their agreement/ disagreement with the educational system"; "I think pupils of my age should make a statement about their rights, even if they had to do that individually"; and "I think pupils of my age should dedicate themselves to their own course of learning because this is the best way to achieve a better educational system".

Results show that the statement that best represents a likeable opinion was "I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system". This statement generated the highest agreement (M = 6.15, SD = 0.79) and obtained significantly more agreement among participants than all the other statements ($t40 > 5.06$, $p < .001$, in all paired comparisons).

To choose a statement that would be as unlikeable as the former statement was likeable, we recoded statements that obtained means significantly below the middle point of the scale (4), and conducted similar analyses of the resulting means. Results show that the only statement that achieved a similar score to likeable statement was "I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them" Participants consistently disagreed with this opinion (M = 6.15; SD = 0.99) and they disagreed as much with this statement as they agreed with the previous one ($t40$ = 1.86, *ns*).

Method

Participants

Fifty-three high school pupils participated in this experiment. Thirty-three were male, and 20 were female. Their age ranged from 15 to 19 years old (M = 16.83; SD = 1.00). There were no differences between participants' sex (χ^2 <1, N = 53, d.f. = 3) or age (F3,49 < 1) across experimental conditions and between age. Eleven participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions are not part of this sample.

Procedure

Participants attended two sessions. In the first session, following a procedure similar to that employed by Marques, Abrams and Serôdio (2001, Experiment 2), we categorized participants in two groups (Abstract vs. Pictoric), supposedly on the basis of their responses to a bogus test of "social perception". Participants then gave their opinion about the two statements that we chose from the pilot-study ("I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system", and "I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them".

Group membership manipulation. In the second session, participants received (bogus) feedback about the type of social perception to which they belonged. We then informed participants that we were going to organize debates between individuals who belong to the two types of social perception. Finally, we asked participants to help us choosing the members that should represent each type in the forthcoming debates. We informed participants that other pupils had already taken part in previous meetings under the theme "to fight for a better educational system", and asked them to give their opinion about two such pupils, who had been supposedly "chosen at random from those who had participated in these meetings since the first session, who felt very well integrated in those meetings, and who reported to be strongly willing to participate in the forthcoming debates". This was intended to provide participants with the strong sense that these targets corresponded to the defining features of full members.

Status manipulation. We informed half of the participants that the majority of pupils who participated in the previous meetings held the likeable position, and only a minority stood up for the unlikeable position (full member condition). The other half of the participants (new member condition) did not receive any information about an existing consensus among pupils present in the meetings. All participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.

Dependent Measures

Social identification. Before eigth presented with information about target members, participants answered four questions aimed to tap social identification:

"How well do you think you will get along with Abstract (vs. Pictoric) individuals?", "How far do you consider yourself as similar to other Abstract (vs. Pictoric) individuals?", "How far do you think you will get a good understanding with Abstract (vs. Pictoric) individuals?", and "How far do you identify yourself with Abstract (vs. Pictoric) individuals?". These questions were answered on 7 point scales (1 = *nothing at all*; 7 = *very much*). We averaged these items to an in-group identification (Chronbach's $\alpha = 0.77$) and an out-group identification (Chronbach's $\alpha = 0.81$) score.

Evaluation of target members. Participants had to evaluate target members on seven evaluative bi-polar traits: (1) good-bad colleague, (2) good-bad example to other pupils, (3) with-without good moral principles, (4) with-without good sense, (5) generous-self-centered, (6) interesting-uninteresting person; and (7) loyal-disloyal. Ratings were given on 7 point scales (1 = *negative evaluation*; 7= *positive evaluation*). We averaged these ratings to a likable member (Chronbach's $\alpha = 0.81$) and an unlikeable member (Chronbach's $\alpha = 0.82$) score.

Opinion tolerance. In the first session, participants stated their agreement with the likeable and with the unlikeable opinion. In the second session, participants stated their agreement with the opinions of the likeable and the unlikeable targets: "How much do you agree with the position held by this pupil about the issue 'fighting for a better educational system?" (1= *I totally disagree*; 7= *I totally agree*). We computed participants' opinion change by subtracting their scores of agreement with the likeable and unlikeable opinions in the first session from their agreement with the opinions of the likeable target (agreement with likeable position) and the unlikable target

(agreement with unlikeable position) in the second session. We computed a Likeable Opinion Change score by subtracting agreement with the position of the likeable target in the second session from agreement with the likeable opinion in the first session. Concomitantly, we computed an Unlikeable Opinion Change score by subtracting agreement with the position of the unlikeable target in the second session from agreement with the unlikeable opinion in the first session. The Likeable Opinion Change and Unlikeable Opinion Change scores reflect the extent to which participants' opinion changed in the direction of the target opinion from the first to the second session of the study. A score of 0 indicates no change, and negative and positive scores reflect, respectively, decreases or increases in agreement with the target opinion.[9]

Manipulation-checks. Finally, participants answered to questions aimed to ensure that they knew what were their membership category and the membership category of targets ("To which type of perception do you belong?", "To which type of perception does Pupil A (Pupil B) belong?"), as well as whether they recalled the target pupils' opinions ("What are the opinions of Pupil A (Pupil B) about the issue at stake?", and "What is the general opinion of pupils who participated on the debates?" Opinion A / Opinion B / I have no information about that"). Participants also indicated their willingness to continue participating in forthcoming studies ("How willing are you to participate in the forthcoming debates?", "How willing are you to be a representative member of your school in the debate?").

[9] In the second session, we chose not to directly ask participants' opinion for a second time, in order to prevent participants' likely attempts to show consistency in their opinions.

Results and Discussion

Social Identification

We ran a Group x Status ANOVA on in-group and out-group identification scores. The results show that participants identified more with the in-group (M = 6.10; SD = 0.57) than with the out-group (M = 4.62; SD = 0.94), as indicated by the significant difference between the in-group and out-group identification scores, $F(1,49) = 101.62$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.675$. The remaining effects were non-significant (all $F1,49 < 3.06$, *ns*). In brief, participants identified more with the in-group than with the out-group and this effect was similar across experimental conditions. This result showed that our minimal group's procedure was effective.

Evaluation of Target Members as a Function of Group and Status

Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of evaluations of likeable and unlikeable targets in the four experimental conditions. To test our hypotheses about evaluations of target members, we ran a Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on targets' evaluations. We found a significant effect of Likeability ($F1,49 = 156.28$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.761$). This effect indicates that participants evaluated likeable targets (M = 5.64; SD = 0.59) more positively than unlikeable targets (M = 4.15; SD = 0.86).

We also found a significant Group x Likeability interaction ($F1,49 = 4.28$, $p=.044$, $\eta 2 = 0.080$). Participants evaluated the likeable in-group target (M = 5.91, SD = 0.49) more positively than the likeable out-group target (M = 5.36, SD = 4.13), $t(51)$

= 3.88, p<.001. However, participants did not differentiate between the unlikable in-group and out-group targets (respectively, M = 4.18, SD = 0.92, and M = 4.13, SD = 0.80; $t(51) < 1$).

		Group			
		In-group		Out-group	
Status	Likeability	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
New Member	Likeable	6.13	0.38	5.49	0.59
	Unlikeable	4.70	0.91	3.90	0.79
Full Member	Likeable	5.68	0.50	5.24	0.51
	Unlikeable	3.62	0.55	4.33	0.79

Table 1. Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable Members as a Function of Group and Status (Experiment 1).

Our hypothesis is tested by the Group x Status x Likeability interaction. This interaction was significant (F1,49 = 7.39, p=.009, η2 = 0.131).

Our hypothesis states that participants should upgrade likable in-group targets and derogate unlikable in-group targets relative to their out-group counterparts more when they are in a position equivalent to full members' status than when they are in a position equivalent to new members' status. To test this hypothesis, we broke down this interaction in terms of the Status factor. In support of our hypothesis, and consistent with previous research on the black sheep effect, we found a significant Group x Likeability interaction in the full member condition (F1,50 = 11.97, p=.001, η2 = .192). As can be seen in Table 1, participants evaluated likeable in-group

members more positively (M = 5.68) than likeable out-group members (M = 5.24; $t25$ = 2.23, p=.035). Simultaneously, participants evaluated unlikeable in-group members more negatively (M = 3.62,) than unlikeable out-group members (M = 4.33; $t25$ = 2.71, p=.012; see Figure 3).



Figure 3. Evaluation of likeable and unlikeable members as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 1)

In turn, as expected, participants who were in the equivalent of the new member status disregarded the targets' normative or deviant positions evaluated them only according to their group membership. Indeed, in the new member condition, the Group x Likeability interaction was not significant (F1,50 < 1), but Group was significant (F1,50 = 14.29, p=.001, η2 = .149). Participants evaluated both in-group

members (M = 5.42, SD = 0.47) more positively than both out-group members (M = 4.69, SD = 0.51; see Figure 3).[10]

In brief, the results are consistent with our hypotheses. In the full member condition, we found a pattern of evaluations that matches the black sheep effect, whereas in the new member condition, the pattern corresponds to a simple in-group bias. Apparently, thus, when participants have information about their group's norm, they use this information as a basis for derogating individuals who hold undesirable positions, but they do not do so when these undesirable positions are not matched against their knowledge of the group's norm.

These results are consistent with the subjective group dynamics' claim that reactions to deviants are moderated by the deviants' group membership. But, more importantly in light of our present concerns, the results also show that, even, in-group deviants are derogated only to the extent that individuals are able to match the deviants' opinions against an existing in-group consensus. Therefore, we may suggest that, not only is the group a powerful mediator of reactions to deviant individuals, but also that the degree of normative expertise of individuals within the in-group (in the present case, their full member status) is crucial in generating negative reaction towards deviant members. In this vein, the present results seem to illustrate the validity

[10] To check for the relationship between upgrading and derogation of likable and unlikable targets and in-group identification, we computed an Intra-Group Differentiation score as the difference between the evaluation scores of likeable and unlikable targets, and a Differential Identification score as the difference between the In-Group Identification score and the Out-Group Identification score. We then correlated these scores. We should expect the correlation between the two measures to be stronger and more positive in the in-group/full member status condition than in all other conditions. That is, in this condition, the more participants differentially identified with the in-group, the more they would upgrade the likeable in-group member and derogate the unlikeable in-group member. However, the results were largely inconclusive. For one thing, in the in-group/full member condition, the correlation was not significant (r = .16, *ns*). Interestingly, the correlation was negative (r = -.28, *ns*) in the in-group/new member condition, indicating that, in this condition, the more participants differentially identified with the in-group, the less they differentiated between likeable and unlikeable in-group targets. The correlations in the out-group condition were, respectively, r = .24, and r = -.02).

of our theoretical articulation between the group socialization and the subjective group dynamics models.

Commitment to the Norm

Our second hypothesis stated that new members would be more influenced than full members would, by the deviant opinions of unlikable in-group members, whereas full members would reinforce their normative position. To test this hypothesis, we compared the scores of opinion change towards the likeable and unlikeable positions with a value of 0 (indicating no change) within conditions. The results only showed that participants in the in-group full member condition marginally increased their agreement with the likeable position (M = 0.31, SD = 0.63; $t12$ = 1.76, p=.10, remaining differences were not significant; t always <1.47, *ns*). Although, this result is inconclusive, this marginal effect is in line with our hypothesis. Participants tended reinforce their agreement with an opinion they considered to be normative in the second session of the study.

We followed a similar procedure with respect to changes towards the unlikable position. In this case, the results were more conclusive and consistent with our hypothesis. Indeed, participants in the in-group/new member condition showed a more marked tendency towards the unlikeable opinion between the first and the second session ($t13$ = 2.88, p=.013) than did participants in all other conditions (t always < 1.29, *ns*; see Table 2 and Figure 4).

	Group			
	In-group		Out-group	
Status	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
New Member	0.93	1.21	-0.58	1.56
Full Member	-0.15	1.07	0.14	1.56

Table 2. Change towards Unlikeable Position as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 1)

Finally, we attempted to check for whether there would be reinforcement of the group norm following evaluations of target members. We thus correlated the scores of evaluations of the likeable and unlikeable members with agreement with the likeable opinion within each condition. Results were consistent with our hypothesis.



Figure 4. Change towards unlikeable position as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 1)

As can be seen in Table 3, we found a significant positive correlation between evaluation of the normative member and agreement with the normative opinion in the second phase (r = 0.65, p=.015), only within the in-group/high salience norm condition. This association was not observed in the first phase (r = 0.15, *ns*). Consistently with this result, we observed that the initial correlation between agreement with the unlikeable opinion and evaluation of the deviant target, become significant in the second session of the study.

			Group	
Status			In-group	Out-group
New Member	1rst Session	Likeable	.34, *ns* (N=14)	.35, *ns* (N=12)
		Unlikeable	.23, *ns* (N=14)	-.25, *ns* (N=12)
	2nd Session	Likeable	.44, *ns* (N=14)	.45, *ns* (N=12)
		Unlikeable	-.21, *ns* (N=14)	-.52, *p*=.08 (N=12)
Full Member	1rst Session	Likeable	.15, *ns* (N=13)	.19, *ns* (N=14)
		Unlikeable	-.46, *ns* (N=13)	-.06, *ns* (N=14)
	2nd Session	Likeable	.65, *p*=.015 (N=13)	.22, *ns* (N=14)
		Unlikeable	-.55, *p*=.05 (N=13)	-.13, *ns* (N=14)

Table 3. Product-Moment Correlations between Agreement with the Likeable Opinion and Evaluations of Likeable and Unlikeable Members in the First and Second Session of the Experiment (Experiment 1)

Although these results are not enough clear to allow one to draw strong conclusions, they suggest that, after being confronted with deviant in-group members, full members increase their commitment to the group's normative position, i.e. they reinforce their allegiance to that norm, and derogate the deviants.

General Discussion and Conclusions

Our results show that participants more strongly derogate deviant in-group members and upgrade normative in-group members than their out-group counterparts. More importantly, the results show that participants who were informed of the consensual position of their group derogated in-group deviants, and upgraded in-group normative members more than participants who were not informed about the group's consensus. The judgments of normative and deviant in-group members thus seem to be strongly due to the individuals' allegiance to in-group norms, rather than to interpersonal differences of opinion within the group. In addition, we found a tendency for participants to increase their allegiance to their breached norm, after having judged normative and deviant members. This result does not allow us to establish any causal link between the two phenomena, but are consistent with the idea that judgments of normative and deviant in-group members may be part of a more general process according to which groups reinforce their uniformity through the reinforcement of their members (specifically, full members) commitment to the violated norms.

The present results seem consistent with Levine and Moreland's socialization model (1994) and with the subjective group dynamics model. New members should be highly motivated to obtain reinforcement from the other group members, but they lack

the required knowledge to be certain about group norms. As a result, their only way to promote positive in-group differentiation is by engaging in in-group biased judgments, irrespective of the degree to which the characteristics or behaviour of group members fit the group's norms. As a result, full members will be less tolerant, whereas new members will be more lenient, towards deviant opinions. It suggests that contrary to full members, new members lack sufficient knowledge to adopt a prescriptive focus in the presence of deviant members.

In the following chapter, we will attempt to examine the reverse side of this coin. That is, we will attempt to examine the impact that deviance shown by different status members may have on individuals, and how their resulting reactions may help them to reinforce their beliefs in a positive social identity.

CHAPTER IV

EFFECT OF TARGETS' SOCIALIZATION STATUS, GROUP MEMBERSHIP, AND LIKEABILITY ON THEIR EVALUATION

In this chapter, we present two experiments aimed to test the general idea that individuals will judge normative in-group members and deviant in-group members respectively, more positively and more negatively than normative and deviant out-group members, but that this will be especially the case when in-group targets have a full member intra-group status. Among other details, in Experiment 2, the targets of judgment are normative and deviant full members as compared with normative and deviant new members, and normative and deviant marginal members. In Experiment 3, the targets of judgment are normative and deviant full members as compared with normative and deviant new members, and normative and deviant ex-members. These judgments are always made in an inter-group context.

As we discussed in Chapter I, the small group approach considers that group members view intra-group dissidence as a threat to valued beliefs (social reality) and group goal attainment (group locomotion). The group will solve the tension resulting from the presence of deviants, either by attempting to make the deviants reintegrate the majority opinion or, if this effort fails, by excluding deviant member's from the group (Festinger, 1950; Levine, 1980). Consistently with this idea, Levine and colleagues (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982) propose that deviants may be ascribed a marginal member status within the group, following which full members engage in re-socialization strategies aimed to lead the deviants to adopt pro-group behaviour (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). If these strategies fail, group members may

decide to expel the marginal member from the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982).

An important form of intra-group deviance is disloyalty (Levine & Thompson, 1996; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). As Zdaniuk and Levine (2001) pointed out, every group holds a norm according to which members ought loyalty to the group and should involve themselves in pro-group behaviour. Individuals who decide to leave the group are perceived as violators of this norm. Such individuals are frequently labelled as traitors (Levine & Thompson, 1996). One important reason for this fact is that members, who decide to abandon the group, are publicizing the group's inability to satisfy their personal needs and lack of skills to retain them as members. Defectors are thus perceived as a direct threat to the groups' image in view of other groups (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001).

On its side, the subjective group dynamics approach views deviance as a menace to the normative standards that legitimize members' beliefs in the in-group's positive social differentiation (Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). Following self-categorization, these standards become a relevant aspect of social reality and have an immediate impact on individuals' social identity. In-group deviance from such standards is thus an immediate wounding to the individuals' social self-concept (Marques & Páez, 1994). As a result, individuals would strongly express their rejection of deviant in-group members, expect other in-group members to express similar rejection, and assume that others expect them to express rejection as well (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Taboada, 1998, Experiment 2).

Considering that group members assume different statuses within the group, depending on which socialization phase they are (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994), we

can expect that members will react towards deviant behaviour in light of the intra-group status of deviant members. The same deviant opinion may trigger different reactions (rejection or even acceptance) depending on the member's status. For the same reason, a normative opinion should be more or less positively appraised depending on the intra-group status of the member that supports this opinion.

We can think of, at least, three reasons why full members have a stronger impact on the legitimization of the group's positive value. First, full members should be perceived as better group representatives than other members whose intra-group status is less central, or even marginal to the group (cf. Turner et al, 1987). Second, normative members are expected to define the group's standards and to point the right track for the group. Full members are expected to endorse group norms, contribute to intra-group uniformity and cohesion, and engage in influencing strategies towards other members in order to reinforce conformity to group norms (Levine & Moreland, 1994). Third, full members should be perceived as the epitome of group loyalty and, therefore, their behaviour should correspond to the group's ideal to be achieved by other members.

In turn, new members are not supposed to have a good grasp of the group's norms, or to know the appropriate courses of action to promote group goals (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). Similarly, marginal status ensues from group members' decreased commitment to the group, and reciprocally, a decreased commitment of the group towards these members. To some extent, these members are not expected to represent the group, and the group does not feel responsible by their behaviour (cf. Levine & Moreland, 1994).

It follows from the above reasoning that in-group full members whose behaviour diverges from the group's standards will be perceived as a higher threat than

a new member or a marginal member who adopted a similar behaviour. By referring to the subjective group dynamics model, we may thus suggest that full members that deviate from group norms will be viewed as a stronger threat to social identity than other less central in-group members will.

Overview and Hypotheses

The two experiments reported in this chapter (Experiments 2 and 3), examined the general hypotheses that, whereas individuals generally evaluate normative in-group full members more favourably than less central in-group members or out-group members, they will more strongly derogate in-group full members who deviate from the group's standards than other less central in-group members whose behaviour is equally deviant. Assuming that the behaviour of out-group members, irrespective of their status within the out-group, is irrelevant to the validation of in-group standards, these members will evoke less extreme reactions.

In Experiment 2, pupils of two neighbouring schools had to judge two other pupils issuing either from the in-group school or from the out-group school. According to conditions, the targets were described as either having a new member status (newcomer pupils), or a full member status (elder pupils) or a marginal member status (elder pupils who decided to leave the school). In the three conditions, one of the targets adopted a likable opinion, and the other adopted an unlikable opinion.

Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 2, except targets had a new member, full member, or ex-member status. The ex-member was constructed as a pupil who had left the school to join another one.

It may be worth noticing that participants' less extreme evaluations of in-group marginal members and ex-members than of in-group full members has important theoretical implications. As we noticed above, group defectors breach the important norm of loyalty, and defection may create a negative image of the group as lacking the ability to attract its members (Zdanyuk & Levine, 2001). In addition, deviant (i.e. unlikeable) in-group members should also pose a threat to the group in that they jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of the standards that sustain beliefs in a positive social identity (Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1998).

We may thus reason that normative in-group defectors, who are likely to be viewed as potential contributors to the group's identity, should be more harmful to the group's image than deviant in-group defectors who, in any case, are likely to jeopardize such identity.[11] We thus propose that, whereas defection of normative members may harm the group's self-image, defection by deviant members should not pose such a problem. To some extent, defection of deviants would be an instance of the group's "getting rid" of undesirable individuals. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we hypothesized, in addition to the above general hypotheses, that participants would make less positive evaluations of the normative in-group ex-member than of the normative out-group ex-member, while evaluating deviant in-group and out-group ex-members in a similar manner.

[11] Indeed, this is the main reason we chose to include the ex-member status, instead of the marginal member status, in Experiment 3.

Experiment 2

Effect of Status and Group Membership on the Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members

Method

Participants

Forty-six female and 49 male compose our sample ($N = 95$). Participants' sex was equally distributed across experimental conditions ($\chi 2 = 1.41$, d.f. = 5, $N = 95$, *ns*). Participants' age ranged from 13 to 17 years old ($M = 14.45$; $SD = 0.73$). There were no significant age differences across experimental conditions ($F5,88 < 1$). All participants were high school pupils. Seventeen participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions are not part of this sample.

Experimental Design

The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member vs. Full Member vs. Marginal Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative Member vs. Deviant Member). Group and Status were between-participants factors, whereas Likeability was a within-participant factor.

Procedure

This experiment was presented to participants as part of a larger study about the school environment experienced in neighbouring schools. We informed participants

that the experiment was composed of two sessions. In the first session, participants gave their opinions about the in-group school and the out-group school, as well as about some relevant issues. The second session was presented as an attempt to validate results obtained in the first session.

In the first session, participants responded to three sets of questions. The first set referred to participants' school and to how long they have attended that school. These questions allowed us to introduce the experimental manipulations in the second session. The second set of questions aimed to measure participants' identification with their school as compared to the out-group school. The third set of questions was composed of five continua of seven assertions each, so that the first and second assertions were socially undesirable ("I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them", and "I think we should demand whatever we want from our friends, and they have to comply with us"); the sixth and seventh sentences were socially desirable ("I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system", and "I think we should respect our friends, and be cautious not to demand too much from them"). Each issue ended with a question asking participants to state how important that issue was for them ("How much do you think this issue is important?" 1= not at all important; 7= very important). These issues were used to manipulate likeability in the second session.

Likeability manipulation. In the second session, we manipulated target members' likability by means of two of the issues to which participants had responded in the first session. For each participant, we chose the issue that participant considered as the most important of all. Only two issues were used, because participants were unanimous about the importance of these two issues. One issue concerned the struggle

for better teaching conditions (herein called Issue 1). The other issue was related to friendship (Issue 2)[12]. Depending on the issue participants considered the most important, and the sentence they agreed the most with, the normative target was presented as a pupil who chose one of the following statements: "I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system" (Issue 1), or "I think we should respect our friends, and be cautious not to demand too much from them" (Issue 2). Deviant targets were presented as having chosen one of the following statements "I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them" (Issue 1) or "I think we should demand whatever we want from our friends, and they should comply" (Issue 2).

Two weeks later, in the second session, participants received feedback relative to their answers in the first phase of the experiment: "The pupil attends the (participant's) school, for (number of years participant has attended that school) years. The pupil in question is very well integrated in his/her school. Chosen Issue: (1 or 2). Opinion pupil agrees with the most: (transcription of the statement)." This feedback was based on the information collected about each participant in the first session of the experiment and served, mainly, for the purpose of establishing credibility of

[12] Issue 1 included the following statements, from most socially desirable to most socially undesirable: "I think pupils of my age should join together and negotiate the best way to fight for a better educational system"; "I think pupils of my age have to fight for a different educational system, even if they are not aware of a clear solution to adopt"; "I think pupils of my age should comply to the elder pupils' decisions"; "There is no need to fight for a better educational system"; "I think pupils of my age should comply to the actual educational system, even if they do not agree"; "I think pupils of my age have no right to fight for a better educational system"; and "I think pupils of my age are not mature enough to know what is best for them".
Issue 2 included the following statements, from most socially desirable to most socially undesirable: "I think we should respect our friends, and be cautious not to demand too much from them"; "I think we should be always available to our friends, even if we have to sacrifice ourselves"; "I think we should help our friends according to our desires and not to their needs"; "I think that there is no such thing as truly friendship"; "I think we may ask anything from our friends"; "I think our friends should feel obliged to help us whenever we need"; "I think we should demand whatever we want from our friends, and they should comply".

information about the targets members. Participants should indicate how much they considered that information about them as being correct or incorrect.

Group and status manipulations. Participants were then provided with information about two target members. According to experimental conditions, these target members were presented as attending either the same school as participants (in-group condition) or a neighbouring school (out-group condition). Moreover, both target members were presented, either as "having attended the school for 6 months" and feeling "very motivated to be in that school" (new member condition), or as "having attended that school for about 5 years" and feeling "very integrated in their school" (full member condition), or as "having attended that school for about 5 years", but "preferring to leave the school" (marginal member condition).

Normative and deviant members' manipulation. All participants were presented with two targets. For each participant, one target (normative member) had allegedly chosen the same socially desirable statement as the participant did, and the other target (deviant member) had allegedly chosen the opposite statement, i.e. the most socially undesirable one.

Dependent Measures

Social identification. Before participants received information about target members, they answered to a series of questions measuring their degree of identification to their school. These questions were: "I like to be a pupil of my school";

"I would rather be a pupil of (neighbouring school)"; "I like to hang around with the other pupils of my school"; "I would rather hang around with pupils of the (neighbouring school)"; "I like to be sociable with the other pupils of my school"; and "I would rather be sociable with pupils of the (neighbouring school)". Answers were given on a 7 point scale (1 = *I completely disagree*; 7 = *I completely agree*). From these answers, we computed an In-group Identification (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.73$) and an Out-group Identification (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.84$) score.

Evaluation of target members. After reading information about both target members, participants evaluated these members on six traits: fun, respectful, sensitive, generous, correct, and loyal (1 = *nothing at all*; 7 = *completely*). The evaluation score for each target corresponds to the mean of these traits (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.59$ and Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.77$, respectively for the normative and deviant target members).

Manipulation-checks. At the end of the second phase of the experiment, and before they were debriefed, participants answered to manipulation-checks questions: "Which school does pupil A(B) attend?", "For how long does pupil A(B) attend this school?", "How does pupil A(B) feel about their integration in this school?, and "With whose opinion do you agree the most: pupil A(B)"). Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.

Results

Social Identification

A Group x Status x Social Identification ANOVA on identification with the in-group and with the out-group revealed that participants identified more strongly to the in-group (M = 5.93, SD = 0.88) than with the out-group (M = 3.06, SD = 1.11), $F(1,89)$ = 458.87, $p<.001$, $\eta 2$ = .77. The remaining effects were not significant, F always <1.84, *ns*.

Evaluation of Target Members

A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA conducted on target evaluation scores showed a main effect of Likeability ($F1,89$ = 312.05, $p<.001$, $\eta 2$ = .78). Participants evaluated the normative target (M = 5.05, SD = 0.64) more positively than the deviant target (M = 2.87, SD = 0.86). We found no significant effects of Group, Status, Group x Likeability, and Group x Status (all $F2, 89 < 2.91$, *ns*).

The analysis also yielded a significant Status x Likeability effect ($F2,89$ = 5.00, p=.009, $\eta 2$ = .101). Regardless of group membership, we observed differences between evaluations ascribed to normative members ($F1,92$ = 6.75, p=.002, $\eta 2$=.128). Normative marginal members (M = 4.77, SD = 0.62) were less positively evaluated than new members (M = 5.07, SD = 0.59, $t62$ = 2.00, p=.05) and than full members (M = 5.32, SD = 0.61, $t63$ = 3.61, p=.001). We found no differences between evaluations of normative new members and normative full members ($t59$ = 1.63, *ns*). No differences emerged from evaluations of new, full, and marginal deviant members ($F1,92$ = 1.69, *ns; Overall Mean* = 2.87, SD = 0.86).

Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a Function of their Status and Group Membership. More relevant to our hypotheses is the interaction Group x Status x Likeability ($F2,89 = 3.20$, p=.046, $\eta 2 = .07$). Table 4 shows the mean scores of evaluations of target members across experimental conditions.

	Group			
	In-Group		Out-Group	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
New Member				
Normative	5.11	0.44	5.04	0.71
Deviant	3.02	0.83	2.88	0.61
Full Member				
Normative	5.62	0.51	5.04	0.58
Deviant	2.27	0.87	3.00	0.99
Marginal Member				
Normative	4.89	0.61	4.65	0.62
Deviant	3.12	0.94	2.91	0.71

Table 4. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment 2)

We hypothesized that participants should evaluate the normative in-group full member more positively than the out-group normative full member and,

simultaneously, evaluate the deviant in-group full member more negatively that the deviant out-group full member. To test this hypothesis, we broke down the second-order interaction according to Status. We found a significant Group x Likeability interaction in the full member status condition, $F(1,91) = 8.01$, $p=.006$, $\eta 2=.08$. Participants evaluated the deviant in-group member more negatively than the deviant out-group member ($F1,91 = 5.64$, $p=.020$, $\eta 2=.058$), and the normative in-group full member more positively than the normative out-group full member ($F1,91 = 6.20$, $p=.015$, $\eta 2=.063$). The Group x Likeability interaction was not significant, either in the new member status, or in the marginal member status conditions (both $F1,91 < 1$, see Table 4 and Figure 5).



Figure 5. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 2).

Our hypothesis also establishes that, in the out-group condition, there should be differences between evaluations of normative targets or between deviant targets, according to their socialization status. In turn, in the in-group condition, full members should be the most positively or the most negatively evaluated of all targets, depending on whether they are, respectively, normative or deviant.

To check for this prediction, we broke down the second-order interaction according to the Group factor. The Status x Likeability interaction was significant in the in-group condition ($F2,90 = 7.18$, $p=.001$, $\eta 2=.136$) but not in the out-group condition ($F2,90 < 1$).[13]

As predicted, evaluations of the normative in-group full member were more positive than evaluations of the normative in-group new member and marginal member ($F2,90 = 5.81$, $p=.004$, $\eta 2=.109$; both $ts > 2.89$, p always $< .022$), but there were no significant differences between evaluations of normative in-group new members and marginal members ($t29 = 1.10$, *ns*). Concomitantly, participants evaluated the deviant in-group full member more negatively than the other deviant out-group members ($F2,90 = 4.80$, $p=.010$, $\eta 2=.096$; both ts > 2.28, p always $<.030$). In brief, these results confirm our main hypothesis about the increased impact of in-group full members' normativeness or deviance on participants' judgments.

Correlation between In-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation

We propose that upgrading of normative in-group members and derogation of deviant in-group members should be a direct function of in-group identification, and that this should be more the case when normative and deviant in-group members have

[13] Our results also show a significant effect of Likeability ($F1,90 = 303.91$, $p<.001$). The remaining effects were not significant (Status in the in-group condition: $F2,90 < 1$; Status in the out-group condition: $F2,90 = 1.71$, *ns*).

the full member status than any other status. To check for this assumption, we computed the product-moment correlations between the in-group identification or the out-group identification scores and the intra-group differentiation score (difference between evaluation of the normative member and the deviant member) in the Group and Status conditions. Table 5 shows these correlations.

	In-Group Condition		Out-Group Condition	
	r In-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* Out-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* In-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* Out-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation
New	.04, *ns* (N=14)	.45, *ns* (N=14)	.09, *ns* (N=16)	-.28, *ns* (N=16)
Full	.45, $p = .092$ (N=15)	.18, *ns* (N=15)	.23, *ns* (N=16)	-.13, *ns* (N=16)
Marginal	-.02, *ns* (N=17)	-.05, *ns* (N=17)	.27, *ns* (N=17)	.02, *ns* (N=17)
Total	.35, $p = .019$ (N=46)	.17, *ns* (N=46)	.02, *ns* (N=49)	-.12, *ns* (N=49)

Table 5. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Identification or Out-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-Group Conditions (Experiment 2).

As can be seen in the "Total" row of Table 5 the only significant correlation is found in the in-group condition ($r = .35$, $p=.019$). This result suggests that identification may be a predictor of differentiation between normative and deviant members, only in the case of the in-group (cf. Branscombe, Wann & Noel, 1994). Also interesting is the fact that, within conditions, the only correlation that approached

significance is to be found in the in-group/full member condition.[14] In other words, the more participants identified with the in-group, the more they upgraded the normative in-group full member and derogated the deviant in-group full member, but in-group identification was not associated with judgments of new and marginal in-group members. This result is thus in line with our assumption that full members are especially relevant to the legitimization of individual's social identity.

To summarize, the present results seem to be entirely in accordance with our predictions. Participants upgraded normative in-group full members and derogated deviant in-group full members as compared to their out-group matching members. This phenomenon did not emerge from evaluations of members who held other statuses. Moreover, participants upgraded normative in-group full members relative to normative in-group new members and normative in-group marginal members. This result reinforces the assumption that full members are particularly relevant paragons for other members as they define the group's normative standards. In addition, participants derogated deviant in-group full members relative to deviant in-group new members and deviant in-group marginal members. In addition, we found a significant correlation between in-group identification and differentiation between normative and deviant in-group full members. Together, these results support our reasoning about the increased validation impact of normative full members, and the threatening impact of deviant full members as regards the positiveness of the in-groups social identity.

[14] Notice that this correlation was computed on a sample of $N = 15$.

Experiment 3

Reaction to Normative and Deviant Members as a Function of Targets' Group Membership and of their Contribution to the Validation of Group Norms

Overview and Hypotheses

Experiment 3 was, essentially a replication of Experiment 2, except that, in the present experiment, we replaced marginal members by ex-members. As in Experiment 2, we predicted that normative in-group full members would be upgraded relative to normative in-group new members and ex-members, and that deviant in-group full members would be derogated relative to deviant new and ex-members. In addition, we expected normative in-group full members and deviant in-group full members to be, respectively, upgraded and derogated as compared to their out-group counterparts, but that this effect should not emerge from evaluations of new members and ex-members.

Another difference between the present experiment and Experiment 3 is that, this time, we decided to more directly measure participants' evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole, instead of asking them about their identification with these groups. We expected an in-group bias to emerge from these evaluations, in the form of more favourable in-group than out-group evaluations. More importantly, in line with previous research (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; Marques, Robalo & Rocha, 1992; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988), we expected, a positive correlation to emerge between in-group bias (i.e. the positive difference between evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole) and intra-group

differentiation (i.e. the positive difference between evaluations of normative and deviant in-group members) especially in the case of full members.

Method

Participants

Participants were 12 male and 61 female (N = 73) university students issuing from a private university of Porto. Their ages ranged from 19 to 47 years old (M = 23.29; SD = 3.87). Thirty-five participants were Psychology students, and 38 were Management students. There were no differences in age (F5,66 < 1), course ($\chi 2 = 1.24$, d.f. = 5, N=73, *ns*) and sex ($\chi 2 < 1$, d.f. = 5, N=73) across the experimental conditions. Sixteen participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions are not part of this sample.

Experimental Design

The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member vs. Full Member vs. Ex-Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Status were between-participants factors whereas Likeability was a within-participant factor.

Procedure

Participants were invited to take part in a study concerning the educational system. They were informed that the Portuguese government had created a task force

aimed to examine and propose solutions to a number of problems currently faced by the Portuguese educational system. Participants were informed, both verbally and by written instructions, that a preliminary survey had been conducted with pupils of several courses, in which pupils had been asked to state their most important needs. They were further informed the present study aimed to validate evidence collected at that survey. They were thus to answer to a questionnaire about the issues raised by the previous sample of respondents.

Likeability manipulation. Participants were provided with two short reports that presented information about two targets. These reports were similar to those used in Experiment 2, with the necessary changes to make them fit the university, rather than the high-school level. The normative target agreed with the statement "students should join together and fight for their right to participate in decisions regarding the educational system". In turn, the deviant target member agreed with the statement "students are not competent enough to decide about what is best for them".

Group and members' status manipulations. According to Group conditions, target members were presented issuing either from the participants' course (in-group condition) or from the other course (out-group condition). Targets' status also varied according to conditions. In the new member condition, they were presented as "attending the course for 6 months, after having asked to be transferred from another course", and as having reported "a strong motivation to attend this course". In the full member condition, the targets were presented as "having attended the course for 4 years", and as having reported "a strong motivation to remain in the course". In the ex-

member condition, the targets were presented as "having just left the course after having asked to be transferred to another course" and as having reported that they had "felt strong difficulties of integration in the former course".

Dependent Measures

The dependent measures tapped the topics as in Experiment 2, with an additional set of question aimed to measure in-group bias.

Evaluation of target members. After participants received information about the two targets, they evaluated each target on seven bi-polar traits by means of seven-point scales (1 = selfish, bad example, unethical, disrespectful, bad colleague, uninteresting, and disloyal; 7 = altruistic, good example, ethical, respectful, good colleague, interesting, and loyal). We averaged scores of these traits to a Normative Target (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.79$) and a Deviant Target (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$) score.

Groups' evaluations. Finally, participants answered to eight questions aimed to tap evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole: "How much do you consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are competent?"; "How much do you consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are fun?", "How much do you consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are good colleagues?", "How much do you consider that students of the (in-group/out-group) course are hard workers?" (1= nothing at all; 7= very much). We averaged these evaluations to an In-Group Evaluation (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.92$) and an Out-Group Evaluation score (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.94$).

Manipulation-checks. At the end of the experiment, all participants answered manipulation-checks questions, similar to those used in Experiment 2. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment.

Results

Evaluations of Normative and Deviant Targets as a Function of their Status and Group Membership

Table 6 shows the means and standard-deviations of evaluations of members across conditions. A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on these evaluations showed a main effect of Likeability, $F1,67 = 456.20$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = .872$. Across conditions, the normative target ($M = 5.50$; $SD = 0.62$) was more positively evaluated than the deviant target ($M = 3.43$; $SD = 0.73$). The effects of Group, Status, and Group x Status were not significant (F always < 2.93, *ns*). Group x Likeability was marginally significant ($F1,67 = 3.69$, $p=.059$, $\eta 2 = .052$), and Status x Likeability was significant ($F2,67 = 7.12$, $p=.002$, $\eta 2 = .175$). More relevant in light of our hypotheses, is the significant Group x Likeability x Status interaction ($F2,67 = 9.83$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = .227$).

We broke down this second-order interaction according to the Status factor. The Group x Likeability was significant in the full member condition ($F1,69 = 14.42$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = .166$), marginally significant in the ex-member condition ($F1,69 = 2.84$, $p=.097$, $\eta 2 = .032$), and non-significant in the new member condition ($F1,69 < 1$; see

Table 6 and Figure 6. Our results also show a significant effect of Likeability (F1,69 = 389.11, p<.001).[15]

	Group			
	In-Group		Out-Group	
Status	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
New Member				
Normative Member	5.56	0.55	5.66	0.62
Deviant Member	3.44	0.82	3.85	0.43
Full Member				
Normative Member	6.14	0.42	5.32	0.54
Deviant Member	2.83	0.82	3.48	0.81
Ex-Member				
Normative Member	4.86	0.57	5.44	0.34
Deviant Member	3.51	0.57	3.40	0.62

Table 6. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment3)

Consistently with results of Experiment 2 and with previous research on the black sheep effect, we found that participants evaluated the normative in-group full member (M = 6.14; SD = 0.42) more positively than the normative out-group full member (M = 5.32; SD = 0.54; F1,69 = 11.34, p = .001, η2 = .132) and,

[15] The remaining effects were not significant (Group in the new member condition: F1,69 = 1.90, *ns*; Group in the full member condition: F1,69 < 1; Group in the ex-member condition: F1,69 = 1.48, *ns*).

simultaneously, that they evaluated the deviant in-group full member (M = 2.83; SD = 0.82) more negatively than the deviant out-group full member (M = 3.48; SD = 0.81; F1,69 = 4.30, p=.042, η2 = .059; see Figure 6).



Figure 6. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of Group and Status (Experiment 3).

To further inspect on these results, we broke down the three-way interaction according to the Group factor, in order to compare target evaluations across status within each group. We found a significant Likeability x Status interaction in the in-group condition (F2,68 = 15.04, p<.001, η2 = .305) but not in the out-group condition (F2,68 < 1).

We then computed separate one-way ANOVAs, one aimed to compare evaluations of normative in-group new members, marginal members, and ex-members,

and the other, aimed to compare evaluations of deviant in-group new members, marginal members, and ex-members. The ANOVA on evaluations of normative in-group members yielded a significant effect ($F2,68 = 17.10$, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = .325$). The ANOVA on evaluations of deviant in-group members yielded a marginally significant effect ($F2,68 = 2.96$, $p = .058$, $\eta 2 = .077$).

These ANOVAs indicate that participants evaluated in-group normative ex-members less positively ($M = 4.86$; $SD = 0.57$) than normative new members ($M = 5.56$; $SD = 0.55$, $t22 = 3.08$, $p=.005$) and than normative full members ($M = 6.14$; $SD = 0.42$, $t20 = 6.04$, $p<.001$). Also in line with predictions, the normative in-group full member was more positively evaluated than the normative in-group new member ($t22 = 2.88$, $p = .009$).

Concomitantly, with respect to deviant members, participants derogated the full member ($M = 2.83$; $SD = 0.82$) as compared to the ex-member ($M = 3.51$; $SD = 0.57$; $t20 = 2.24$, $p=.036$), and, marginally, the new member ($M = 3.44$; $SD = 0.82$; $t22 = 1.81$, $p=.08$). There were no differences between evaluations of deviant new members and of deviant ex-members ($t22 < 1$). These data replicate results found in the previous experiment.

In brief, consistent with our predictions, among normative in-group targets, the full member was the most positively evaluated, and the ex-member was the less positively evaluated of all. Among deviant in-group targets, the full member is the most derogated and the new member and the ex-member are equally less derogated. In the whole, these results are consistent with results of Experiment 2, and suggest that full members, normative or deviant, are those, which have more strongly impact on participants' motivation to validate their beliefs on a positive social identity.

Reactions to defectors. We predicted that normative in-group ex-members would be judged more negatively than normative out-group ex-members, whereas no difference should emerge between evaluations of deviant in-group and out-group ex-members. Although the Group x Likeability interaction found in the ex-member condition was only marginally significant, we tested the differences in evaluations between normative ex-members of both groups.

We found a significant difference between evaluations of the normative in-group ex-member (M = 4.86; SD = 0.57) and the normative out-group ex-member (M = 5.44; SD = 0.34; $F1,69 = 5.37$, p=.023, $\eta 2 = .062$). However, there were no significant differences between deviant ex-members ($F1,69 < 1$). Thus, the present results lend acceptable support to our hypothesis. They suggest that participants' viewed the normative in-group ex-member as a potential threat to the in-group's image. Notice, however, that this target was still positively judged, a result that also supports the impact of the likeability manipulation on participants' judgments.

In-Group Bias and Intra-Group Differentiation

We constructed an In-Group Bias score by subtracting the In-Group Evaluation score from the Out-Group Evaluation score, so that a positive value indicates in-group bias. We first submitted the in-group bias score to a Group x Status ANOVA. We found no significant effects either of Group ($F1,66 = 2.68$, p = .106), or of Status and Group x Status (both $F2,66 < 1$). Overall participants showed an in-group bias in their evaluations of in-group and out-group as a whole (M = 1.06, SD = 1.05; this score was significantly different from 0, $t71 = 8.55$, $p < .001$).

Similarly to what we did in Experiment 2, we computed the product-moment correlation between the intra-group differentiation score (difference between evaluation of the normative member and the deviant member) and the in-group bias score across Group and Status conditions. A positive correlation would indicate that the more participants bias their evaluations towards a favourable view of the in-group the more they would upgrade the normative target and derogate the deviant target. Table 7 shows the obtained correlations.

	In-Group Condition	Out-Group Condition
New Member	.33, *ns*, ($N = 13$)	.17, *ns*, ($N = 13$)
Full Member	.41, *ns*, ($N = 11$)	-.06, *ns*, ($N = 13$)
Ex-Member	-.22, *ns*, ($N = 11$)	-.19, *ns*, ($N = 12$)
Total	.16, *ns*, ($N = 35$)	.03, *ns*, ($N = 38$)

Table 7. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Bias and Intra-Group Differentiation across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-Group Conditions.

Although the correlations were not significant, which may be due to the relatively small samples, they go in a direction consistent with our reasoning. As can be seen in Table 7, in general, the correlations found for new member targets and full member targets are stronger in the in-group than in the out-group condition. This indicates that the more participants differentiated between normative and deviant in-group targets in the new member and the full member conditions, the more they were biased towards the in-group. Although these results do not grant any definitive

conclusions, they seem to encourage the idea that derogation of these in-group targets indeed, may sustain positive in-group differentiation.

To summarize, the present experiment yields three important results. First, the present results provide further support to the black sheep effect. However, they contribute to deepen our understanding of this effect. Indeed, they show that the black sheep effect is largely dependent on the more central (as opposed to more peripheral) status of in-group normative and deviant members. Indeed, the black sheep effect emerged exclusively from evaluations of full members. In our view, this result establishes the relevance of a theoretical integration of the group socialization model, which accounts for the importance of members' status within their groups, and the subjective group dynamics model, which accounts for the impact of group standards on the evaluation of these members.

Second, and in accordance with the above idea, participants upgraded normative in-group full members and derogated deviant in-group full members as compared, respectively, to normative in-group new members and ex-members, and, to deviant in-group new members and ex-members. This result thus further supports the idea that in-group full members have an increased impact on individuals' subjective validation of their beliefs on a positive in-group identity.

Finally, the results indicate that defectors (i.e. ex-members) may be differently appraised depending on their normative status and group membership. At face value, one might suppose that individuals particularly dislike in-group defectors who, in addition, infringe other relevant group norms. However, our findings suggest that, although group loyalty is, undoubtedly, a relevant prescriptive norm, the reactions triggered by defection depend on the defectors' potential contribution to the positive identity of the group. Defectors seem to be judged according to the extent to which

they may help validating the group's identity. In this vein, those members whom, by defecting, deprive the group of potential positive contributions to identity (i.e. normative ex-members) generate even less favourable evaluations than those whom, by defecting, rid the group's representation from negative instances.

General Discussion and Conclusions

What have we found in Experiments 2 and 3? Our results consistently showed that individuals' judgments of normative and deviant in-group members are more extreme when these members occupy a central status in the group than when occupy a less central position. Full members are expected to provide a frame of reference to other members regarding the group's values and goals. As Levine and Moreland (e.g. 1998) suggest these members should boast the commitment of group members towards the group and towards each other. For the same reason the group should expect the highest commitment from these members. As a result, those full members who comply with this expectation are praised above all other members. Our findings support this idea. They also show that the downside of this process is that full members who adopt a clearly deviant stance in regard of valued prescriptive norms should generate strong negative reactions. In this vein, we believe the present findings can contribute to expand the two models from which our studies were inspired: the group socialization model and the subjective group dynamics model. They show that evaluations of group members strongly depend on these members' intra-group status. This result seems to be a relevant development for the subjective group dynamics model. But our findings also suggest that members' intra-group status does not warrant by itself the acceptance

of a deviant point of view by other members. As a case in point, our findings may illustrate an important process through which full members may start a role transition process that leads them to a more marginal status. Our result may thus contribute to a relevant insight to the group socialization model.

Throughout the present chapter, and preceding chapters, we repeatedly assumed that deviant in-group full members pose a relevant threat to the group. However, we did not directly observe this phenomenon (but cf. Serôdio, 2006). In the next chapter we report one experiment that, while attempting to replicate the preceding results, also attempts to directly test the idea that reactions to deviant in-group full members actually depend on their perceived threat to the group.

CHAPTER V

EFFECT OF TARGETS' SOCIALIZATION STATUS ON PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH IN-GROUP DEVIANCE

In the present chapter, we report one experiment (Experiment 4) that was aimed to test the general idea that reactions to deviance by in-group members depends on the extent to which these members are perceived as threat to the group's image. In Experiments 2 and 3, we showed that individuals react more positively and more negatively, to normative and deviant in-group full members than to other normative and deviant in-group members or to out-group members. Based on the group socialization model's assumptions (Levine & Moreland, 1994), we proposed that this was due to the group's increased reliance on full members as keepers of the group's core beliefs and courses of action. Full members should thus elicit confidence in other group members regarding the group's potential and, ultimately, positive social identity. As a result, these members should elicit more favourable evaluations than other members who hold less relevant intra-group statuses.

The Threatening Character of Deviant In-Group Full Members

The above assumption corresponds to the well-balanced situation in which full members meet, or even, outperform group expectations and behave in accordance with values that are commonly shared among group members. However, one may think of situations in which full members behave in a way inconsistent with the group's expectations and, more specifically, with commonly held values that are viewed by

other members as supports for the group's positive distinctiveness. Due to their representativeness in the group, in these situations, full members can be perceived as more threatening to the group's positive identity than other members with similar behaviour or characteristics. As a result, these members will be judged more negatively than other members who display similar behaviour or characteristics but whose status is less central to the group.

The present experiment was aimed at examining this general idea. We predict that normative in–group full members will generate stronger feelings of confidence than normative new members or normative marginal members. Conversely, deviant in–group full members will generate stronger feelings of threat than deviant new members or deviant marginal members. We further expect these feelings to mediate evaluations of these members.

Strategies to Deal with Deviants

The second idea underlying the present experiment draws directly from the group socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). This model proposes that groups will adopt different socialization strategies towards their members depending on these members status. Such strategies may correspond to direct pressure, which, in the case of psychological groups should emerge in the form of hostile attitudes and negative evaluations (cf. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998; Marques & Serôdio, 2000). But other strategies may be available to group members. For example, according to the group socialization model, new members should have a limited grasp of group norms but their motivation to accept full members' influence will facilitate their learning and assimilation of these norms. Therefore, it seems unlikely that new members who

behave in counter-normative ways be targeted in terms of strongly hostile reactions. Rather, such members will be treated by full members according to group inclusive strategies aimed to teach them the group's normative expectations (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). In turn, full members are supposed to have a good grasp of group norms (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). As a result of the above process, full members that deviated from group norms should be perceived on the basis of an attributional reasoning that tends to interpret their deviance either in terms of contempt, or in terms of an underlying intention to disrespect the group's standards (cf. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001). In this case, other group members might feel hostility towards these members, thus engaging in punitive action towards them (Levine & Moreland, 1994; cf. also Erikson, 1966). This action might include prestige withdrawal or exclusion from the group (Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). In the present experiment, we have attempted to examine the type of strategies that group members may adopt towards deviant members with different intra-group status.

Overview and Hypotheses

Our procedure in the present experiment is similar to the procedure used in experiments 2 and 3. In this experiment, high-school pupils judged in-group or out-group new members, full members, or marginal members issuing from either their in-group or the out-group, one of which adopted a likeable opinion, and the other, an unlikeable opinion. The dependent measures tapped in-group and out-group identification, evaluations of normative and deviant member, perception of the extent

to which the deviant member threatened their group's image, and proposed strategy to deal with deviant member.

Our hypotheses are derived from the reasoning that we presented at the beginning of this chapter. As regards judgments of target members, we expect to find the same pattern of results as in the preceding experiments. More precisely, we expect a black sheep effect and a positive correlation between intra-group differentiation and social identification to emerge from participants' evaluations of target full members, but not of new members and marginal members.

As regards perceived threat, we expect participants to perceive higher threat from deviant in-group full members than from any other deviant members. More importantly, we perceived threat to mediate the association between identification with the in-group and evaluation of deviant in-group full members.

As regards strategies advocated to deal with deviants, we expect participants to advocate punishment strategies regarding in-group full members, and teaching strategies regarding new members. Marginal members should not elicit any of these strategies, because they are experimentally constructed in a way close to the ex-member status.

Method

Participants

Eighty-seven high school pupils from two schools of Porto constitute our sample. There are 34 male participants and 53 female participants. Age ranged from 14 to 19 years old (M = 15.97; SD = 1.03). There are no differences in age ($F5,79 < 1$)

and sex ($\chi 2$ = 5.26, d.f. = 5, *N* = 87, *ns*) across the experimental conditions. Three participants who did not correctly answered manipulation check questions and thirteen participants that were attaining that school for only six months, are not part of this sample.

Experimental Design

The design was a 2 (Group: In-group vs. Out-group) x 3 (Status: New Member vs. Full Member vs. Marginal Member) x 2 (Likeability: Normative vs. Deviant). Group and Status were between-participants factors, whereas Likeability was a within-participant factor.

Procedure

The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 3. As part of the cover-story, we informed participants that the forthcoming debates between pupils of the two (in-group and out-group) schools would be conducted among a limited number of selected pupils and that the participants' function was to help us choose the pupils that should represent each school. Thus, each participant should evaluate two (target) pupils that, supposedly, had already participated in the previous phase of the investigation and were candidates for participation in the debates. This was intended to allow us observe the kind of strategies participants advocated towards deviant targets.

The manipulations of Group, Status, and Likeability were identical to those in Experiment 2, except that we added for the present targets' manipulation their supposed motivation to be representative pupils of their school. Whereas new and full member targets were highly motivated, marginal member targets were not.

Dependent Measures

Dependent measures were similar ton those employed in Experiment 2. Items used to measure social identification were averaged to an In-Group Identification (Cronbach $\alpha = 0.78$) and an Out-Group Identification score (Cronbach $\alpha = 0.84$), and evaluations of target members were averaged to a Likeable Member (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.80$) and to an Unlikable Member (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.83$) score.

Dependent measures additional to those we employed in the preceding studies were (1) the perception of threat by deviant targets and (2) the participants' advocated reaction to deviance strategies.

Perception of Threat by Deviant Member towards the Group. After evaluating the target members, participants answered the following questions about the deviant member: "This pupil would represent a threat if they are included in the team that is going to represent their school"; "This pupil badly influences the public image of their school"; "This pupil is a threat to the positive image of the school" (1 = *I totally disagree*; 7 = *I totally agree*). We averaged the answers to the three questions to a Perceived Threat score (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.77$).

Reaction to Deviance Strategies. Finally, participants stated their willingness to engage in reaction towards the deviant member on six items representative of strategies inspired in Forsyth (1990) that might be used to deal with the deviant member. These strategies were: (1) *Discussion*: "To discuss the issue with the pupil, using rational arguments" (2) *Instruction*: "To inform the pupil about the group's

opinion"; (3) *Persistence*: "To persist and convince the pupil to change opinion"; (4) *Threat*: "To show the pupil the negative effects of maintaining the opinion"; (5) *Depreciation*: "To ascribe less responsibility-demanding tasks to the pupil"; and (6) *Demand*: "To demand the pupil's support to the group opinion". Answers were given on 7-point scales (1 = *I totally disagree*; 7 = *I totally agree*).

Results and Discussion

Social Identification

A Group x Status ANOVA on the in-group identification and out-group identification scores yielded only a significant effect of identification. Participants identified more with the in-group (M = 5.24; SD = 0.86) than with the out-group (M = 3.95; SD = 1.04), $F1,81 = 134.24$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.624$[16].

Evaluation of Target Members

A Group x Status x Likeability ANOVA on the evaluations of likeable and unlikeable targets yielded no significant effects of Group ($F1, 81 = 2.72$, *ns*) and Group x Status ($F2,81 < 1$). Status ($F2,81 = 9.67$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.187$) was significant, and showed that participants evaluated marginal members more negatively targets (M = 4.04; DP = 0.54) than new members (M = 4.55; DP = 0.46; $t56 = 3.90$, $p<.001$) and full members (M = 4.41; DP = 0.38; $t55 = 3.06$, $p=.003$). There were no differences

[16] The remaining results were the following: Group ($F1,81 < 1$); Status ($F2,81 < 1$); Group x Status ($F2,81 < 1$); Group on social identification with the in-group and with the out-group ($F1,81 < 1$); Status on social identification with the in-group and with the out-group ($F2,81 = 2.33$, *ns*); Group x Status social identification with the in-group and with the out-group ($F2,81 = 1.37$, *ns*).

between the evaluations of new members (M = 4.55; DP = 0.46) and full members (M = 4.41; DP = 0.38, t57 = 1.24, *ns*). In addition, the likeable target was more positively evaluated (M = 5.36; SD = 0.75) than the unlikeable target (M = 3.31, SD = 0.86), as indicated by the significant effect of Likeability, $F(1,81) = 295.73$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.785$.

Results also showed a significant Status x Likeability interaction, $F(2,81) = 3.60$, $p = .032$, $\eta 2 = 0.082$. Status significantly affected evaluations of normative targets (F2,84 = 9.80, $p < .001$, $\eta 2 = 0.189$). The normative marginal target (M = 4.90, SD = 0.77) was less positively evaluated than other normative targets (new member: M = 5.54, SD = 0.53, t56 = 3.71, $p<.001$; full member: M = 5.64, SD = 0.73, t55 = 3.71, $p<.001$), and there were no differences between evaluations of the normative new member and the normative full member (t57 < 1). Status did not affect evaluations of deviant targets (*Overall Mean* = 3.31, SD = 0.86; F2,84 = 1.96, *ns*). Group x Likeability was not significant (F1,81 = 2.76, *ns*).

More importantly, the analysis showed a significant Group x Status x Likeability effect (F2,81 = 9.76, $p<.001$, $\eta 2 = 0.194$), see Table 8.

We predicted a black sheep effect to emerge from evaluations of the full member targets, more than other targets. To test this prediction, we broke down the full interaction according to the Status factor. We found a significant Group x Likability interaction in the full member condition (F1,83 = 16.73, $p<.001$, $\eta 2=.162$; effect of Group: F1,83 <1). As predicted, in this condition, evaluations of the normative in-group target were significantly more positive than evaluations of the normative out-group target, $F(1,83) = 8.96$, $p=.004$, $\eta 2=.092$. Simultaneously, the evaluation of the in-group deviant target were significantly more negative than evaluations of the deviant out-group target, $F(1,83) = 9.79$, $p=.002$, $\eta 2=.104$ (see Table 8 and Figure 7).

	Group			
	In-Group		Out-Group	
Status	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
New Member				
Normative Member	5.52	0.58	5.55	0.50
Deviant Member	3.42	0.71	3.69	0.99
Full Member				
Normative Member	6.05	0.70	5.25	0.53
Deviant Member	2.69	0.73	3.66	0.79
Marginal Member				
Normative Member	4.54	0.74	5.21	0.67
Deviant Member	3.25	0.89	3.11	0.69

Table 8. Evaluation of Normative and Deviant Members by Status and Group (Experiment4)

The Group x Likeability interaction was not significant in the new member condition ($F1,83 < 1$; effect of Group: $F1,83 <1$), but it was marginally significant in the marginal member condition ($F1,83 = 3.13$, $p=.08$, $\eta 2=.030$; effect of Group: $F1,83 = 1.29$, *ns*). In this latter condition, participants evaluated normative marginal members of the in-group less positively than normative marginal members of the out-group, $F1,83 = 5.08$, $p=.027$, $\eta 2=.052$. However, no differences emerged from evaluations of deviant targets, $F1,83 < 1$; see Table 8 and Figure 7).

A related prediction was that the normative in-group full member and the deviant in-group full member would be, respectively, more positively, and more negatively evaluated than other in-group targets. However, this should not happen with out-group targets. To test this prediction, we broke down the three-way interaction according to the Group factor. We obtained a significant Status x Likeability interaction in the in-group condition, $F2,82 = 11.91$, $p<.001$, $\eta 2=.222$ (effect of Status within the in-group condition: $F2,82 = 5.63$, $p=.005$, $\eta 2=.111$). This interaction was not significant in the out-group condition, $F2,82 < 1$ (effect of Status within the out-group condition: $F2,82 = 3.93$, $p=.023$, $\eta 2=.078$).



Figure 7. Evaluation of normative and deviant members as a function of group and socialization (Experiment4).

In the in-group condition, we observed significant differences between normative targets ($F2,82 = 20.71$, $p<.000$, $\eta 2=.328$). As predicted, evaluations of the

normative full member were significantly more positive than evaluations of the normative new member, and these latter evaluations were significantly more positive than evaluations of the normative marginal member (t always > 2.67, p always <.013 between conditions[17]; see Table 8 and Figure 7).

We also found a significant effect of Status in evaluations of deviant targets within the in-group (F2,82 = 2.98, p=.056, η2=.064). The deviant full member was less positively evaluated than the deviant new member was (t26 = 2.18, p=.038), and than the deviant marginal member (t25 = 1.79, p=.085). There were no differences between evaluations of deviant new and marginal members (t25 < 1).

In brief, the present results support our predictions regarding the black sheep effect. This effect emerged in the full member condition but not in the other status conditions. Moreover, participants significantly upgraded the normative in-group full member and derogated the deviant in-group full member as compared, respectively, to the other in-group normative and in-group deviant targets.

Correlation between In-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation

As in Experiment 2, we expected in-group identification to be positively correlated with intra-group differentiation, especially in the in-group full member condition. To check for this prediction, we correlated the in-group identification score with the intra-group differentiation score in each condition. In partial consistency with our hypothesis, the correlation between in-group identification and intra-group differentiation was marginally significant in the in-group full member condition (r = .52, p=.058), see Table 9.

[17] Difference between evaluations of normative new members and normative full members (t26 = 2.18, p=.038); normative new members and normative marginal members (t25 = 3.86, p=.001); normative full members and normative marginal members (t25 = 5.48, p<.001)

	In-Group Condition		Out-Group Condition	
	r In-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* Out-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* In-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation	*r* Out-Group Identification – Intra-Group Differentiation
New	.05, *ns*	.54, *p=.048*	.16, *ns*	.26, *ns*
	(*N* = 14)	(*N* = 14)	(*N* = 16)	(*N* = 16)
Full	.52, p=.058	.00, *ns*	.02, *ns*	-.54, *p*=.039
	(*N* = 14)	(*N* = 14)	(*N* = 15)	(*N* = 15)
Marginal	.10, *ns*	-.37, *ns*	.29, *ns*	.06, *ns*
	(*N* = 13)	(*N* = 13)	(*N* = 15)	(*N* = 15)
Total	.25, *ns*	.06, *ns*	.08, *ns*	-.05, *ns*
	(*N* = 41)	(*N* = 41)	(*N* = 46)	(*N* = 46)

Table 9. Product-Moment Correlations between In-Group Identification or Out-Group Identification and Intra-Group Differentiation across Experimental Conditions, and In-Group and Out-Group Conditions (Experiment 4).

The more participants identified with the in-group, the more they upgraded the normative in-group full member while derogating the deviant in-group full member. No other meaningful correlations emerged from the in-group condition. Interestingly, and consistent with findings in Experiment 2, we found a negative correlation (r = -.54, p=.039) between out-group identification and differentiation between normative and deviant out-group full member targets. The more participants identified with the

out-group, the less they differentiated between these two targets. We have no aprioristic explanation for this latter correlation. However, the opposite correlation patterns in the in-group and the out-group condition suggest that participants followed different criteria in judging in-group and out-group full member targets. Contrary to what happens with judgments of out-group full members, differentiation between deviant in-group full members may be a function of the degree to which participants identify with the in-group.

Perceived Threat by Deviant Targets

We predicted that deviant in-group full member target would evoke stronger perceptions of threat than every other target. To test this hypothesis, we ran a Group x Status ANOVA on perceptions of threat. The results are consistent with other research (cf. Serôdio, 2006), but are only partially consistent with our hypothesis. Indeed, we found a significant effect of Group ($F1,81 = 5.14$, $p=.026$, $\eta 2 =0.250$), but no significant effects of Status ($F2,81 < 1$) or Group x Status ($F2,81 = 1.62$, *ns*). The Group effect indicates that deviant in-group members ($M = 4.98$, $SD = 1.38$) were perceived as more threatening to the group than deviant out-group members ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.41$).

A more important prediction was that the perception of threat should operate as a mediator between in-group identification and evaluation of deviant in-group full member targets. We found a significant correlation between in-group identification and the evaluation of the deviant full member of the in-group ($r = -.52$, $p= .057$). The correlations between out-group identification and derogation of deviant targets were not significant (r always $< |.18|$, *ns*), except in the out-group full member condition ($r = .54$, $p=.039$).

More importantly, we found a significant correlation between perceived threat and evaluations of the deviant target in the in-group full-member condition, (r = -.57, p = .032; in remaining conditions, r always < .35, *ns*). Thus, in the in-group full member condition, the more participants perceived the deviant target as a threat, the less favourably they evaluated this target.



Figure 8. Mediation in the In-group Full Member Condition

The above results allow us to analyse the predicted mediation. Although the results were marginally significant, they show a pattern consistent with our predictions. We observed that, only for the in-group full members condition (R = .60 (R^2 = .36); F2,11 = 3.09, p=.086)[18], the more participants identified with the in-group the more they perceive these targets as a threat to their group (r = 0.68, p=.008). When we entered perceived threat in the regression equation, the association between

[18] Results obtained in the remaining conditions were not significant: in-group new member condition: R = .24 (R^2 = .06), F2,11 < 1; in-group marginal member condition: R = .37 (R^2 = .14), F2,10 < 1; out-group new member condition: R = .36 (R^2 = .11), F2,13 < 1; out-group full member condition: R = .19 (R^2 = .04), F2,12 < 1; out-group marginal member condition: R = .36 (R^2 = .13), F2,12 <1.

identification with in-group and evaluation of the deviant member was decreased by nearly half of its strength (53.85%), see Figure 8. Thus, derogation of deviant in-group full member targets is a function of in-group identification as mediated by the perceived threat of these targets to the group.

Reaction Strategies

We conducted a principal factor components analysis with varimax rotation on the six items aimed to check for participants' advocated strategies towards the deviant target.

Itens	Factor 1	Factor 2
Discussing using rational arguments	**.83**	-.16
Informing group's opinion	**.61**	.46
Persisting and convincing to change opinion	**.66**	.20
Showing negative effects of maintaining deviant opinion	.18	**.56**
Ascribing tasks demanding less responsibility	.25	**.69**
Demanding support for group opinion	-.23	**.66**

Table 10. Item-Factor Correlations after Varimax Rotation (Experiment 4)

The analysis extracted three factors that account for 52.26% of the total variance. The first factor explains 27.34% of the variance and the second factor explains 24.92% of the variance.

These factors seem consistent with the type of strategies we have proposed to analyse. Specifically, the first factor seems to correspond to teaching strategies, whereas the second factor seems to correspond to punishment strategies. We thus used Factor 1 and Factor 2 as Teaching and Punishment scores (see Table 10).

	Group	
	In-Group	Out-Group
New Member		
Teaching Strategies	-.67, .009, (*N*=14)	-.18, ns, (*N*=16)
Punishment Strategies	-.27, ns, (*N*=14)	-.20, ns, (*N*=16)
Full Member		
Teaching Strategies	-.16, ns, (*N*=14)	-.49, .074, (*N*=15)
Punishment Strategies	-.50, .080, (*N*=14)	-.14, ns, (*N*=15)
Marginal Member		
Teaching Strategies	.09, ns, (*N*=13)	-.36, ns, (*N*=15)
Punishment Strategies	.03, ns, (*N*=13)	-.25, ns, (*N*=15)

Table 11. Product-Moment Correlation between Evaluation of Deviant Target and Teaching and Punishment Strategies across Conditions (Experiment4)

We correlated the teaching and punishment scores with evaluations of the deviant target in each experimental condition (see Table 11).

These correlations indicate that participants associated teaching strategies to the evaluation of deviant new members of the in-group (r = -.67, p=.009) and, to a lesser

extent, to deviant full members of the out-group (r = -.49, p=.074). Punishment strategies were associated only to evaluations of deviant full members of the in-group (r = -.50, p=.08), see Table 11. In the out-group, the pattern is less consistent, as shown by the generally weaker correlations.

These results are consistent with our predictions: the more negative is the evaluation of deviant new members of the in-group, the more group members are willing to engage in socialization (teaching) strategies. The more group members consider a full member's behaviour as deviant (negative), the more they are willing to engage in punishment strategies. However, in line with our reasoning, teaching applies more to new members, whereas punishment applies more to full members.

General Discussion and Conclusions

The present results are consistent with those obtained in the preceding two experiments. The black sheep effect emerged only from evaluations of full member targets. Normative in-group full members were more appreciated than any other member. Deviant in-group full members were more derogated than any other member.

In addition, this strong upgrading of normative in-group full members and derogation of deviant in-group full members is associated with social identification. The more participants identified with the in-group, the more strongly they differentiated between these members. Although this result is not conclusive, the evidence also suggests that the effect of in-group identification on the derogation of deviant in-group full members may be mediated by the extent to which these members are perceived as a threat to the in-group.

Finally, we observed that, whereas deviant in-group new members generally evoke socialization strategies that are aimed at informing these members about the group's norm, deviant full members mainly evoke punishment strategies.

In the whole, these results support our general assumptions. Consistent with the results of the preceding experiments, the most representative members of the group are those that evoke more extreme reactions near other group members

Our results are consistent with the subjective group dynamics approach (Marques & Páez, 1994; Abrams et al, 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001; Serôdio, in preparation). Indeed, deviance adopted by a member that is expected to represent and validate the group standards, was perceived as a threat to the individuals' beliefs on a positive social identity. Consequently, group members were willing to engage in punitive strategies towards these members. These results are consistent with the idea that through derogating and punishing the deviant in-group member, individuals are subjectively legitimizing the value of the violated norm and, hence, their beliefs on a positive social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

Our results also seem consistent with the group socialization model (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1994). Indeed, and based on Levine and colleagues (2005) assumptions, because new members lack some important information about the group, they are supposed to evoke inclusive strategies from other group members, in order to learn group norms. The willingness to apply teaching strategies to deviant new members is consistent with this idea (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005).

In contrast, since full members have already assimilated group norms, the strategies that deviant in-group full members obtained should not have the same

aiming as those directed to deviant new members. Group members showed intention to engage in punishment strategies toward deviant in-group full members. This punitive character of these strategies (namely the suppression of some responsibilities in respect to group tasks) is in line with the goals of a re-socialization phase (e.g. Moreland & Levine, 1982) and to the idea (that we approached in the conclusion of the previous chapter) of an initialization of a role transition process from full to marginal member status.

Also relevant to the subjective group dynamics model (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) and to the group socialization model as well (e.g. Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), members that state an intention to transgress group loyalty norm but that contribute to the legitimization of the group standards, were slightly derogated (more precisely, they were less positively appraised that all other normative members). This idea suggests that these members are considered as potential positive contributors to the validation of the in-group standards, but are personally stating that the group is not able to keep them as members. Therefore, these members may be perceived as future contributors to a negative public image of the group.

CHAPTER VI

IMPLICATIONS OF DEVIANCE IN GROUPS AND IN SOCIETY

In this thesis, we attempted a theoretical and empirical articulation between Levine and colleagues' group socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994) and Marques and colleagues' subjective group dynamics model (e.g. Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998). The former model is directly inspired on the tradition of study of groups as social units composed by restricted numbers of individuals who interact with each other, and who share similar beliefs and goals. The latter model is ingrained in the tradition of study of large social categories, as collective or individual representations of the characteristics that define a large number of individuals that share the same identity. Although, from this idea, one might infer that the two models are directed at different psychological and social realities, we hope to have demonstrated that this is not true. On the one hand, the group socialization model can extend its analysis to the kind of reality that corresponds to processes associated to representations of social categories, and the subjective group dynamics model can extend its analysis to processes associated to social interaction in face-to-face groups. On the other hand, the integration of the two models can provide a better understanding of these processes.

Based on these two models, we argued that individuals strive to achieve and to maintain a positive in-group identity, but that this identity is, to a large extent, dependent on intra-group differentiations. These intra-group differentiations are of two kinds. One such kind of intra-group differentiation deals with individuals' status in the group. This applies both to the status of those that judge and to the status of the targets of judgment. The other kind of intra-group differentiation deals with the prescriptive

aspects of behaviour of group members. We argued that intra-group status is associated with the levels of knowledge of group standards and of commitment to the group that members have and expect from others. This knowledge and expectations should determine the impact of behaviour or characteristics of group members on the sustenance of a positive social identity. Specifically deviant (i.e. undesirable) behaviour adopted by members who are expected to show stronger commitment to, and are viewed as more representative of, the group should be interpreted as a threat to social identity, and, as such, should evoke punitive reactions from other members.

We attempted to demonstrate these ideas in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we showed that likeable in-group members and unlikeable in-group members were significantly upgraded and derogated, respectively, as compared to similar out-group members, but that this was not the case when participants did not know what the group's position was in light of the dimension of likeability. In Experiment 2, we found that likeable in-group members and unlikeable in-group members were significantly upgraded and derogated, respectively, as compared to similar out-group members, but that this was the case only when these members were viewed as occupying a full member status in the groups. In addition, these members were upgraded or derogated, respectively, as compared to their in-group counterparts that occupied new member and marginal member status. We also find that this process is directly correlated with the extent to which perceivers identify with the in-group. In Experiment 3, we found similar results. In addition, we found that normative ex-members of the in-group were judged less favourably than all other normative individuals, even those who belong to the out-group. Finally, in Experiment 4, we observed that derogation of deviant in-group full members actually ensues from the

perception of their threatening character to the individuals' social identity and actually correspond to a punishment, as opposed to informational strategy.

Overall, these results are consistent with the assumptions of the subjective group dynamics model (e.g. Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001) and the group socialization model (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994). Namely, our results seem consistent with the idea that because full member are the closest members to the group's prototype (Levine & Moreland, 1994), they also are those members that most contribute to the clarity of inter-group differentiation (Turner et al, 1987), to the validation of normative system (Festinger, 1950; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), and to the attainment of group goals (Festinger, 1950; Levine & Moreland, 1994). Consequently, we can say that in-group full members play a special role in establishing the perceived legitimacy of a positive social identity, or, conversely, in threatening such legitimacy (Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001).

The general pattern of results supports claims by Marques and colleagues (e.g. Marques et al., 1998; Marques, Abrams & Serôdio, 2001) according to which self-categorization processes do not simply involve the cognitive construction of inter-group settings in terms of clear-cut inter-group differences. Indeed, such inter-group settings may, simultaneously involve inter-group distinctiveness and prescriptive differentiation between in-group members according to their contribution to such distinctiveness. Actually, in Experiment 3, we found indirect support to the idea that differentiation between likable and unlikable in-group full members may sustain positive in-group differentiation, as shown by the positive correlation of differentiation between these members and in-group bias. Unfortunately, our data did not allow a direct test of this conjecture. However, the data are in line with this idea and with previous research on subjective group dynamics (Marques et al., 1998).

Our results also support Levine and colleagues' contention (e.g. Levine & Moreland, 1994) that full members' behaviour is more significant to other members because the latter view the former as the foundation of the group's image and goals. This may explain why, contrary to full members, new members, marginal members, and ex-members do not trigger such hostile reactions. On the contrary, the latter members, namely new members, trigger informational, more than punishment strategies. This is in line with the group socialization model's assumption that individuals will attempt to increase commitment of in-group members that hold peripheral statuses within the group (specifically, new members and marginal members) (Levine, Moreland & Hausmann, 2005). Concomitantly, the fact that normative in-group marginal members and normative in-group ex-members were less positively evaluated than normative in-group full members may reflect participants' motivation to restate their commitment to the norm of loyalty toward the group. This idea is consistent with Zdaniuk and Levine's (2001) assumptions about the prescriptive character of loyalty to the group (cf. also Levine & Thompson, 1996).

In brief, if the subjective group dynamics model has neglected the impact of intra-group status on the consequences of group members' adoption of a prescriptive focus in the judgment of deviants, the socialization model has neglected the larger inter-group context in which such prescriptive focus emerges. The evidence reported in this work seems to demonstrate that the two models may complement each other by allowing one to account simultaneously for both of these factors.

Problems and Questions for Future Research

We are well aware of the fact that our research raised more questions than it answered. Among such questions, three are of particular interest to us. The first question deals with the way in which the reactions to deviance we observed may contribute to the socialization process proposed by Levine and colleagues' model. Assuming that new members are motivated to learn group norms and to behave in accordance to normative expectations, we may expect these members to be focused on behaviour and characteristics of full members (cf. Fiske & Depret, 1986) Thus, punishment of deviant in-group full members should be a striking opportunity for the learning of group norms by new members. In this vein, whereas the emergence of deviance by the former members may be viewed as disruptive to the group, it may nevertheless contribute to the group's cohesiveness and uniformity. This idea is in line with theoretical work by sociologists like Becker (1963) and Erikson (1966; cf. also Durkheim, 1930/1998). According to these authors, if the public punishment of deviant acts allows new members to perceive that this specific behaviour is not tolerated (cf. also Marques & Serôdio, 2000), as a result, punishment of deviants and, specifically of those deviants that ought to behave according to the society's rules should be particularly informative.

A second question for research deals with the distinction between inclusive and exclusive reactions towards deviants and their functions. Following Levine, Moreland and Hausmann (2005), we may suppose that derogatory reactions to in-group deviants are exclusive reactions. In turn, following Marques and Páez's ideas (1994; Marques, Abrams, Páez & Hogg, 2001), punitive reactions to in-group deviants ensue from the fact that these deviants cannot, by definition, be expelled from the group, that is, they

cannot be re-constructed as out-group members (cf. also Serôdio, 2006). In addition, it would be interesting to know if derogation of in-group deviants actually stands for a downgrading process in terms of these deviants' status in the group. As a case in point, we may establish a parallel between this process and Lemert's (1964) classical distinction between primary and secondary forms of deviance in the realm of the sociology of deviance. According to this author, primary deviance concerns deviant behaviour that becomes accepted by the group. Generally, primary deviance has no consequences to the perpetrator's intra-group status, because other members interpret this behaviour as being occasional. In turn, secondary deviance is associated with the perceived personal dispositions of the deviants (cf. also Orcutt, 1973). As a result, we may expect groups to direct inclusive strategies to deviant behaviour that is perceived as occasional and exclusive strategies to deviant behaviour that is perceived as intentional (cf. Levine, 1980).

The third question deals with the process through which some group members entered a marginal status. Indeed, following the assumptions of the group socialization model, we can conceive of two types of marginal members. On the one hand, some group members may occupy a marginal status because they decreased their commitment to the group. On the other hand, there may be individuals whose marginal status was determined by the group's lack of commitment towards them. Deviant behaviour adopted by each type of marginal members should evoke different reactions by the group. In the case in which the marginal status is due to a decrease in the level of commitment of the individual to the group but that this decrease was not accompanied by a decrease in the level of commitment of the group to the individual, the marginal member might still be perceived as a potential contributor to the group's social identity. This would not be the case if the group's commitment to the individual

decreased. As a result, we should expect the group to engage in strategies aiming to keep these members within the group. Specifically, the former members should trigger inclusive strategies aimed at reinforcing their commitment to the group. The latter type of member would trigger an exclusive reaction aimed at clarifying the group's boundaries and, possible, positive in-group distinctiveness.

To conclude, with this work, we hope to have contributed for the clarification of deviance as an important group process. We believe that, in integrating the two models that fostered this work, we hope to have been able to show the relevance of an approach to deviance that is simultaneously based on the intra-group and inter-group contexts in which it emerges. We see this work more as the beginning than as the end of a research process, and we hope to have proposed some heuristic avenues for future research.

REFERENCES

Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., Hutchison, P., & Viki, T. (2005). When bad becomes good (and vice-versa): Why social exclusion is not based on difference. In D. Abrams, M. Hogg & J. Marques (Eds.), *The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion* (pp. 161-190). New York: Psychology Press.

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2004). Metatheory: Lessons from social identity research. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8,* 2, 98-106.

Abrams, D., Marques, J. M., Randsley de Moura, G., Hutchison, P., & Bown, N. J. (2004). The maintenance of entitativity: A subjective group dynamics approach. In V. Y. Yzerbyt, C. M. Judd & O. Corneille (Eds.), *The psychology of group perception: Contributions to the study of homogeneity, entitativity, and essentialism*. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Abrams, D. (1994). Social self-regulation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*, 5, 473-483.

Abrams, D. (1990). How do group members regulate their behaviour? An integration of social identity and self-awareness theories. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances (*pp.89-112). New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1990). An introduction to the social identity approach. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances* (pp. 1-9). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Abrams, D., Wetherell, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1990). Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity and group polarization. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 97-119.

Archer, D. (1985). Social deviance. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of Social psychology* (vol. II, pp. 743-804). New York: Random House/ Erlbaum.

Asch, S. E. (1987). *Social Psychology*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Asch, S. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. *Scientific American, 193,* 5, 31-35.

Asch, S. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. In H. Guetznow (Ed.), *Groups, leadership and men* (pp.177-190). Pittsburgh, US: Carnegie Press.

Becker, H. S. (Ed.) 1964. *The other side: Perspectives on deviance.* New York: Free Press.

Becker, H. S. (1963). *Outsiders: Étude de la sociologie de la déviance*. Paris: Métaillé.

Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 3*, 27-52.

Böhner, G., & Wänke, M. (2002). *Attitudes and attitude change*. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press.

Branscombe, N. R. (2004). A social psychology perspective on collective guilt. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 320-334). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N. R., Wann, D. L., & Noel, J. G. (1994). In-group or out-group extremity: Importance of the threatened social identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19*, 381-388.

Brewer, M.B., & Brown, R. (1998) Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (vol. 2, pp. 554-594). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Brewer, MB (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin, 86*, 307-324.

Cartwright, D. (1968). The nature of group cohesiveness. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Research and Theory* (pp. 91-109). New York: Harper & Row.

Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (Eds.) (1968). *Group dynamics: Research and Theory* (pp. 3-62). New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row.

Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert; S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed.) (pp. 151-192). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Cialdini, R. B. (1996). Social influence and the triple tumor structure of organizational dishonesty. In D.M. Messick & A.E. Tenbrunsel (Eds.), *Codes of conduct*, (pp. 44-58). New York: SAGE.

Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, 201-234.

Coser, L. (1962). Some functions of deviant behaviour and normative flexibility. *American Journal of Sociology*, 68, 2, 172-181.

Crisp, R., & Hewstone, M. (2001). Multiple categorization and implicit intergroup bias: Differential category dominance and the positive-negative asymmetry effect. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *31*, 1, 45-62.

DeLamater, J. (1968). On the nature of deviance. *Social Forces, 46*, 4, 445-455.

Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51 (3), November, 629-636.

Doise, W., Deschamps, J.-C., & Meyer, G. (1978). The accentuation of intra-category similarities. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 159-169) London: Academic Press.

Durkheim, E. (1930/1998). *De la division du travail social*. Paris : PUF.

Durkheim, E. (1915). *The elementary forms of religious life*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Durkheim, E. (1897). *Le suicide: Étude de sociologie*. Electronic edition: http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/suicide/suicide.html.

Duyckaerts, F. (1966). *A noção de normal em psicologia clínica*. São Paulo: Herder.

Earle, W. B. (1986). The social context of social comparison: Reality versus reassurance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *12*, 2, 159-168.

Ellemers, N., Van Knippenberg, De Vries, N., & Wilke, H. (1988). Social identification and permeability of group boundaries. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 497-513.

Emler, N., & Reicher, S. (1995). *Adolescence and delinquency*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Erikson, K. (1964). Deviance and its place in society. In H. Becker (Ed.), *Perspectives on deviance: The other side*. New York: The Free Press.

Erikson, K. (1966). *Wayward puritans*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations, 7*, 117-140.

Festinger, L., & Thibaut, J. (1951). Interpersonal communication in small groups. *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 46*, 92-99.

Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. *Psychological Review, 6*, 271-282.

Festinger, L., Schachter, S., & Back, K. (1950). *Social pressures in informal groups*. New York: Harper.

Fiske, S. T., Depret, E. (1996). Control, interdependence and power: Understanding social cognition in its social context. *European Review of Social Psychology, 7,* 31-61.

Forsyth, D. (1990). *Group Dynamics*. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/ Cole Publishing Company.

French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1968). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Research and Theory* (pp. 259-269). New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row.

Foucault, M. (1975). *Surveilller et punir: Naissance de la prison*. Paris : Gallimard.

Gibbs, J. (1992). The sociology of deviance and social control. In M. Rosenberg & R. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives* (pp. 483-522). New Brunswick, London: Transaction.

Gibbs, J. (1977). Social control, deterrence, and perspectives on social order. *Social Forces, 56*, 2, 408-423.

Gibbs, J., & Erikson, M. (1975). Major developments in the sociological study of deviance. *Annual Review of Sociology, 1*, 21-42.

Gibbs, J. (1965). Norms: The problem of definition and classification. *American Journal of Sociology, 70*, 5, 586-594.

Hains, S. C., Hogg, M. A., & Duck, J. M. (1997). Self-categorization and leadership: effects of group prototypicality and leader stereotypicality. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *23*, 1087-1100.

Hamilton, D. L., Sherman, S. J. and Lickel, B. (1998). Perceiving social groups: The importance of the entitativity continuum. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler and C. A. Insko (Eds.), *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior* (pp. 47-74). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hamilton, V. L., & Rauma, D. (1995). Social psychology of deviance and law. In K. Cook; G. Fine & J. House (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Haslam, S. A., Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & McGarty, C. (1996). Social identity, self-categorization and perceived homogeneity of ingroups and outgroups: The interaction between social motivation and cognition. In M. Sorrentino & E. Higgins (Eds.), *Motivation & cognition, vol.3*. New York, London: The Guilford Press.

Hogg, M. A., Fielding, K. S., & Darley, J. (2005). Fringe dwellers: Processes of deviance and marginalization in groups. In D. Abrams; M. Hogg & J. Marques (Eds.), *The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion*. New York, Hove: Psychology Press.

Hogg, M. A. (2004). The social identity approach. In S. A. Wheelan (Ed.), *The handbook of group research and practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Hogg, M. A. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5,* 184-200.

Hogg, M. A. (2000). Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behaviour. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), *Social categorization and group behaviour*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Hogg, M. A., & Hains, S. C. (1996). Intergroup relations and group solidarity: Effects of group identification and social beliefs on depersonalized attraction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 295-309.

Hogg, M. A. (1993). Group cohesiveness: A critical review and some new directions. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology, 4* (pp. 85-111). New York: Wiley.

Hogg, M., & Abrams, D. (1993). Towards a single-process uncertainty-reduction model of social motivation in groups. In M. A. Hogg & D. Abrams (Eds.), *Group motivation: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 173-190). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hogg, M. A., Cooper-Shaw, L., & Holzworth, D. W. (1993). Group prototipicality and depersonalized attraction in small interactive groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *19*, 4, 452-465.

Hogg, M. A. (1992). *The social psychology of group cohesiveness: From attraction to social identity.* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1990). Social motivation, self-esteem and social identity. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances (pp*. 28-47). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hogg, M. A., & McGarty (1990). Self-categorization and social identity. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances (pp*. 10-27). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations*. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.

Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C (1985). When liking begets solidarity: An experiment on the role of interpersonal attraction in psychological group formation. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 24,* 267-281.

Hollander, E. P. (1964). *Leaders, groups and influence*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Israel, J. (1956). Self-evaluation and rejection in groups: Three experimental studies and a conceptual outline. Stokholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Jones, E. E., & Gerard, H. B. (1967). *Foundations of social psychology*. New York: Wiley.

Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. *Psychological Review, 93*, 2, 136-153.

Kruglanski, A., Shah, J., Pierro, A., & Mannetti, L. (2002). When similarity breeds content: Need for closure and the allure of homogeneous and self-resembling groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83*, 3, 648-662.

Lauderdale, P. (1976). Deviance and moral boundaries. *American Sociological Review, 41*, 4, 660-676.

Latané, B. and Wolf, S. (1981) The social impact of majorities and minorities, *Psychological Review*, *88*, 438-453

Lemaine, G., Kastersztein, J., & Personnaz, B. (1978). Social differentiation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychological intergroup relations* (pp. 269-300). London: Academic Press.

Lemert, E. (1964). Social structure, social control, and deviation. In M. Clinard (Ed.). *Anomie and deviant behavior*. New York: The Free Press.

Levine, J. M., Moreland, R. L., & Hausmann, L. R. (2005). Managing group composition: Inclusive and exclusive role transitions. In D. Abrams, M. A. Hogg & J. Marques (Eds.), *The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion* (pp. 137-160). New York: Psychology Press.

Levine, J. M., Moreland, R., & Choi, H-S. (2001) Group socialization and newcomer innovation. In M. Hogg & S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. (1998). Small groups. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, e G. Lindzey (Eds.). *The handbook of social psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Levine, J. M., Moreland, R & Ryan, C (1998). Group socialization and intergroup relations. In C. Sedikides; J. Schopler & C. Insko (Eds.), *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior* (pp. 283-308). Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Levine, J. M., & Thompson, L. L. (1998). Conflict in groups. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 745-776). Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Levine, J. M., Bogart, L. M., & Zdaniuk, B. (1996). Impact of anticipated group membership on cognition. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Motivation & cognition* (pp. 531-569). New York, London: The Guilford Press.

Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1994). Group socialization: Theory and research. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.) *European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 5*. New York: Wiley.

Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. (1990). Progress in small group research. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 41, 585-634.

Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1986). Outcome comparisons: consequences for the self and others. In R. Schwarzer (Ed.), *Self-related cognitions in anxiety and motivation*. Hillsdale, New Jersey, London: Erlbaum.

Levine, J. M., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1984). Conformité et obéissance. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), *Psychologie sociale* (pp. 25-50). Paris : P.U.F.

Levine, J. M. (1980). Reaction to opinion deviance in small groups. In P. Paulus (Ed.), *Psychology of group influence* (pp. 375-430). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Major, B., & Eccleston, C. (2005) Stigma and social exclusion. In D. Abrams, M. Hogg & J. Marques (Eds.), *The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion.* New York, Hove: Psychology Press.

Manstead, A. S. (2000). The role of moral norm in the attitude-behavior relation. In D. J. Terry & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Attitudes, behaviour, and social context: the role of norms and group membership* (pp. 11-30). Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Marques, J. M. (in preparation). *Déviance et identité: une perspective psychosociale*. Grenoble, France: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Marques, J. M. (2004). Déviance, normativité et dynamique de groupes subjective. In C. Staerklé & D. Spini (Eds.), *Festschrift in honour of Willem Doise. New Review of Social Psychology, 1-2*, 29-37.

Marques, J., Abrams, D., Páez, D., & Hogg, M. (2001). Social categorisation, social identification, and rejection of deviant group members. In M. A. Hogg e R. S. Tindale (Eds.). *Blackwell handbook of social psychology* (*vol 3*: Group Processes) (pp. 400-424). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Marques, J., Abrams, D., & Serôdio, R. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of in-group deviants when generic norms are undermined. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 3, 436-447.

Marques, J. M., & Serôdio, R. G. (2000). Identité sociale, rejet des déviants et maintien de la cohésion sociale. *In* J.-L. Beauvois, R. V. Joulé & J. M. Monteil (Eds.), *Perspectives cognitives et conduites sociales (Vol. 7)*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Marques, J., Abrams, D., Páez, D., & Taboada, C. (1998). The role of categorization and ingroup norms in judgments of groups and their members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*, 976-988.

Marques, J. M., Páez, D., & Abrams, D. (1998). Social identity and intragroup differentiation as subjective social control. In S. Worchel, J. F. Morales, D. Páez & J.-C. Deschamps (Eds.), *Social Identity: International perspectives* (pp. 124-141). London: SAGE.

Marques, J. M., & Páez, D. (1994). The black sheep effect: social categorisation, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.) *European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 5* (pp. 37-68). New York: Wiley.

Marques, J. M., Robalo, M., &. Rocha, S. A. (1992). Ingroup bias and the black sheep effect: Assessing the impact of cognitive-motivational and informational antecedents of judgemental extremity towards ingroup members. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 22*, 331-352.

Marques, J. M. (1990). The black sheep effect: Outgroup homogeneity as a social comparison process. *In* D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and critical advance*s (pp. 131-151). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Marques, J. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (1988). The black sheep effect: Judgmental extremity towards ingroup members in inter- and intra-group situations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 287-292.

Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J.-Ph. (1988). The black sheep effect : Judgmental extremity towards ingroup members as a function of ingroup identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 1-16.

Mead, G. (1918). The psychology of punitive justice. *The American Journal of Sociology, vol. XXIII, 5*, 577-602.

Miller, D. T., & Prentice, D. A. (1996). The construction of social norms and standards. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: handbook of basic principles* (pp. 799-829). New York, London: The Guilford Press.

Miller, D., Prentice, D., & Lightdale, J. (1994). Asymmetries in attachments to groups and to their members: Distinguishing between common-identity and common-bond groups. Special Issue: The self and the collective. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20*, 5, pp.484-493.

Moreland, R & Levine, J. (2003). Group composition: Explaining similarities and differences among group members. In M. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Psychology* (pp. 367-380). London: SAGE.

Moreland, R., Levine, J., & Wingert, M. (1996). Creating the ideal group: composition effects at work. In E. Witte & J. Davis (Eds.), *Understanding group behavior: Small group processes and interpersonal relations*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Moreland, R. L., Levine, J. M., & Cini, M. A. (1993). Group socialization: The role of commitment. In M. A. Hogg & D. Abrams (Eds.), *Group motivation: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 105-129). Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Moreland, R & Levine, J. (1988). Group dynamics over time: development and socialization in small groups. In J. E. McGrath (Ed.), *The social psychology of time: new perspectives* (pp. 153-181). Newbury Park, London: SAGE.

Moreland, R & Levine, J. (1982). Socialization in small groups: Temporal changes in individual - group relations. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 15, pp. 137-192). New York: Academic Press.

Morris, R. (1956). A typology of norms. *American Sociological Review, 21*, 5, 610-613.

Newcomb, T. M. (1963). Stabilities underlying changes in interpersonal attraction. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 66, 4, 376-386.

Newcomb, T. M. (1956). The prediction of interpersonal attraction. *American Psychologist, 11*, 575-586.

Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1994). *Stereotyping and social reality*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Oakes, P. J., Turner, J. C., & Haslam, S. A. (1991). Perceiving people as group members: The role of fit in the salience of social categorizations. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 30*, 125-144.

Orcutt, J. D. (1973). Societal reaction and the reaction to deviation in small groups. *Social Forces, 52*, 259-267.

Prentice, D. A., Miller, D. T., & Lightdale, J. R. (1994). Asymmetries in attachments to groups and their members: Distinguishing between common-identity and common-bond groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*, 484-493.

Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. Loyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Rosch, E., Mervis, C., Gray, W., Johnson, D., & Boyes-Brahem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. *Cognitive Psychology, 8,* 382-439.

Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. (1975). Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories. *Cognitive Psychology*, *7*, 573-605.

Schachter, S. (1968). Deviation, rejection, and communication. In D. Cartwright, & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics: Research and Theory* (pp. 165-181). New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row.

Serôdio, R. G. (2006). C*auses and consequences of reactions do deviants: A subjective group dynamics approach.* Doctoral Thesis. Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences. Porto: University of Porto.

Shaw, M. E. (1976). *Group dynamics: The psychology of small group behaviour*. New York: McGraw Hill Inc.

Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms. New York, London: Harper & Brothers.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In S. Austin & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago. Il: NelsonHall.

Tajfel, H. (1984). Intergroup relations, social myths and social justice in social psychology. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The social dimension, vol 1*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1-39.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-47). Monterey, US: Brooks Cole.

Tajfel, H. (1978). *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 27-100). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1972). La categorisation sociale. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), *Introduction à la psychologie sociale* (pp. 272-302). Paris: Larousse.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 1*, 149-178.

Tajfel, H. (1969) Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues, 25*, 4, pp. 79-97.

Tajfel, H., & Wilkes, A. L. (1963). Classification and quantitative judgement. *British Journal of Psychology*, *54,* 2, 101-114.

Terry, D. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2001). Attitudes, behaviour, and social context: The role of norms and group membership in social influence processes. In J. P. Forgas & K. D. Williams (Eds.), *Social influence: Direct and indirect processes*. The Sidney Symposium of Social Psychology. Psychology Press.

Terry, D. J., Hogg, M. A., & White, K. M. (2000). Attitude-behavior relations: social identity and group membership. In D. J. Terry & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Attitudes, behaviour, and social context: The role of norms and group membership* (pp. 67-93). Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum.

Terry, D. J., & Hogg, M. A. (1996). Group norms and the attitude-behavior relationship: a role for group identification. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22*, 8, 776-793.

Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959/ 1986). *The social psychology of groups* (2nd edition). New Brunswick, London: Transaction.

Turner, J. C., & Bourhis, R. Y. (1996). Social identity, interdependence and the social group: A reply to Rabbie et al. In W. P. Robinson (Ed.) *Developing the legacy of Henri Tajfel (pp*. 25-63). Bodmin, UK: Butterworth Heinemann.

Turner, J. C. (1991). *Social influence*. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.

Turner, J. C. ; Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory.* Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Turner, J. C. (1984). Social identification and psychological group formation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The social dimension: European developments in social psychology.* (vol 2, pp. 518-536). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Turner, J. C. (1981). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. *Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 1*, 93-118.

Turner, J. C. (1978). Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations. London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C., & Brown, R. (1978). Social status, cognitive alternatives and intergroup relations. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 5-34.

Wilder, D., & Simon, A. F. (1998). Categorical and dynamic groups: Implications for social perception and intergroup behavior. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, & C. A. Insko (Eds.), *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior* (pp. 27-44). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Williams, K. D. (2001). *Ostracism: The power of silence*. New York: Guilford.

Zdaniuk, B., & Levine, J. (2001). Group loyalty: Impact of members' identification and contributions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *37*, 502-509.